ASEAN’s First Break from Strict Non-Interference Falters with the Myanmar Setback

Having secured the recognition of neighboring mainland Southeast Asian states, Myanmar’s military-led authorities are openly flouting ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus framework on Myanmar.

Having secured the recognition of neighboring mainland Southeast Asian states, Myanmar’s military-led authorities are openly flouting ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus framework on Myanmar. Notwithstanding its lack of strong enforcement measures, the framework nonetheless represents the bloc’s two unprecedented developments: its shift away from the long-standing principle of non-interference in a member state’s internal affairs and the embryonic form of conflict resolution, rather than the usual conflict management approach. The Myanmar setback raises broader questions not just about ASEAN’s institutional and normative evolution but also the bloc’s unity and centrality amid regional security challenges.

Former Junta Chief’s Diplomatic Rehabilitation

After assuming Myanmar’s presidency through the military-led parliament’s backing in April, Min Aung Hlaing has been steadily expanding his diplomatic inroad into regional diplomatic fora. In addition to consolidating the longstanding strategic ties with China and Russia through state and official visits, his official visit to India, the world’s largest democracy, signaled the beginning of a breakaway from the regime’s diplomatic isolation since the military coup in 2021. But through the lens of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which adopted the Five Point Consensus (5PC) as a collective framework to address the Myanmar crisis, the more significant trips of the former coup leader lie in his visits to ASEAN’s mainland members.

Min Aung Hlaing is courting mainland Southeast Asian states for his quest for legitimacy as Myanmar’s leader. Mirroring neighboring Laos, Thailand’s Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul welcomed Min Aung Hlaing with a red carpet while spearheading calibrated re-engagement with Myanmar’s civilianized authorities for the latter’s full reintegration into the ASEAN. As per Thailand’s official diplomatic rhetoric, calibrated re-engagement means keeping dialogue open and responding to realities on the ground while ‌encouraging ⁠concrete progress.

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Bangkok’s diplomatic stance was then followed by Vietnam, ASEAN’s would-be second-largest economy. Vietnam hosted Min Aung Hlaing from September 4 to 6, during which the military-appointed president held talks with Vietnamese President To Lam and elevated defense and security ties as a key pillar of bilateral relations. Besides, the two countries reaffirmed a commitment not to let each territory be used by any individual or organization for activities against the other. Min Aung Hlaing also visited Cambodia from September 11 to 12.

Regime’s Defiance of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus Framework

With its gradual diplomatic rehabilitation, Myanmar’s military-led authorities have extended their defiance of the 5PC from the failure of implementation to openly questioning the legitimacy of the framework and rejecting its key mechanisms. In a statement issued by Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on July 23, the regime challenged the 5PC’s consensus nature, charging that the bloc’s annexation of the framework to the Chairman Statement breached the fundamental principles of the ASEAN, particularly the consensus and non-interference principles. Instead, the regime pushed for its own Five-Point Roadmap, purportedly in line with the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Way, and ASEAN Spirit. In a subsequent August 8 statement, the regime said that ASEAN’s Special Envoy is no longer necessary now that Myanmar had conducted “a multi-party democratic election” and rejected the release of detained civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

As almost half of ASEAN’s members have opted to bilaterally engage with the regime, the regime’s Five-Point Roadmap, rather than the 5PC, is gaining traction. Hence, in line with the regime’s MOFA rhetoric of alignments between the roadmap and the ASEAN principles, the non-interference principle has appeared to continue to prevail.

What the Five-Point Consensus and Its Setback Mean for ASEAN’s Institutional Architecture

The 5PC’s diminishing importance represents a significant setback for ASEAN’s nascent break from its strict non-interference principle. Irrespective of the international criticisms over its institutional limitations, the ASEAN undertook certain unprecedented steps vis-à-vis post-coup Myanmar. The bloc barred Myanmar’s politico-military leaders, including Min Aung Hlaing himself, from its high-level meetings, thereby defying its longstanding tradition of recognizing state actors regardless of political systems. In contrast to its relative indifference toward ousted democratic leaders and opposition figures across the region, the ASEAN pressed for the unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi.

In addition, the 5PC symbolized not only a departure from ASEAN’s strict non-interference principle but also the bloc’s emerging shift from conflict management to conflict resolution approaches toward the regional security crises. ASEAN’s long-standing conflict management approach has been termed “sweeping conflicts under the carpet” until the right moment based on the ASEAN Way—consensus-based decision-making, non-interference, quiet diplomacy, and non-use of force. Instead, the 5PC gestures toward the nascent form of conflict resolution, that is, aiming to end conflicts by addressing the root causes, seeking workable solutions, and cultivating long-term harmony among the concerned parties. The 5PC encompasses measures, some of which allude to those of conflict resolution, including calling for constructive dialogue among all parties in finding a peaceful solution with the facilitation and mediation of a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair. In addition, the ASEAN pledged to assist war-torn Myanmar in reaching a peaceful and durable solution, thereby implying the facilitation of the elimination, rather than the containment, of the conflict.

Hence, ASEAN’s setback in its pilot case in Myanmar with the 5PC’s erosion undermined the bloc’s institutional and normative evolution toward more flexible adjustments to the ASEAN Way, particularly its rigid non-interference principle, as well as its budding conflict resolution potential. Although ASEAN’s institutional trajectory has been marked more by a process-oriented rather than progress-oriented nature, the total breakdown of the 5PC, including the lack of even partial implementation, would effectively bring ASEAN’s institutional reforms to a standstill.

Intra-ASEAN Divergence and Implications for ASEAN Centrality

Meanwhile, the Philippine Foreign Secretary and incumbent ASEAN Envoy on Myanmar, Ma. Theresa Lazaro said that the readmission of Myanmar leaders to ASEAN Summits remains “far-off” without tangible implementation of the 5PC. The Philippine position is shared by other maritime members, including the next ASEAN Chair, Singapore.

Therefore, besides the implications for institutional and normative evolution, the 5PC stands as a testing ground for ASEAN unity and centrality amid regional security crises. The ASEAN Centrality, or the aspiration of the bloc’s steering position in regional cooperation and community building, requires both genuine consensus and unity among member states as well as enhanced institutional architecture for timely and effective measures. The 5PC, which secured unanimous support from all members, except Myanmar’s military authorities, and encompassed institutional conflict resolution measures, could serve as a guiding precedent for the future of ASEAN’s strategic approaches vis-à-vis pressing regional security challenges.

Taken together, ASEAN’s first break from its long-standing non-interference-based pluralist tradition with institutional innovations to tackle a regional security challenge has stumbled with the setback of the 5PC on Myanmar. Min Aung Hlaing’s diplomatic reintegration with the support of ASEAN’s mainland members posed significant challenges to Myanmar’s democracy and peace as well as 5PC’s viability and, by extension, the partial solidarist turn in ASEAN’s institutional and normative evolution, intra-ASEAN unity, and the bloc’s centrality in the regional security landscape.

Myat Sandar Zaw
Myat Sandar Zaw
Myat Sandar Zaw is a final year student of the BSc. International Relations program at the University of London. She is also a correspondent at the Asia in Review (AiR), a weekly news publication under the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG). Her work at AiR analyzes constitutional politics, human rights and macroeconomic landscape of Thailand as well as the geopolitical developments in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asia. Her research interests include Southeast Asian political economy, women’s political participation, nationalism, and foreign policy of small states.