At first glance, Morocco’s participation in the proposed international stabilization force in Gaza and the extraordinary migration crisis in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta appear to be two separate stories. One concerns the future security architecture of Gaza; the other concerns Spain’s border with Morocco.
Yet Chinese strategic and analytical circles are examining whether the two developments should be understood within a wider regional realignment involving the United States, Israel and Morocco.
This does not mean that Beijing has established a direct causal connection between Morocco’s role in Gaza and the migration crisis in Ceuta and Melilla. Nor is there public evidence demonstrating that the two events form part of a coordinated operation. Rather, the Chinese reading focuses on what the convergence of these developments could mean for the distribution of influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
From Beijing’s perspective, the important issue is not simply Morocco’s deployment of personnel to Gaza. It is the possibility that Arab states could increasingly become operational components of a US- and Israel-backed regional security architecture.
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That is where what some Chinese strategic assessments describe as a “functional extension” of Western influence becomes relevant.
Morocco’s emerging role in Gaza
Morocco has become one of the founding contributors to the International Stabilization Force for Gaza. A United Nations report on implementation of the Gaza plan states that Morocco, together with Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan and Kosovo, signed the Declaration of Founding Contributors in February 2026 and expressed its intention to contribute troops. The same report says preparations for the force are well advanced and that its mission includes ceasefire monitoring, support for decommissioning, police training, civilian protection and humanitarian operations.
The issue moved from diplomatic planning toward a more concrete military arrangement in August, when the Board of Peace issued a building contract for a small military outpost intended to accommodate approximately 150 Moroccan troops. The planned facility is in an Israeli-controlled area of Gaza near the border and is designed to support a rotating Moroccan deployment.
This is significant because Morocco would not simply be participating politically in post-war arrangements. Its personnel could become part of the security mechanism operating on the ground.
For Washington and its partners, the participation of Arab states offers an important political advantage. A stabilization force containing Arab personnel can potentially provide a degree of regional legitimacy that would be difficult to achieve through an exclusively American or Israeli military presence.
For Israel, Arab participation could also reduce some of the operational and political burden associated with post-war security arrangements.
For China, however, the development raises a different question: does the participation of Morocco and other Arab states represent the emergence of a new regional security architecture in which Washington and its partners retain the decisive influence?
That is the basis of the Chinese interpretation.
The “functional extension” theory
Chinese strategic circles increasingly view regional security arrangements through the competition between the United States and its major geopolitical rivals.
According to the interpretation presented in this analysis, Morocco’s role in Gaza can be understood as a form of “functional extension”: Washington and its partners can use regional actors to extend the reach and legitimacy of a security structure without relying exclusively on American or Israeli forces.
The logic is straightforward.
Instead of an arrangement dominated visibly by Israel and the United States, Arab states such as Morocco become participants in the security mechanism. Their presence can give the arrangement a broader regional character while still operating within an overall framework shaped by Washington and its partners.
Beijing therefore views such arrangements with caution.
From the Chinese perspective, the issue is not simply whether Moroccan soldiers participate in Gaza. The larger concern is whether Arab governments are gradually being incorporated into security structures that reinforce American influence at a moment when China is attempting to expand its own diplomatic and economic role in the Middle East.
This interpretation also explains why Chinese analysts pay particular attention to Morocco.
Morocco occupies a strategically important position between Europe, North Africa and the wider Middle East. It has developed close relations with the United States and Israel while maintaining important relationships with European and Arab partners.
Its participation in Gaza therefore has implications beyond the territory itself.
If successful, such arrangements could create a model in which regional Arab powers become important components of a new Middle Eastern security architecture rather than merely diplomatic participants.
Why Spain and Ceuta enter the picture
The second part of the Chinese analysis concerns Spain.
In late July and early August 2026, Ceuta experienced an extraordinary migration crisis, with tens of thousands of people crossing from Morocco. Spanish authorities were overwhelmed, while the crisis generated a wider political dispute over migration, border control and relations between Spain and Morocco. Current reporting has put the number of arrivals at roughly 72,000, although estimates vary.
The episode has also revived longstanding questions about the politically sensitive status of Ceuta and Melilla, the two Spanish-administered territories on Morocco’s northern coast.
The crisis is particularly significant because it unfolded against a broader deterioration in European political cohesion over migration. Italy and Spain subsequently became embroiled in a diplomatic dispute over border controls and migration policy.
Moroccan officials have denied responsibility for deliberately creating the crisis. Other explanations have focused on social-media mobilization, changes in Spanish legal procedures and the dynamics of irregular migration itself. The existence of the crisis, therefore, should not automatically be treated as evidence of a Moroccan state strategy.
Nevertheless, from a strategic perspective, the episode demonstrates how vulnerable Spain and the wider European Union can be to sudden pressure along their external borders.
That vulnerability is what makes the Ceuta crisis relevant to Chinese analysts examining the broader Mediterranean picture.
Israel’s intervention adds another layer
The situation became even more politically sensitive after Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, criticized Spain over the Ceuta crisis and questioned Spain’s continued sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, describing them as “colonial enclaves.”
The intervention was striking because Spain has been among the European governments most critical of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians.
From a Chinese strategic perspective, the timing of such rhetoric is significant. It provides another example of how the Middle East conflict can spill into European political disputes.
At the same time, Danon’s comments should not automatically be treated as evidence of official Israeli policy toward Spain or the status of the two territories. The distinction between an individual diplomat’s political statement and a formally adopted government position is important.
For Chinese analysts, however, the episode illustrates a broader phenomenon: the Gaza conflict is increasingly interacting with political and security disputes far beyond the Middle East.
The question of Moroccan migration
This is where the most controversial part of the Chinese interpretation begins.
Some Chinese strategic assessments reportedly examine whether the migration crisis in Ceuta should be considered alongside Morocco’s expanding security cooperation with Washington and Israel.
The argument is not necessarily that the migration crisis was deliberately organized by Israel, the United States or Morocco. Rather, Chinese analysts are interested in whether the two developments could have mutually reinforcing geopolitical consequences.
Morocco’s participation in Gaza potentially strengthens its importance to the emerging US-backed security architecture.
At the same time, the Ceuta crisis has placed Spain under considerable domestic and European pressure.
That creates a complicated situation for Madrid.
Spain has to manage its relations with Morocco, its position on Israel and Gaza, its responsibilities toward the European Union and the practical challenge of controlling its external borders.
From Beijing’s perspective, this illustrates what could be described as the “cost of regional roles.”
When a European country becomes deeply involved in Middle Eastern political and security disputes, it may face consequences in other parts of its strategic environment.
A wider US-China competition
China’s interest in the issue ultimately goes beyond Morocco or Spain.
Beijing is watching the emergence of a Middle Eastern order in which the United States is attempting to rebuild and reorganize its partnerships after the wars and crises of recent years.
The inclusion of Arab states in security arrangements is particularly important.
China has spent years expanding its economic and diplomatic presence in the Middle East through trade, infrastructure investment, energy cooperation and initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative. It has also sought to present itself as a diplomatic actor capable of maintaining relations with rival regional powers.
The United States, by contrast, retains far greater military capabilities and a much deeper network of formal security partnerships.
The competition between the two models is therefore becoming clearer.
Washington seeks to maintain strategic influence through alliances, military cooperation and security partnerships.
Beijing emphasizes economic interdependence, diplomatic engagement and development while gradually expanding its own security relationships.
Morocco’s participation in Gaza can therefore be viewed by Beijing as part of a wider question: will Arab states increasingly become pillars of an American-led security architecture, or will they retain sufficient strategic autonomy to balance among the major powers?
Beyond the conspiracy theories
The convergence of the Gaza stabilization arrangements, Morocco’s role, the Ceuta crisis and Israeli-Spanish tensions inevitably generates speculation.
But speculation should not be confused with evidence.
There is currently no public evidence establishing that the migration crisis in Ceuta was deliberately created as part of a coordinated US-Israeli-Moroccan strategy linked to Gaza.
The more significant analytical question is different.
Why are Chinese strategic circles interested in connecting these developments?
The answer lies in the changing structure of regional power.
For Beijing, the Middle East is no longer simply an energy supplier or a diplomatic arena. It is increasingly part of the wider competition between competing international systems and security networks.
If Washington succeeds in drawing more Arab countries into a coordinated security framework, China’s room for maneuver could eventually narrow.
If, on the other hand, Arab states maintain strategic autonomy and continue balancing among the United States, China, Russia and other powers, Beijing will have greater opportunities to expand its influence.
Morocco sits at an unusually important intersection of these dynamics.
Its geographical position connects Europe, North Africa and the Atlantic. Its relationships with Washington and Israel give it a role in the emerging Middle Eastern security architecture, while its relationship with Europe makes developments around Ceuta and Melilla strategically sensitive.
For Chinese analysts, these are not isolated events.
They are pieces of a larger picture in which regional actors are being asked to choose how far they will participate in competing security architectures.
The Gaza stabilization force may therefore become more than a mechanism for managing post-war security. It could become an early test of whether Arab states can be incorporated into a new US-backed regional order while preserving their own strategic autonomy.
And the Ceuta crisis demonstrates the other side of the equation: geopolitical realignments in the Middle East can have consequences far beyond the region itself.
For China, that is precisely why Morocco matters.
The question is no longer simply who will provide security in post-war Gaza. It is who will shape the wider network of alliances, partnerships and dependencies that emerges from the region’s current upheaval—and whether the United States or China will have the greater influence over it.
