In a speech on November 19, 2025, President Trump spoke at length about the horrific atrocities being committed in Sudan, specifically by Colombian mercenaries fighting alongside the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Hemedti, and stated that the United States would use its power and influence to stop them. On December 9, 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on a transnational Colombian mercenary network comprising four individuals and four entities, primarily Colombian, linked to the conflict in Sudan, for their role in fueling the Sudanese civil war and its devastating consequences. China’s stance on the Trump administration’s actions toward Sudan in late 2025 was characterized by caution and a consistent call for dialogue, while reiterating its principled opposition to unilateral sanctions. The following details this position and the reactions related to the aforementioned events.
Regarding the connection between Washington’s imposition of sanctions on those Colombian entities linked to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan and their ties to China, international reports, such as those from Amnesty International, have documented the use of advanced Chinese weapons by these Colombian mercenary forces, associated with the (Sudanese) RSF. These weapons include guided bombs manufactured by the Chinese company Norinco. They also include Chinese-made drones, which were transferred through regional allies. This has placed China under US scrutiny as an indirect technology supplier in this conflict.
As for the summary of the US sanctions imposed on December 9, 2025, on the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces led by Hemedti, the targeted group consisted of four individuals and four entities, the majority of whom are Colombian citizens and companies. The US accusation against the Sudanese RSF was the recruitment of former Colombian military personnel and the training of fighters (including children) on behalf of the RSF. Therefore, the United States’ objective behind the sanctions imposed on the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is to disrupt external support for the RSF and weaken its ability to perpetrate violence against civilians. These individuals and entities supporting the Sudanese paramilitary RSF belong to a transnational network primarily composed of Colombian citizens and companies that recruit former Colombian military personnel to fight for the RSF and train fighters, including children. The sanctions imposed today disrupt a significant source of external support for the RSF, thereby diminishing its ability to utilize skilled Colombian fighters to violently target civilians.
Regarding China’s stance on Trump’s November 19, 2025, speech, in which President Trump pledged to use US influence to stop the horrific atrocities in Sudan, noting that he was responding to requests from regional leaders, most notably Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, while China did not directly condemn the speech’s content, it emphasized in simultaneous statements the importance of dialogue with America, even as the administration targeted international partners. While expressing reservations about foreign intervention, China maintained its traditional position that conflicts should be resolved through political means and negotiations led by the Sudanese themselves, warning that external interventions could further complicate the strategic landscape. The connection between these various issues for China lies in its apprehension about Washington’s extending the scope of US national security, a strategy aimed at containing the shared military and economic networks of influence between its adversaries and their allies in conflict zones. China rejects this strategy, viewing it as an infringement on its economic sovereignty in Sudan and the wider region.
Regarding China’s stance on the sanctions imposed by Washington on December 9, 2025, against four individuals and four entities (a Colombian network that recruits mercenaries for the Rapid Support Forces and trains children), China’s response was to express its principled opposition to unilateral sanctions imposed by Washington. China reiterated its rejection of what it calls American political bullying and blackmail and the unilateral sanctions imposed by Washington outside the framework of the UN Security Council. With China warning against the expansion of US sanctions, Beijing believes these sanctions could open the door to targeting other entities potentially linked to its economic interests in the region, especially given Washington’s frequent updates to its lists of Chinese military companies. Therefore, China has called for a balanced approach to relations, attempting to maintain a positive tone in its direct communications with Trump, such as the phone calls Trump described as positive with China in early 2026, to ensure that China’s interests are not affected by sudden shifts in US policy toward regional issues, such as Sudan.
From my research and analytical perspective, Washington deliberately imposed sanctions on those Colombian entities primarily linked to the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as a pretext to update US sanctions against a number of Chinese military companies, known in the US as the 1260H List. Therefore, the US Department of Defense expanded the scope of its military designation of terrorist entities, such as those Colombian mercenaries within the Sudanese RSF, and linked them to Chinese military companies. This was done to broaden the US sanctions lists to include a number of Chinese military companies, which fall under the US sanctions classification known as the CMC List. This list also includes giant Chinese technology companies, such as Alibaba, Baidu, and CATL.
China rejected these US sanctions against its technology and military companies, considering this US update to the list of sanctioned companies to be discriminatory and aimed at undermining its economy. Under the pretext of US national security, China retaliated by imposing counter-sanctions on American military industries. The US response to China was that the Chinese military, technology, and engineering companies included in the US sanctions list have regional ties to conflict zones in Sudan and the Middle East. Washington accused these Chinese companies of contributing to the modernization of the Chinese military, which in turn supports networks in conflict zones, including Sudan and the Middle East.
Regarding the connection between the current US war against Iran and Washington’s reopening of the file on US sanctions policy imposed on a number of Chinese military, technology, and engineering companies immediately after the Iran war, Washington considers this to be part of an arc of sanctions extending from Sudan to China, aimed at cutting off sources of support for Iran and its allies. Washington accuses these Chinese companies and military entities of supporting Iranian military programs and operating within Sudanese conflict zones. Therefore, Washington imposed sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong entities on charges of supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program and providing advanced carbon technology. With Washington accusing several Chinese shipping companies of exporting Iranian oil and circumventing unilateral US sanctions against Iranian oil exports and imports, US sanctions have once again targeted several independent Chinese shipping companies and refineries for assisting Iran in its oil trade. China rejects these sanctions, considering them unjustified US oppression.
This highlights the unified US objective behind its sanctions policy against Iran, its militias, China, and Colombian entities linked to the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces. The US links Sudanese mercenaries, Chinese companies, and Iran, as this connection manifests in transnational networks. Washington seeks to prevent Chinese technology or Iranian oil financing from reaching local proxies, such as the Rapid Support Forces or pro-Iranian militias in the region, to ensure that regional stability is not destabilized in a way that serves the interests of its adversaries, from the US perspective.
Therefore, we conclude that China’s rejection of the US policy of expanding unilateral sanctions stems from Beijing’s understanding that US sanctions are no longer limited to Sudan as an isolated case but are part of a broader US strategy called the comprehensive containment strategy, which targets Chinese companies that form the technological backbone of Washington’s adversaries in the region, most notably Iran.
