Donald Trump’s renewed outreach to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is exposing a growing tension at the heart of U.S. strategy in Asia: Washington wants to preserve its alliances and deter China and North Korea, but Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy is increasingly prompting partners to question how dependable the United States will be when their security interests collide with his priorities.
The latest concern follows Trump’s decision to scale back military drills with South Korea, which he has described as unnecessarily provocative toward Pyongyang. Seoul subsequently said Washington had cancelled another exercise scheduled for next month, citing constraints on U.S. forces because of the war with Iran. Together, the decisions have revived memories of Trump’s first term, when he suspended major joint exercises with South Korea after his 2018 summit with Kim.
The immediate issue is the future of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, but the implications extend far beyond the Korean Peninsula. Japan is watching closely as it negotiates with Washington over the cost of hosting U.S. forces. Taiwan is concerned about how Trump’s desire for a stable relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping could affect arms sales and deterrence. India, meanwhile, is reassessing the value of its growing strategic relationship with Washington amid disagreements over trade and defence policy.
“The decision will certainly fuel growing doubts in the region about U.S. security commitments,” said Jeremy Chan, a senior analyst with political risk consultancy Eurasia Group and a former U.S. diplomat in Japan and China.
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A diplomatic gamble with North Korea
Trump’s approach to Kim has changed dramatically since the beginning of his first presidency. In 2017, he threatened North Korea with “fire and fury” as Pyongyang accelerated its nuclear and missile programs. A year later, Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to meet a North Korean leader, holding a summit with Kim in Singapore.
The diplomacy produced extraordinary imagery but little lasting progress toward denuclearisation. A second summit in Hanoi in 2019 collapsed without an agreement, and North Korea subsequently continued expanding its missile and nuclear capabilities.
Trump’s renewed effort therefore comes under substantially different strategic circumstances. North Korea is now more heavily armed, while its military relationship with Russia has deepened. Pyongyang has also continued missile testing even as Trump has signalled his willingness to reopen direct dialogue.
That raises a fundamental question: what exactly would Washington be willing to offer Kim in return for another summit?
A reduction in military exercises could be interpreted in Pyongyang as a diplomatic concession. For Seoul and Tokyo, however, the same decision could raise doubts about the credibility of the military deterrence underpinning their security.
North Korea’s response has so far been cool. Pyongyang has shown little enthusiasm for Trump’s overtures while continuing to demonstrate its military capabilities, including a recent volley of ballistic missile launches.
That contrast is important. Trump appears interested in restarting diplomacy, but North Korea has few incentives to abandon weapons programs that have strengthened its bargaining position.
Seoul faces an uncomfortable choice
South Korea’s dilemma is particularly acute. It depends heavily on the U.S. security umbrella to deter North Korea but also has an interest in reducing tensions with Pyongyang.
The cancellation and reduction of exercises therefore raise concerns about whether Washington’s approach could gradually weaken military readiness.
The problem is not simply the number of exercises. Military drills provide the two allies with opportunities to practise command structures, interoperability and responses to rapidly changing threats. Reducing them could eventually affect the credibility of deterrence even if U.S. troops remain stationed in South Korea.
At the same time, Washington is pushing Seoul to assume more responsibility for its own defence.
Trump has repeatedly questioned the costs associated with maintaining around 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea. The two countries already have a cost-sharing agreement covering 2026 through 2030, with Seoul contributing around 1.52 trillion won this year.
Yet Trump’s continuing criticism suggests that the issue is unlikely to disappear.
For Seoul, this creates a difficult strategic calculation. It must strengthen its own military capabilities without creating the impression that the U.S. alliance is becoming less necessary. At the same time, it has to ensure that greater defence spending does not simply become an open-ended response to demands from Washington.
Japan is watching closely
The implications may be even broader for Japan.
Tokyo is entering sensitive negotiations with Washington over the financial contribution it makes toward hosting U.S. forces. Japan hosts America’s largest overseas military deployment and sees the U.S. alliance as central to deterring China and responding to regional security threats.
Japanese officials are therefore watching Trump’s treatment of South Korea for clues about how he might approach Tokyo.
If Washington can suddenly reduce exercises with one major Asian ally, Japanese officials have reason to wonder whether military cooperation could also become a bargaining instrument in their own negotiations.
The upcoming Keen Sword exercises are particularly significant. Although Washington and Tokyo do not currently expect them to be cancelled, analysts warn that Trump could alter his position.
The diversion of U.S. military assets to the Middle East has already created concerns. The departure of the USS George Washington from Asia to support operations involving the Middle East has raised questions about whether Washington can simultaneously sustain its commitments across multiple theatres.
That is increasingly important because the first island chain, stretching from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines, is a central element of U.S. efforts to contain Chinese military pressure.
Taiwan and the China question
The most consequential test of U.S. reliability could ultimately come in Taiwan.
Beijing claims Taiwan as part of China and has dramatically expanded its military pressure around the island. Washington, meanwhile, has long maintained strategic ambiguity over how it would respond to a Chinese attack while supplying Taiwan with weapons and maintaining military cooperation.
Trump’s desire to maintain a stable relationship with Xi introduces another layer of uncertainty.
Washington has delayed approval of a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan, raising concerns in Taipei that military support could become entangled with wider U.S.-China negotiations.
Taiwanese officials therefore face a difficult question: can they rely on continued American support if Washington decides that maintaining a broader economic or diplomatic accommodation with Beijing is more important in the short term?
There are signs that the underlying U.S. military relationship with Taiwan remains substantial. American intelligence sharing, training and naval activity have continued, and a U.S. Navy aircraft recently transited the Taiwan Strait.
This distinction matters. Trump’s rhetoric and transactional diplomacy do not necessarily mean the United States is abandoning its regional commitments.
But alliances ultimately depend not only on military capabilities but also on perceptions of political commitment.
India’s confidence is also being tested
India presents another example of the consequences of Trump’s approach.
For years, Washington has invested in strengthening ties with New Delhi as part of a broader strategy to balance China’s growing influence and reduce India’s dependence on Russia.
Yet Trump’s steep tariffs on Indian exports, his repeated claims that he mediated an India-Pakistan ceasefire and other disagreements have already generated frustration in New Delhi.
Indian officials are reportedly becoming more cautious about committing to long-term defence arrangements with Washington.
That is strategically significant. India has traditionally valued strategic autonomy and has been reluctant to become formally aligned with any major power. If Washington becomes perceived as unpredictable or excessively transactional, New Delhi has alternatives, including maintaining defence and diplomatic relationships with Russia while expanding ties with other partners.
The result could undermine one of the central objectives of U.S. policy in Asia: bringing India more firmly into a network of partnerships designed to constrain China’s strategic influence.
The Iran war is making the problem worse
The uncertainty surrounding America’s Asian commitments cannot be separated from the war with Iran.
The United States has redirected military assets and personnel toward the Middle East, reducing the resources immediately available for exercises and deterrence in Asia.
From Washington’s perspective, this may simply represent a temporary adjustment to an urgent conflict.
From the perspective of Asian allies, however, the message can look different: American military power is finite, and when another crisis emerges, forces committed to Asia may be moved elsewhere.
That perception could encourage regional governments to accelerate military spending, strengthen independent capabilities and diversify their security partnerships.
Paradoxically, Trump’s demand that allies spend more on their own defence could therefore produce exactly that outcome, but not necessarily in the way Washington wants. Allies may become more militarily capable while simultaneously becoming less dependent on the United States.
A transactional alliance system?
The broader issue is whether Trump’s approach is transforming the traditional U.S. alliance system.
For decades, Washington’s Asian alliances have been built around relatively predictable commitments: military presence, joint exercises, extended deterrence and long-term institutional cooperation.
Trump’s approach places greater emphasis on measurable returns, financial contributions and immediate political outcomes.
That can create leverage. Allies may increase defence spending, contribute more financially and make concessions to preserve access to the U.S. security umbrella.
But it can also impose a strategic cost.
If allies begin to believe that U.S. commitments can be reduced or withdrawn depending on short-term political calculations, they may start planning for a future in which Washington is less dependable.
Pearl Pandya, a senior analyst at Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, described Trump’s approach as reinforcing his “transactional view of foreign affairs,” warning that disagreements over individual policies can impose costs on broader bilateral relationships.
The strategic contradiction
Trump’s Asia policy therefore contains a fundamental contradiction.
Washington wants its allies to do more because the United States faces competing security demands from Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. Yet demanding greater contributions while simultaneously questioning military commitments can weaken the confidence that makes those alliances strategically valuable.
The United States needs Japan, South Korea, India, Taiwan and other regional partners to believe that Washington will remain committed when a crisis emerges. Those partners, in turn, increasingly need to decide how much they should invest in alternatives.
Trump’s outreach to Kim could still produce diplomatic benefits if it succeeds in opening meaningful negotiations and reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. A dialogue with North Korea is not inherently damaging to the alliance.
The danger lies in what Washington gives up to obtain that dialogue.
If military exercises are repeatedly sacrificed without corresponding concessions from Pyongyang, the policy could weaken deterrence without producing denuclearisation. If allies conclude that their security interests can be traded away for diplomatic or economic gains elsewhere, the consequences could extend well beyond Korea.
At a time when China is expanding its military capabilities, North Korea is strengthening its nuclear arsenal and regional governments are reconsidering their defence strategies, perceptions of American reliability have become a strategic asset in their own right.
Trump’s Kim gambit may therefore be about more than whether Washington can bring North Korea back to the negotiating table. It is also a test of whether the United States can pursue transactional diplomacy without convincing its closest Asian partners that they need to prepare for a future in which Washington may no longer be there when they need it most.
With information from Reuters.
