For more than two decades, European energy policy has pursued three ambitions simultaneously: affordable energy, strategic autonomy and decarbonization. Individually, each objective appears rational and politically defensible. Collectively, however, they have often proven difficult to reconcile. The history of European energy policy since the early 2000s can therefore be read as a succession of paradoxes in which the solution to one problem repeatedly created another. The debate surrounding Russian gas, LNG imports, storage targets and new transport corridors is not merely an energy discussion. It is the latest chapter in a longer story in which Europe continuously exchanged one vulnerability for another while pursuing security, competitiveness and sustainability.
The six paradoxes examined below illustrate how cheap energy generated strategic vulnerability, how diversification produced new dependencies, how decarbonization encouraged further gas investments, how geopolitical ambitions surrounding transport corridors often exceeded market realities, how physical security gradually overshadowed economic affordability and, finally, how Europe largely solved the problem of supply availability only to become increasingly exposed to global LNG pricing and competition from Asia.
Competitiveness Created Vulnerability
At the beginning of the century, Europe appeared to have found an elegant solution to one of its permanent challenges. Russian pipeline gas provided abundant and relatively inexpensive energy, allowing European industry to maintain competitiveness in a global economy increasingly challenged by lower-cost producers. Germany, Italy and several Central European economies built important industrial advantages upon this foundation. Energy interdependence was widely viewed as mutually beneficial. Commercial logic suggested that stable trade relationships would reinforce political stability and economic prosperity for both sides.
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The strategy achieved its immediate objectives. Energy remained affordable, industry prospered and Europe enjoyed a long period of relative supply security. Yet the success of the model contained the seeds of its own weakness. As Russian gas gradually approached 45% of European gas imports, efficiency turned into concentration and concentration evolved into vulnerability. What initially appeared as an economic strength eventually became a geopolitical liability. Europe discovered that energy dependence accumulated quietly over decades but became visible only in periods of crisis. The paradox was striking: the very mechanism that strengthened European competitiveness ultimately reduced European strategic flexibility.
Escaping One Dependence Created Another
Europe’s response after 2022 was rapid. New LNG terminals were commissioned, alternative supply routes developed and relationships with new suppliers strengthened. Russian volumes were progressively replaced by imports from Norway, the United States, Algeria, Qatar and Azerbaijan. From a security perspective, diversification unquestionably improved resilience. No single supplier could again exercise the influence once enjoyed by Russia. Yet dependence itself did not disappear. It simply changed its geography and its political character. At the same time, another factor often receives less attention. While Europe was diversifying its external suppliers, it was simultaneously reducing its willingness to develop new domestic oil and gas resources. Particularly after 2019, the political and financial environment became increasingly unfavorable to hydrocarbon exploration and production across much of the Union. As a result, diversification often meant replacing one imported molecule with another rather than reducing the overall need for imported molecules.
This evolution raises a broader question. If Europe reduced its dependence on Russia while continuing to constrain domestic production, where exactly did that dependence migrate? The answer reveals one of the most interesting dimensions of the new energy landscape and highlights how diversification can sometimes modify a dependency without fully eliminating it.
By 2025, the European Union imported a record volume of LNG, of which the United States supplied approximately 58%, equivalent to roughly 84 bcm and close to one quarter of European gas consumption. While this situation is not comparable to the former Russian dominance of the European pipeline network, it nevertheless illustrates how the center of gravity of Europe’s external energy relationships has shifted across the Atlantic.
The observation becomes even more interesting when viewed beyond energy. The transatlantic relationship increasingly encompasses energy supplies, security guarantees, advanced technologies and military cooperation. Europe purchases growing quantities of American LNG while simultaneously reinforcing NATO cooperation and supporting Ukraine through defence frameworks in which American systems play a central role. This is not an argument against the Atlantic alliance. It is simply a recognition that dependence has not disappeared. It has become broader, more diversified and politically more comfortable. Europe sought strategic autonomy yet emerged more deeply embedded within another strategic ecosystem.
A Lower-Gas Future Requires More Gas Infrastructure
One of the most intriguing contradictions of contemporary European policy lies in the coexistence of two apparently opposing narratives. On the one hand, European institutions continue to project a long-term decline in natural gas consumption as renewable energy, electrification, efficiency improvements and storage technologies progressively transform the energy system. On the other hand, billions of euros continue to be mobilized for LNG terminals, regasification facilities, storage sites, interconnections and import infrastructure. Europe is therefore pursuing two objectives simultaneously: preparing for a lower-gas future while investing heavily in assets designed to facilitate the movement and import of gas.
The contradiction does not necessarily invalidate either objective. Diversification remains necessary as long as gas continues to play a significant role in the energy mix. Yet it raises an uncomfortable question. If gas demand is expected to decline structurally over the coming decades, how much new gas infrastructure will ultimately be required? The challenge is therefore not technical but strategic. Europe must determine whether today’s investments are designed for tomorrow’s energy system or primarily for managing today’s geopolitical uncertainties.
Geopolitics Meets Market Reality
The Vertical Corridor illustrates how strategic ambitions and commercial realities do not always evolve in parallel. Greece expects the project to strengthen its role as an energy gateway linking the Mediterranean with Southeastern and Central Europe, while supporters view the corridor as an additional instrument of diversification following the reduction of Russian gas imports. The geopolitical logic is understandable. More routes create greater flexibility, additional optionality and reduced exposure to supply disruptions.
However, infrastructure ultimately follows economics rather than political narratives. Current demand across much of the Balkans remains relatively modest, estimated at roughly 3.5 bcm annually. Transforming the corridor into a major regional artery would require substantial investments in compressors, storage facilities, reverse-flow capabilities and network reinforcements. At the same time, Europe faces competing priorities requiring enormous capital commitments, particularly electricity grid modernization, renewable integration, industrial electrification and storage technologies.
The challenge is particularly acute for Greece and most Balkan countries, whose fiscal capacities remain constrained. Romania presents a different picture. Already producing approximately 11 bcm annually, it could significantly strengthen its regional role once the Neptun Deep development enters production, assuming no major regulatory, commercial or legal delays. In such a scenario, Romania may emerge not merely as a transit country but as one of Southeastern Europe’s most important gas producers.
The broader lesson extends beyond the Balkans. Markets rarely evolve exactly as policymakers expect. Infrastructure justified by geopolitical concerns can become commercially underutilized, while projects initially regarded as secondary may later become indispensable. The future of the Vertical Corridor will therefore depend less on political declarations and more on demand, pricing, financing and the evolving balance between regional production and imported gas.
Physical Security and Economic Security Are Not the Same
No aspect of the current debate illustrates Europe’s changing priorities more clearly than the emphasis placed on storage. Every year policymakers celebrate the achievement of storage targets, treating high filling rates as evidence of resilience and preparedness. From a security perspective, this approach is understandable. Greater storage reduces vulnerability to supply disruptions and strengthens emergency preparedness.
Yet storage volumes reveal little about competitiveness. A storage facility filled at €25/MWh and another filled at €60/MWh or even €100/MWh during periods of stress provide identical physical security. What differs is the economic burden carried by consumers, households and especially industry.
This distinction is becoming increasingly important. Manufacturers do not consume storage percentages. They consume energy at market prices. Industrial investment decisions, export competitiveness and long-term economic performance depend less on storage volumes than on acquisition costs. The political focus on physical security therefore risks overshadowing an equally important dimension of energy policy: affordability. Europe may possess secure supplies while simultaneously eroding industrial competitiveness through persistently high energy costs.
The LNG Trap
All previous paradoxes ultimately converge into a final and more consequential one. Before 2022, the principal concern was supply security. Would sufficient gas be available? Could deliveries be interrupted? Were supply routes sufficiently diversified?
Today the answers are largely positive. Gas is available. It can arrive from Norway, the United States, Algeria, Qatar, Azerbaijan and potentially the Eastern Mediterranean. Europe has diversified suppliers, expanded LNG capacity and reinforced storage resilience. The availability question has been substantially addressed. The pricing question has not.
The growing share of LNG has integrated Europe more deeply into global gas markets where Asian demand frequently influences marginal prices. The continent can build terminals, storage facilities and transport corridors, yet it cannot determine the international pricing mechanisms governing LNG cargoes. This may be the ultimate trap of the post-Russian energy strategy. Europe solved the problem it feared most while becoming increasingly exposed to a challenge discussed far less frequently. The fear of scarcity has gradually been replaced by the fear of unaffordability.
Beyond Energy Security
The six paradoxes outlined above reveal a deeper reality. European energy policy has not been a story of failure. On the contrary, many of its immediate objectives have been achieved. Russian dependence was reduced, supply routes diversified and system resilience improved. Yet every success generated new constraints and new questions.
Cheap gas created vulnerability. Diversification created new dependencies. Decarbonization encouraged additional gas investments. Strategic corridors competed with electricity networks for scarce capital. Physical security overshadowed economic affordability. And successful diversification exposed Europe more directly to global LNG price formation. Yet behind all these developments lies another question that Europe has not fully resolved: whether the systematic reluctance to develop domestic oil and gas resources has unintentionally reinforced the very external dependencies the Union sought to reduce.
While production in the North Sea continued to decline and exploration activity across much of Europe became increasingly constrained, the continent’s dependence on imported molecules remained structurally high. As long as gas remains necessary for power generation, industry and energy security at least until 2050, the debate is unlikely to disappear. The fundamental issue is no longer whether Europe should decarbonize, but whether reducing domestic production faster than consumption inevitably increases reliance on foreign suppliers.
Europe therefore enters a new phase of its energy journey. The central question is no longer whether sufficient gas will be available. Nor is it whether Russian gas can be replaced. Those battles have largely been fought. The emerging challenge is whether Europe can maintain industrial competitiveness while navigating an energy system increasingly dependent on imported LNG, globally determined prices and massive investment requirements. At the same time, an uncomfortable question will continue to resurface: could a measured development of domestic resources have reduced some of the vulnerabilities that diversification merely redistributed? There is no simple answer. Yet the fact that the question is being asked with increasing frequency across Europe reveals how profoundly the debate has evolved. The continent no longer fears running out of gas. It fears running out of affordable options.
That may ultimately be the defining lesson of Europe’s energy transition. Every vulnerability that was solved revealed another beneath the surface, reminding policymakers that energy security, economic competitiveness and strategic autonomy remain inseparable parts of the same equation. In Europe’s long search for sovereignty, the greatest paradox may be that reducing dependence on one source did not eliminate dependence itself. It merely changed its face.
