The war in Ukraine is entering another dangerous phase as Russia increasingly relies on large scale missile and drone attacks to pressure Ukraine’s already strained air defenses.
Last month, the consequences were visible at a suburban railway platform near Kyiv, where eight people were killed in a Russian missile barrage targeting industrial facilities in the Brovary district.
Ukrainian investigators said the missile that struck the railway was not Russia’s primary Iskander ballistic missile. Instead, they identified it as an RM48U, a less accurate missile originally developed as a training target for air defense crews.
The growing use of RM48Us offers an insight into how Russia has been able to intensify its aerial campaign while preserving more capable missiles for future operations.
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Official Ukrainian data reviewed by Reuters shows that more than half of the 228 ballistic and hypersonic missiles fired at Ukraine during July and the first eight days of August were RM48Us. Military analysts at Ukraine’s General Prosecutor’s Office recorded 87 RM48U launches among 158 ballistic and hypersonic missile strikes in July alone.
The figures suggest that Moscow is increasingly using cheaper and less precise weapons to sustain the volume of its attacks while conserving more sophisticated systems.
Russia’s missile strategy
The shift is significant because Russia is operating under its own production and inventory constraints.
Sidharth Kaushal, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, said the use of RM48Us allows Russia to preserve more capable missiles such as the Iskander while forcing Ukraine to expend scarce interceptors.
“Their use allows the Russians to husband the more capable missiles they have,” Kaushal said, arguing that Moscow could preserve these weapons for a more intensive ballistic campaign during the winter.
The Ukrainian data provides some evidence of such a shift. As RM48U attacks increased in July, the number of Iskanders used fell to 38, compared with more than 100 the previous month.
Russia therefore appears to be using a layered approach to its missile campaign. Less accurate systems can increase the number of incoming threats and place additional pressure on Ukrainian defenses, while more advanced missiles remain available for higher priority targets.
The approach also complicates Ukraine’s response. Even a missile with limited accuracy can cause significant damage when fired toward populated or industrial areas.
A growing threat to Ukrainian defenses
The RM48U is designed as a target missile and is launched from Russia’s S-400 air defense system. Ukrainian prosecutors and military intelligence officials told Reuters that it travels at high speed along a ballistic trajectory but is less powerful and accurate than the Iskander.
Ukrainian military experts estimate that RM48Us deviate from their intended targets by roughly 300 meters on average. Their warheads can also scatter metal fragments across a broad area.
Ukrainian prosecutors attributed several recent strikes with high civilian casualties to the weapon, including the attack on the railway platform in Brovary.
Forensic investigators said they identified an RM48U after examining the crater, fragments and damage to the railway platform, surrounding trees and victims. Reuters could not independently verify those findings.
Satellite imagery from Planet Labs showed damage to a warehouse complex near the Kvitnevyi railway platform, with two plumes of smoke visible above the site.
Russia’s Defense Ministry did not respond to Reuters questions about the use of RM48Us. Moscow has repeatedly denied deliberately targeting civilians and says its attacks focus on military infrastructure.
Following the Brovary attack, Russia’s Defense Ministry said it had struck a logistics center used to store drone components.
The numbers are rising
The scale of the missile campaign has increased sharply.
According to Ukrainian data, July recorded the largest number of Russian ballistic and hypersonic missile strikes in a single month since the full scale invasion began in 2022. Russia carried out 158 such strikes, including 87 involving RM48Us.
The pace continued into August. During the first eight days of the month, Russia launched 70 ballistic and hypersonic missile strikes, with 36 involving RM48Us.
The increased attacks are taking place alongside a wider aerial campaign. Russia has relied heavily on missiles and drones against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, while Ukraine has responded with long range drone attacks against Russian refineries, ports and ships.
The humanitarian consequences have been substantial. The United Nations recorded at least 437 civilian deaths in Ukraine in July, the highest monthly civilian death toll since the early months of the invasion, and identified missile and drone attacks as a major factor.
Civilian casualties inside Russia have also increased, although they remain considerably lower than in Ukraine. The Conflict Intelligence Team, an independent open source investigation group, recorded 327 civilian deaths in Russia during the first seven months of 2026, compared with 145 during the same period in 2025.
Russia is conserving its most capable missiles
The growing reliance on RM48Us also reflects the importance of missile stockpiles in the wider war.
The Institute for the Study of War estimated last month that Russia had around 100 Iskanders available, compared with approximately 400 RM48Us.
Russia also possesses smaller numbers of North Korean KN 23 and KN 24 ballistic missiles and Zircon and Kinzhal hypersonic weapons.
Kaushal estimates that Russia can produce around 750 Iskanders annually but argues that solid rocket motors represent a production constraint. That limitation provides an incentive to use more abundant or less sophisticated weapons for some targets.
The RM48U therefore has value beyond its destructive capability. Its strategic utility may lie in allowing Russia to increase the number of missiles entering Ukrainian airspace without consuming its most valuable weapons.
Ukraine’s General Directorate of Intelligence has said Russia intends to more than double RM48U production to 480 missiles this year, compared with 200 last year.
Ukraine’s Patriot shortage
For Kyiv, the problem is not only the number of Russian missiles but also the shrinking ability to intercept them.
Ukraine has said it has nearly exhausted its U.S made Patriot interceptors, which are among the few systems capable of reliably engaging Russian ballistic missiles.
The shortage has become more difficult to address because demand for Patriot interceptors has increased during the war involving Iran, placing additional pressure on U.S. and allied inventories.
A senior U.S. administration official said Washington has sufficient munitions to meet its strategic objectives but must prioritize critical weapons systems while increasing production. The administration is also examining possible forms of future defense industrial cooperation with Ukraine, although no agreement has been finalized.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy renewed his appeal for Patriot systems following the August 5 attacks around Kyiv.
“Ballistic missile interceptors could have saved the lives of those killed today,” he said.
What comes next
The emerging missile strategy points to a broader challenge for Ukraine as the war enters another winter.
Russia does not necessarily need every missile to be highly accurate to place sustained pressure on Ukrainian defenses. By combining large numbers of cheaper RM48Us with more sophisticated ballistic and hypersonic weapons, Moscow can create a difficult choice for Kyiv: expend scarce interceptors against lower accuracy threats or conserve them for missiles capable of causing greater damage.
That dynamic could become particularly important if Russia again focuses its winter campaign on Ukraine’s electricity, heating and other critical infrastructure.
For Ukraine, replenishing air defense interceptors is therefore becoming as important as acquiring additional offensive weapons. The balance between Russia’s ability to generate missile attacks and Ukraine’s ability to intercept them could shape the next phase of the conflict as both sides continue adapting their strategies.
With information from Reuters.
