The Iranian regime has never been more vulnerable. With Israel’s destruction of their proxy forces in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon coupled with the sudden collapse of the Assad regime in Syria as well as the US’ pushback against the Houthis in Yemen, the implicit hand of Tehran is losing its grip over the region. Yet, with a track record of ever-surprising resilience, there is no guarantee that the regime will simply buckle under the pressure. The containment of the current regime is more important than ever given their scale of uranium enrichment, with current estimates suggesting that Iran is mere weeks away from being able to produce the level of weapons-grade uranium required to fuel up to a dozen nuclear weapons.[1] But this nuclear expertise will not be eradicated by sheer force.[i] Instead, the United States should capitalize on Iran’s moment of weakness to force their hand in negotiations and strike what could become the deal of the century.
Although now defunct, the 2015-16 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) established a precedent for navigating a near-nuclear Iran. An agreement was reached between Iran and six world powers—the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, China and Russia—together with the European Union to limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for economic sanctions relief.[ii] Its conception demonstrated the potential for diplomatic maneuvering around Iran’s hatred of the US, convincing them to grant vital concessions on the very program they had ‘built and extended on the narrative of injustice and victimization’.[iii]Key to getting the deal over the edge was a ‘dramatic increase’ in sanctions which made sure that Iran came to the negotiation table with ‘serious intent’.[iv] Today, Iran might be left with little choice but to talk once more. The regime knows it cannot survive a full-scale war against Israel and the US, and their direct strikes on Israel since October 7, 2023, have been both limited and performative.[v] In search of an exit strategy, ‘reformist’ Iranian President Pezeshkian has expressed his desire to revive the Joint Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in exchange for sanctions relief once again.[vi]
Since then, talks have commenced between the E3 (Britain, France and Germany) and Iran in an attempt to halt Iran’s nuclear escalation.[vii] But the Trump administration is very unlikely to put their support behind the revival of the JCPOA given their abrupt withdrawal from the agreement in 2018. Instead, Trump has committed to a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ to ‘bankrupt’ Iran.[viii] The threat of this hardline stance might have the potential to force Iran to make some major concessions if it is deployed to a clear and constructive end. The US must provide a diplomatic offramp for Iran in the form of an agreement that will contain their nuclear ambitions and ensure lasting peace in the region.
A Comprehensive Agreement
Prior to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Trump’s Ambassador to the United Nations criticized the deal on the grounds that it ‘drew an artificial line between the Iranian Regime’s nuclear development and the rest of its lawless behavior’.[ix] It is true that the JCPOA adopted too narrow a scope in curbing the activities of the Iranian Regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was tasked with monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities, with sanctions to be lifted if Iran adhered to commitments made within the JCPOA agreement. Whilst this sought to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and avoid a nuclear arms race in the region, little was done to check Iran’s regional influence via its military proxies and ballistic missile capabilities. It was merely through UN Security Council Resolution 2231 that Iran was called upon to refrain from the production and development of ballistic missiles, should they be capable of carrying nuclear warheads. This proved ineffective not only in its inability to impose a legally binding demand upon the regime, but also in the leeway it allowed Iran to continue with its ballistic missile program under the guise of conventional defense mechanisms.
It is impossible to address Iran’s nuclear program in isolation from the rest of its destabilizing regional activities. The unfortunate reality for policy makers is that the two are intrinsically linked when it comes to regional and global security, each playing into one another to exacerbate the perception of Iran as an existential threat. The ballistic missile program not only forms the cornerstone of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, it is also key to the regime’s projection of power throughout the region, posing a direct threat to neighboring states while bolstering destabilizing non-state proxies including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen.
In fact, mere days after the JCPOA was announced Supreme Leader Khamenei vowed that the deal would not alter Iran’s behavior in any way, emphasizing continued support to their regional allies.[x] He was asserting Iran’s regional presence, nuclear deal aside. Moving forward, Iran’s ballistic missile program and its military support of regional proxies must be explicitly addressed within any comprehensive nuclear agreement if it is to contain the Iranian threat.
Incorporating Regional Actors
The neglect of Iran’s wider regional activities can be attributed to a fundamental flaw in the negotiation process of the JCPOA: the exclusion of regional actors. Instead, a group of extra-regional powers set their own parameters for Iran’s nuclear program whilst overlooking the implications of such an agreement upon regional security dynamics. Not only did such exclusion limit the agreement, it also left US partners in the region nursing a sense of betrayal and heightened vulnerability. Saudi Arabia had once relied on an unwavering guarantee of support from the US to secure its regional footing vis-à-vis Iran; on a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah to George W. Bush’s ranch in Texas in 2005, the two issued a joint statement celebrating their ‘personal friendship’ marked by common regional ambitions, declaring a shared commitment to combat acts of terror that ‘run contrary to efforts to promote peace and stability in the region’.[xi] This alliance was fractured under the Obama administration with the conclusion of the JCPOA, which seemed to instead empower Saudi Arabia’s neighboring rival, Iran. The implications of this abandonment would run deep as Riyadh began to make alternative arrangements.
This neglect of its Middle Eastern allies, and an inconsistent US policy towards the region thereafter, culminated in the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement of March 2023, brokered by Beijing.[xii] China’s expanding engagement in the Middle East in pursuit of economic objectives has increased its regional presence; they have cultivated and maintained several Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships with countries across the region, including both Iran and Saudi Arabia since 2016.[xiii] With Iran resolutely opposed to US influence in the region, and Saudi Arabia inclined to hedge their bets, each saw the benefits of engaging with China.
The Saudi-Iranian rapprochement not only signals China’s growing regional presence, but also a broader trend towards the adoption of a ‘China model’ of engagement across the Middle East, characterized by pragmatic and economically driven cooperation as the region moves towards greater multipolarity.[xiv] The appeal of China’s playbook lies in its apolitical, even-handed approach to bilateral relations in the region, providing an effective forum for diplomatic engagement between long-standing adversaries.
The flipside, however, is that China neither provides nor enhances security for these Middle Eastern actors.[xv] Their reluctance to become entangled within recent political conflict proves that a friend to all is a friend to none. This can act as leverage for the US; if they reassure Saudi Arabia of an unwavering commitment to an alliance and involve them in establishing boundaries for Iran’s regional actions and nuclear program, the upcoming agreement can be framed as a guarantee of security. If Saudi Arabia has agency within the negotiation process, they can act on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council to firmly root the deal within its regional landscape, within which key allies in the Gulf have a stake in ensuring its success.
It is clear from the Israeli-Hamas ceasefire process that Qatar can provide a relatively neutral and seemingly effective backdrop for regional diplomacy. This will account for the move towards Middle Eastern actors seeking greater agency over regional diplomacy in a bid for multipolarity, whilst also underpinning the process within a US-led security architecture.
There also remains the question of guaranteeing Israel’s security within the region which, alongside Iranian containment, will anchor Trump’s Middle East strategy.[xvi] During his previous term, there was a push towards Israeli normalization with Arab states via the Abraham Accords. It is expected that Trump will expand upon this policy during his second term, with his eyes fixed on Saudi Arabia for his next diplomatic win. Whilst Trump’s strategy of slowly incorporating Israel into the regional diplomatic landscape is a step in the right direction, Saudi Arabia’s shifting calculus means that its recognition of Israel may come at a higher price.[xvii] The practicalities will prove difficult, and the balance lies in how the situation in the Palestinian Territories develops.
Working with China?
Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ policy will be undermined so long as China presents a viable alternative for Iran. Before its positioning as an alternative power in the region, China worked alongside the US as a key player behind the JCPOA. Their cooperation in imposing sanctions against Iran helped force the Islamic Republic to the negotiating table.[xviii] But since then, China has become the largest buyer of Iranian oil via a shadow fleet of tankers that skirt western sanctions.[xix] These illicit exports are significant; Tehran was able to bring in $53 billion in 2023, and the output for 2024 was roughly the same.[xx][xxi] This revenue, largely enabled by Chinese demand, keeps Iran’s economy afloat and enables its sponsorship of regional proxies.[xxii] China will simply continue to ignore sanctions on the grounds of economic pragmatism and political impartiality, and Washington will be unlikely to bring them on side amidst Trump’s unfolding trade war with Beijing.
China does not want to rewrite the Middle East, but rather to operate freely outside of the constraints of a US-led order in the region. However, if an agreement with Iran can be pitched to Beijing as a means by which to ensure the stability that is crucial to realizing their economic objectives, there is a greater chance that the Chinese will at least agree to adhere to some shared red lines over Iran’s uranium enrichment program. The US could also threaten sanctions should China continue to enable Iran’s evasion of sanctions by importing Iranian oil. Either way, a united front against Iran will become increasingly important given that Iran has signed a 20-year strategic partnership with Russia.[xxiii]
Of course, there is the question of convincing Trump’s hawkish administration to work with China. Advisors in the White House should sell the idea of working alongside the Chinese by appealing to Trump’s appreciation for the art of a deal, framing it as a political win for his administration against the Iranian regime. It can be framed as a regaining of the upper hand in the Middle East, and a limit on the shift towards a Chinese-led and competing system in the region. He may also be willing to pull back on US commitments to Taiwan, for better or worse, to get the deal over the line with China.[xxiv] This will depend on what Trump views as his most profitable endeavor within the international arena. But the value in a multilateral, comprehensive and all-encompassing agreement to check both Iran’s nuclear ambitions and destabilizing regional activities must be pressed upon him.
Conclusion
Focusing exclusively on containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, whether by force or diplomacy, is not enough to contain the Iranian threat. To launch an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would prove futile in the long term; they have developed a nuclear expertise that cannot simply be eradicated.[xxv] Equally, an agreement that focuses solely on Iran’s nuclear program overlooks their influence that sprawls out across the various arenas of Iran’s foreign policy. The promise of sanctions relief must be conditional upon the cessation of Iranian sponsorship of its regional proxies as well as the containment of its nuclear program. Whilst recent events have exposed the precarious position of the regime, they must now be left with no option but moderation and integration, in exchange for the regime’s most crucial and particularly urgent priority: its survival. Trump’s unique opportunity lies in bringing the various political, security and economic interests of regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, and extra-regional powers like China together, and promoting a deal on Iran that also positions the US as the preferred security guarantor in the Middle East.
[1] Richard Hass, ‘The Iran Opportunity: What America Needs to do to Achieve a Breakthrough’, Foreign Affairs (Jan 6 2025) retrieved https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/iran-opportunity-richard-haass
[i] Ibid
[ii] Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, US. Department of State, retrieved https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf
[iii] Ali Ansari, ‘The United States, Iran, and the Politics of the JCPOA’, in Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change, (2019), p. 507 retrieved https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvhrcxqj.
[iv] 2010 (UN sanctions), 2011 (US financial sanctions) and 2012 (EU oil embargo). Ibid, p. 517
[v] Banafseh Keynouch, ‘Tehran’s Calculations to Avoid an All-out War with Israel and the US’, Middle East Institute (November 12, 2024) retrieved https://www.mei.edu/publications/tehrans-calculations-avoid-all-out-war-israel-and-us
[vi] Text of the Address by His Excellency, Dr Masoud Pezeskhkian, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran At the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (New York, 24 September 2024), retrieved https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/79/ir_en.pdf
[vii] Press Release ‘Iran’s Further Escalation of its Nuclear Programme: Joint Statement by France, Germany and the UK’, retrieved https://www.gov.uk/government/news/irans-further-escalation-of-its-nuclear-programme-joint-statement-by-france-germany-and-the-uk
[viii] Felicia Schwartz and Andrew England, ‘Trump team aims to bankrupt Iran with new ‘maximum pressure’ plan, Financial Times, (November 16, 2024), retrieved https://www.ft.com/content/3710bf14-010e-412d-83c7-b07773d6a45f
[ix] Ambassador Nikki Haley U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York City (September 5 2017), retrieved https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-on-beyond-the-echo-chamber-considerations-on-u-s-policy-toward-iran-at-the-american-enterprise-institute/
[x] Ansari, ‘The United States, Iran and the Politics of the JCPOA’ p. 533
[xi] ‘Joint Statement by President Bush and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah’, Office of the Press Secretary, US Department of State Archives, (Crawford Texas, 25 April 2005), retrieved https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050425-8.html)
[xii] Joint Trilateral Statement by the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran (March 102023), Ministry of Foreign Affairs The People’s Republic of China, retrievedhttps://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367487.html#:~:text=The%20three%20countries%20announce%20that,and%20the%20agreement%20includes%20their
[xiii] China-Saudi Arabia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement (20 January 2016), retrieved https://www.spa.gov.sa/1448743 & China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement (23 Jan 2016), retrieved https://president.ir/en/91435
[xiv] Jon Alterman ’The “China Model” in the Middle East’, Global Politics and Strategy, Vol 66 Issue 2 (28 March 2024), p. 76, retrieved https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2024.2332062
[xv] Ibid, p. 91
[xvi] Sanim Vakil, ‘The World in 2025’, Chatham House, (19 December 2024), retrieved https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2024-12/world-2025#:~:text=The%20impact%20of%20climate%20change,day%2Dto%2Dday%20policies.
[xvii] F. Gregory Gause, III, ‘A Different Middle East: How should Washington Respond?’ (January 7 20025), https://www.mei.edu/publications/different-middle-east-how-should-washington-respond
[xviii] Ansari, ‘The United States, Iran, and the Politics of the JCPOA’, p. 518
[xix] Jon McClure, Richard Valdmanis and David Clarke, Reuters, (January 2025) retrieved https://www.reuters.com/graphics/IRAN-OIL/zjpqngedmvx/
[xx] Ibid, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/IRAN-OIL/zjpqngedmvx/
[xxi] Adam Kredo, ‘Iran’s Illicit Oil Revenue Swells to Nearly $200 Billion Since Biden-Harris Took Office, Latest Figures and Estimates Show’, The Washington Free Beacon, (14 October 2024) retrieved Iran’s Illicit Oil Revenue Swells to Nearly $200 Billion Since Biden-Harris Took Office, Latest Figures and Estimates Show.
[xxii] Ibid, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/IRAN-OIL/zjpqngedmvx/
[xxiii] Robert Plummer, ‘Russia and Iran Move to Strengthen Military Ties’, BBC News (17 January 2025), retrieved https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c87dd4n4jd0o
[xxiv] Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, ‘The New Trump Administration Could Herald a Remaking of the International Order. How Should the World Respond?’ (15 January 2025), retrieved https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/01/new-trump-administration-could-herald-remaking-international-order-how-should-world-respond
[xxv] Richard Haass, ‘The Iran Opportunity’, Foreign Affairs (Jan 6 2025)
