Congress Is Now a Party to the Peace Deals

Democrats won both houses. They can't make peace, but control money, sanctions relief and ratification. Foreign capitals now lobby Congress, not just Trump.

Two Washingtons, One Calendar

A week after the midterms, Reuters and Ipsos asked Americans what they wanted from the new Congress. Seventy-one per cent want it to pass a law ending the war with Iran, including 93 per cent of Democrats and half of Republicans. The same week, Volodymyr Zelensky told Ukrainian television that Kyiv needed to adjust its approach to Washington and build ties with both parties. In Tehran, establishment newspapers celebrated Trump’s defeat as Iran’s win.

Each reaction rests on the same realisation. Since 3 November, every government negotiating with the United States over Ukraine or Iran is dealing with two Washingtons: a president who negotiates and a Congress that will decide whether his deals can be paid for, ratified and kept. The new Congress takes its seats on 3 January. Until then, the race is on.

What the Voters Handed Over

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The scale of the result is not in doubt. Democrats flipped seven Republican-held Senate seats and two dozen House districts without losing one of their own, and will enter 2027 with at least 55 Senate seats and some 256 in the House. Vice President JD Vance has blamed the Iran war for the losses, and Hakeem Jeffries, the likely Speaker, has listed ending the war among the House’s first orders of business. Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer has pointed to the power of the purse as the tool to do it.

But until 3 January, Republicans still control both chambers of the outgoing Congress, and a temporary funding law expires on 11 December. And from January, Democrats will hold majorities, not supermajorities. Overriding a veto takes two-thirds of both chambers; ratifying a treaty takes 67 senators. What the new majorities gain is the agenda: bills such as the Ukraine Support Act, which the House passed in June only after a discharge petition, will no longer need to be forced to the floor.

The Power to Stop by Doing Nothing

Most commentary asks whether the new Congress can end the Iran war or rescue Ukraine. Mostly, it cannot. Democrats will pass war powers resolutions, and Jeffries has said the president will then have to veto them and explain himself to the public. Previous resolutions under the War Powers Act have been ignored, and without Republican votes a veto stands. As one senior House Democrat put it, “We don’t have an off switch.”

That framing misses where congressional power actually sits in these two wars. What Congress does badly is act against a president: disapproval resolutions, mandatory sanctions and war powers votes all run into the veto. What it does well is refuse, and refusal needs no presidential signature. Three gates matter.

The first is money. The current stopgap contains no war supplemental, so any new funding for operations against Iran from January needs a Democratic Congress to say yes. The same gate opens the other way for Ukraine: Democrats are already discussing a military aid package of around $15 billion, and appropriations are the one Ukraine vehicle Trump cannot easily refuse when it is attached to funding the government.

The second is sanctions relief. Under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, any agreement relating to Iran’s nuclear programme must go to Congress for a 30-day review, whatever form it takes. On Russia, section 216 of the 2017 CAATSA law requires congressional review before covered sanctions are lifted. Washington has already tested that boundary: the administration waived those requirements on 16 October as it weighed relief for Russia’s sovereign wealth fund. Democrats want to extend the review to the post-2022 sanctions it does not yet cover. Review cannot block a determined president outright, but it imposes delay and publicity, and in both wars delay is leverage.

The third is ratification. A US security guarantee for Ukraine that is meant to outlast this presidency has to be a treaty, and Zelensky has said the document would go to Congress and the Ukrainian parliament for ratification. As we argued before the vote, the 67 Senate votes probably exist, but the new Senate will attach conditions. That cuts both ways: 34 senators can also refuse to ratify a guarantee that Kyiv considers hollow.

The picture differs by war. In Ukraine, Congress strengthens Kyiv’s hand: it can fund what the White House will not and hold a veto over any guarantee Ukraine dislikes. That gives Moscow a clear preference for a deal that never needs Congress at all, built on executive waivers and political declarations rather than treaties, and concluded before 3 January if possible. In Iran, Congress’s main lever, money, points towards ending the war, which gives Tehran a reason to wait rather than concede to a president whose room for manoeuvre is shrinking. One former official described a two-month window before Congress makes it hard for Trump to proceed as he wants. It is an incentive to deal, and to escalate while the window lasts.

This is what changes for foreign governments. For two years, the shortest path to an American commitment ran through the Oval Office and a handful of envoys. Now any deal that needs money, sanctions relief or permanence also runs through committee chairs: Gregory Meeks, the likely chair of House Foreign Affairs, the appropriators, and a Senate Foreign Relations Committee that will decide what conditions ride on any treaty. As we argued this week, Europe’s leverage in the Ukraine talks lies in what only the 27 can grant. The same is now true of Congress, and the two sets of vetoes can be coordinated.

The strongest objection is that Congress has failed to restrain presidents at war for half a century, and that this White House has already shown it will waive, impound and ignore. Both are true. But the gates that matter here are the ones that require nothing more than inaction: no appropriation, no ratification, no expedited approval. An administration can route around a statute it dislikes. It cannot conjure money or a treaty that was never voted. And foreign governments are not judging only Trump’s remaining two years. They are judging whether any commitment survives January 2029, and that depends on Congress.

How the Race to 3 January Ends

Base case: lock it in early (roughly 50%). The administration pushes to fix as much as possible before 3 January: implementation steps under the Iran memorandum through executive waivers, and a Ukraine framework built on political declarations rather than a treaty. The new Congress spends early 2027 attaching conditions through appropriations and hearings. Deals survive but stay partial, and every foreign capital hedges by courting committee chairs. The assumption is that Trump prefers executive instruments to a fight he would lose. The signpost is whether any Iran text is formally sent to Congress under INARA before January.

Downside case: escalation in the window (roughly 25%). Under pressure from Netanyahu and with weeks of uncontested authority left, the US resumes strikes on Iran before January, or concludes a Russia arrangement with sanctions relief granted by waiver. The new Congress spends 2027 in funding fights and litigation, and foreign governments face contradictory American commitments from the two branches. For energy markets and sanctions compliance teams, this is the scenario in which US policy is least predictable. Allies would face the worst of both: an executive that moves fast and a legislature that undoes it slowly.

Upside case: Congress as guarantor (roughly 25%). The Senate ratifies a Ukraine guarantee with bipartisan conditions such as a two-thirds threshold for withdrawal, and an Iran deal passes INARA review with explicit congressional endorsement. For the first time in this war cycle, American commitments would carry the signature of both branches, making them more credible in Moscow and Tehran than anything an envoy could promise. It would also give European governments a partner whose commitments outlive an election.

The Signature That Lasts

Trump still negotiates for the United States. Since 3 November, he no longer decides alone what the United States will pay for, ratify or keep. For Kyiv that is an asset; for Moscow, a reason to hurry; for Tehran, a reason to wait. For every capital, it is a reason to spend as much time on Capitol Hill as in the West Wing.

Watch the 11 December funding deadline. If the outgoing Republican Congress attaches Iran war money to the stopgap, the White House has bought itself time beyond 3 January. If it does not, the first vote the new Democratic majority takes on the war will be about money, and money is the one vote a veto cannot replace. Washington still has one negotiator. It now has two signatures, and only one of them lasts beyond 2029.

MD Signal Editorial
MD Signal Editorial
MD Signal Editorial leads strategic analysis at moderndiplomacy.eu. Composed of subject matter experts, the team reviews all reporting for accuracy, strategic coherence, and forward looking relevance. We don't chase headlines — we decode them.