The discussion concerning the future Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM) of the BBNJ Agreement—in simpler terms, the High Seas Treaty—has now reached an important phase. The full title of the treaty is the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, and it came into force on 17 January 2026. So the issue is no longer merely what the states had agreed upon in principle, but rather how that agreement will be turned into actual institutions.
A great deal of the attention currently being given is to the existing ocean data infrastructure, possible technical partners, and where the future BBNJ Secretariat might be located. It is entirely reasonable to have these discussions. However, there is a more general question that deserves greater consideration: what kind of global ocean information system does the BBNJ Agreement really need?
The debate concerning the CHM might appear to be merely a technical discussion about databases, interoperability, and digital infrastructure. That is a misconception. Data infrastructure is essentially governance infrastructure; those who help to set the rules regarding what information is collected, how marine genetic resources are identified, how scientific data are shared, how environmental impact assessments are notified, and how capacity-building needs are matched with providers will in fact play a part in determining how the High Seas Treaty functions in practice.
The CHM is therefore more than just a collection of information. It is being incorporated into the knowledge structure that the high seas will be governed, entering an evolving geopolitical camp where law, science, technology, and power converge.
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The CHM is occasionally referred to as the “digital nervous system” of the BBNJ Agreement. This description is helpful, as it emphasizes the central role of the mechanism. Article 51 sets out the CHM as an open-access platform covering the four main areas of the treaty: marine genetic resources; area-based management tools, including marine protected areas; environmental impact assessments; and capacity-building, together with the transfer of marine technology. The CHM is also meant to link capacity-building requirements with available support and providers, including opportunities for research collaboration, training, technology, and funding.
In practice, the CHM will have to do more than simply transfer information from one place to another; it will also have to link scientific knowledge with international cooperation and national implementation, and its architecture will determine who can access the knowledge, who can take part in it effectively, who can share technology and who can benefit from the governance of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction.
Current ocean data projects will certainly play an important role. The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO (IOC), through systems such as the Ocean Biodiversity Information System (OBIS) and the International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange (IODE), has gained many years of experience in managing international ocean information. This experience offers a solid basis for the future CHM. The IOC has made it clear that the mechanism should cover all four treaty pillars and has pointed out its present scientific networks and experience in capacity building as something applicable to its possible function as a technical partner.
Belgium has also underlined its position in this context. The fact that Brussels is considering hosting the BBNJ Secretariat gives it several advantages since it is an international diplomatic hub. Moreover, Belgium hosts significant marine science facilities, such as the IOC Project Office for IODE in Ostend and various scientific networks linked to marine biodiversity data. The official proposal from Belgium also mentions the country’s involvement in hosting global marine information infrastructure, such as OBIS and the World Register of Marine Species.
They are real strengths; international governance requires places where institutions can meet, coordinate, and carry out their activities effectively.
But the future success of the CHM will depend on something that goes beyond where it is located: whether countries with different levels of scientific and technical capacity can participate meaningfully.
This is especially significant for developing countries since, although they have an interest in contributing to global ocean governance, they usually do not have the necessary infrastructure, expertise, and human resources to take full part in complex information systems. The CHM should therefore be seen as more than just an information platform and should also be regarded as a tool for participation.
China also has something valuable to offer in this field. For many years, it has developed broad capabilities in marine observation, scientific research, data services, and international marine cooperation and has also carried out marine capacity-building activities with developing countries, including training programs, scientific exchanges, and regional cooperation initiatives.
These examples are pertinent to one of the main principles of the BBNJ Agreement, namely that the benefits of ocean governance should not be restricted to countries that already have advanced scientific and technological capabilities. The Chinese proposal advocates the development of an operational CHM prototype, comprising functions for notifying of marine genetic resources, notifying of environmental impact assessments, and, most importantly, matching opportunities for capacity building and the transfer of marine technology with interested recipients.
The future CHM probably won’t be based at a single institution or in a single place. It will need cooperation from international organizations, scientific networks, regional platforms, and national systems. The issue then becomes not which country or institution controls the mechanism, but rather how the various capabilities can be combined to produce a system that works for all the parties.
The opportunity is to help achieve this broader goal; instead of competing for control of a platform, it can play a constructive role in improving the accessibility, inclusiveness, and practical value of the CHM, especially for developing countries and regions that need additional assistance.
The next stage in the implementation of BBNJ will offer an important lesson for global ocean governance: technology alone is not enough to achieve effective cooperation; only when knowledge, capacity, and trust are developed together can institutions succeed.
The final assessment of the CHM will not be based on the location of its secretariat or the database that forms its foundation; instead, it will depend on whether it enables all countries to take an active part in the protection and in the sustainable use of the global ocean commons.
