Chinese intelligence agencies have adopted a cautious and pragmatic stance toward Iranian interference in the Sudanese army following the United States’ designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization within the Sudanese military on March 6, 2026. This designation came after the start of the US-Israeli war against Iran and following the Sudanese military leadership’s implementation of legal measures against branches and affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood within the army after they publicly declared their support for Tehran in its conflict with Washington. Due to the complex situation within the legitimate Sudanese army, China has opted for backseat diplomacy to safeguard its investments. Beijing recognizes that this interference could complicate the regional landscape and increase tensions with the West, but it does not consider it a red line, content to monitor its interests without direct intervention, given its partnership with Iran.
Herein lies the significance of Chinese intelligence perspectives and its interactions with the complex landscape within the Sudanese army following the United States’ designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization within the Sudanese military, given its ties to and support for Iran. This is the same group upon which the Sudanese army primarily relies in its confrontation with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Hemedti. China has adopted the following stances: (Backseat diplomacy): China prefers to support non-Western mediation efforts to end the Sudanese conflict while avoiding direct intervention to rescue Iranian-backed factions, especially given the limited scope of its interests compared to other regions. (Chinese caution regarding international competition): Beijing is closely monitoring the tension between Washington and Tehran and its impact on arms supplies to Sudan, attempting to avoid direct confrontation with the United States on regional issues. (Chinese prioritization of stability): China shares concerns about Sudan’s stability and views Iranian interference as a potential destabilizing factor for Chinese oil and development investments, thus motivating it to support any path that restores political and military stability. With Beijing attempting to manage regional competition, Chinese intelligence recognizes that Iranian intervention could prompt some Arab states to reconsider their support for Sudan, potentially diminishing Tehran’s influence, a development that could serve China’s long-term strategic interests.
On the other hand, Chinese intelligence circles are closely monitoring developments within Sudan following the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood within the Sudanese army as a terrorist organization in early March 2026. Beijing views these actions, along with the accompanying US pressure, such as the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as a terrorist organization, as aimed at containing the influence of China and Iran in the region. While China generally supports counterterrorism and counter-extremism efforts, it rarely comments directly on structural changes within foreign militaries. Therefore, relevant circles in Beijing are closely monitoring these developments in Iran and Sudan. Beijing believes that successful intelligence penetrations in the region could open a Pandora’s box of global security risks, and it is concerned with the stability of energy routes and securing oil supplies from the Gulf.
Perhaps even up to this point, no official statements have been issued by Chinese circles expressing their opinion explicitly on the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization within the Sudanese army. Nor has there been any Chinese comment on the legal proceedings against the Muslim Brotherhood within the Sudanese army following its designation as a terrorist organization. However, China generally adheres to the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and its interests in Sudan are focused on stability to protect its economic investments. Here, Beijing emphasizes the continued support of legitimate, internationally recognized Sudanese institutions and supports any measures that promote stability, especially if they reduce the potential for chaos or extremism that could threaten its interests. We find that despite the United States’ designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist entity in March 2026, Beijing prefers to deal with existing armies and governments to safeguard its security and economic interests, and it typically supports the fight against extremist organizations to ensure the security of its investments.
Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles are paying close attention to the Sudanese leaks, as revealed by leaked Sudanese intelligence documents. These documents express internal concerns that pro-Iranian rhetoric from some Islamists within the Sudanese army itself could portray Sudan as aligned with the Iranian axis, jeopardizing Arab, Gulf, and Western economic support. International powers such as the European Union, China, and Russia are closely monitoring the regional conflict, observing Iranian attempts to use Sudan as a platform for its influence in Africa. This is especially relevant after the Sudanese army announced on March 4, 2026, that it would take legal action against Islamist volunteers and commanders fighting alongside it, following statements in which they declared their readiness to send fighters to defend Iran against any American or Israeli ground invasion.
Due to the series of public statements by the Muslim Brotherhood within the Sudanese army and other Islamist factions within the Sudanese army, the United States announced on March 9, 2026, the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity (SDGT) with the intention of officially listing it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on March 16, 2026. These moves and American pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood within the Sudanese army are linked to American accusations that fighters affiliated with the Brotherhood terrorist organization, such as the Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade, received training and support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in their confrontation with Washington and Tel Aviv.
The Sudanese army confirmed that these Islamist groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which had declared their readiness to send fighters to defend Iran in the event of a US or Israeli ground invasion, do not officially represent it. Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan emphasized that the armed forces would not allow any entity to exploit its identity for ideological purposes. As arrests within the Sudanese army expanded, targeting members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist brigades, the Islamist leader in the army, Naji Abdullah, was detained. He had appeared in military uniform pledging to send the Al-Bara’ bin Malik brigades and advanced drones to defend Tehran. There are several political motives behind these moves by the Sudanese army. The army aims to maintain its vital relations with Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, and avoid involvement in the Iranian axis of resistance, especially given the escalating regional conflict.
The crisis within the Sudanese army stems from a speech delivered by Ali Naji Abdullah, a leading figure in the Sudanese Popular Congress Party, during an Iftar meal. In his speech, he stated that his battalions fighting alongside the army were ready to deploy immediately to defend Iran. His remarks included references to several Islamist groups affiliated with the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the Mujahideen Brigades, which support the Sudanese army in its current war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Hemedti. Consequently, the Sudanese army and its official military leadership disavowed and rejected such statements from Islamist volunteer fighters within the Sudanese army itself, who are fighting against the RSF under Hemedti’s command. The Sudanese army vowed to take legal action against them. The official spokesperson for the Sudanese Armed Forces issued a statement denying any connection between the legitimate Sudanese army and these individuals who appeared in military uniform and confirmed that legal proceedings against them would commence. With the warning issued by the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, against exploiting the identity of the Sudanese army to achieve political or ideological agendas, he emphasized that the armed forces will not allow any entity to speak on behalf of the state regarding foreign issues that do not concern it. These moves by the Sudanese army to deny any connection to the statements made by Islamist volunteers within the Sudanese army regarding their readiness to defend Iran have several diplomatic dimensions, especially given the Sudanese army leadership’s aim to protect Sudan’s foreign relations, particularly with the Gulf Arab states, and to reject any threat to their security, while emphasizing that Sudan, which is facing its own internal conflict, does not encourage the expansion of regional conflicts with other fronts.
Amidst a division in official and public opinion within Sudan, as exemplified by the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which condemned the Iranian missile strikes targeting Gulf states such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, describing them as blatant aggression, while excluding the UAE from this expression of solidarity due to previous diplomatic tensions, videos emerged showing Islamist leaders, Islamist groups, and volunteer fighters, fighting alongside the Sudanese army, declaring their readiness to send fighters to defend Iran against any American or Israeli ground invasion. Consequently, the Sudanese army spokesperson’s office adopted a cautious stance, announcing legal action against volunteers who declared their readiness to defend Iran, while emphasizing that the official Sudanese military institution distanced itself from these individual statements. It is worth noting that Sudan restored diplomatic relations with Tehran in 2023, amidst accusations of Iranian support for the Sudanese army with drones in its internal conflict against the Rapid Support Forces.
Due to the unfolding developments within the Sudanese army following the US designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, Chinese intelligence circles view the American designation with suspicion, considering it a tool to exert pressure and increase US influence in the region. China fears harm to its economic interests in Sudan and is concerned about the timing of this US decision, which could exacerbate instability within the Sudanese army, thus threatening its economic interests there. Therefore, Beijing is exploring alternatives. China might exploit this terrorist designation of the Muslim Brotherhood within the Sudanese army to present itself as a more reliable alternative to the Sudanese army, given its non-interference in the identities of the groups fighting alongside it. This is especially relevant given the repercussions of the US designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, including financial isolation. The US designation will result in asset freezes and prohibit financial transactions with the group’s other branches internationally, placing the Sudanese army in a difficult position due to its reliance on these groups in its fight against the Rapid Support Forces. In addition to the fear that the conflict could escalate from an internal to an international one, the US designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization transforms the conflict in Sudan from a local war into a front in a global war against Iranian influence.
In this context, China is adopting a cautious approach in Sudan, focusing on stabilizing its economic interests (oil and infrastructure) and diplomatic efforts without direct military intervention. While the United States designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist entity in 2026, Beijing prefers political solutions and avoids being associated with Western designations. It rejects ideological alliances, especially given the growing Iranian influence, and focuses on maintaining balanced relations to safeguard its investments. China’s vision and stance on Sudan can be summarized as follows: (China’s reaction to the US designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization within the Sudanese army): China does not typically adopt Western and American terrorist designations, viewing them as tools of political pressure. Beijing’s position tends toward non-interference in internal affairs. In this context, Beijing links the Iranian war with Tehran’s influence within the Muslim Brotherhood in the Sudanese army. Chinese intelligence views Iranian expansion into Sudan, through drones and support for the Sudanese army, with suspicion, as it destabilizes the region and threatens Chinese investment interests by provoking Western and American interventions. This leads China to support political solutions that end this influence rather than a military confrontation. Regarding the Chinese choice between supporting the Sudanese army against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), China will not provide direct military support to either side. Instead, China’s support is limited to diplomatic (at the UN Security Council) and economic support for the side that guarantees stability and protects its investments. China prefers the Sudanese state and its traditional army, as they are better equipped to ensure stability for Chinese interests, but without actual Chinese military involvement, in accordance with its usual foreign policy. China’s priorities lie in maintaining the security of its investments (oil), political stability, non-intervention, and the fear of internationalizing the conflict.
