Iran’s presence in the Middle East has been greatly diminished with the fall of Assad. Now the question is, under the current circumstances, is it possible for Iran to return to Syria?
The rule of Bashar al-Assad and the Baath Party in Syria has ended after more than half a century, and a new era has begun in Syria. What is important for the Islamic Republic of Iran is the loss of an old and very important ally in the Arab world. The Syrian Baath government extended a hand of friendship to the new revolutionary government from the beginning of the victory of the Islamic Revolution. A common enmity with Israel and to some extent with the United States, and the hostility of both sides towards Saddam Hussein and the Baath government of Iraq, were considered the main factors in the friendship between Iran and Syria, which had reached the level of a strategic alliance.
In the 1980s, Syria rushed to the aid of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary regime by cutting off Iraq’s oil exports through the Mediterranean Sea and supplying weapons and ammunition to Iran. Although the secular Baathist government of Syria was an enemy of Islamist groups, this did not prevent it from uniting with Shiite Islamist Iran. The Alawite nature of Syria’s Baathist rulers was also not without influence in the alliance with Shiite Iran. Since the 1980s, the two countries had reached a framework for cooperation against Israel in Lebanon.
Syria was the main route for Iranian aid to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s victory in expelling Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000 and then stopping the Israeli army in the 33-day war of 2006 would have been unthinkable without Syrian aid. When the Assad regime was embroiled in civil war in the 2010s and beyond, Iran rushed to his aid and was able to save Assad from overthrow for at least 14 years. Without Iranian economic and military aid, especially the deployment of the Holy Shrine Defense Forces, and of course, without Russian support since 2015, Assad’s continued rule would have been impossible. However, now the Assad regime and the Baath Party in Syria have fallen, and the Alawites have lost their political and security position in the country. Iran has not only lost an important ally, but has also witnessed the rise of political and military currents that are strongly anti-Islamic Republic. They are fiercely hostile to the Islamic Republic of Iran, whether in the nationalist version (like the Free Syrian Army) or the Islamist version (from Tahrir al-Sham and the foreign jihadist groups affiliated with it to Brotherhood groups like Faylaq al-Sham). Syria has now also become a haven for some of the armed Sunni movements in Iran that have had ideological or operational closeness to terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda.
Furthermore, Iran’s security system has collapsed on its western flank, the Arab Middle East.
For 46 years after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Syria was a friend and ally of Iran, but now it is no longer so. Syria is now a country that will be close to Sunni Arab countries and Turkey. Although it is clear that the new rulers of Syria are closer to the Qatari faction and the Muslim Brotherhood bloc (such as the Government of National Accord in Libya) than to countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Although the political ideologies of these currents are a cause of concern for these Arab monarchies, it is clear that they prefer a Sunni government in Syria to one that is allied with Iran. Just as the United States and Israel, after 14 years of fearing the overthrow of Assad, finally realized that it is better for their interests not to have him than to have him.
With the loss of Syria, Iran has lost several geopolitical opportunities and capacities. First, the path of Iran’s assistance to Hezbollah; Hezbollah, which has seen its human and equipment capabilities damaged after a year of non-stop war with Israel, will now have a more difficult path ahead to rebuild its human and military capabilities. Second, Iran’s military and intelligence presence in Syria, which gave it an advantage in confrontation with Israel and even the United States, has also been lost. Iran no longer has access to the Mediterranean and is less able to compete with Turkey. Part of the resistance axis, which viewed Syria as a platform for arming the West Bank, now sees an important capacity lost. The resistance axis intended to arm the West Bank against Israeli occupation through the Syria-Jordan route, but now this capacity, which was a great concern for Israel, has been lost. In addition, the Golan Heights front, which could once have intensified pressure on Israel alongside southern Lebanon, no longer exists today. Third, Iran may feel concerned about the Iraqi front.
Although it is still too early to say that the developments in Syria pose a threat to Iraq, Iraq has a Sunni minority, some of whom once launched the ISIS sedition. It is possible that jihadist movements in Syria will want to flow into Iraq, but it is a threat that could affect Iraq and, consequently, Iran. Although the Iraqi army and the Popular Mobilization Forces are strong, the truth is that they will have many problems if waves of attacks by jihadist militias are launched, especially since the United States has announced that it will withdraw from Iraq. It is clear that the US withdrawal from Iraq will encourage and embolden Sunni jihadists, and the Iraqi government cannot count on US support in preventing “ISIS No. 2”. In particular, it is possible that Golani himself and the current ruling forces in Syria may decide to send them to the Iraqi slaughterhouse to get rid of the extremist forces. We must also remember that if attacks by Sunni jihadist forces from Syria on Iraq are accompanied by Israeli attacks on Iraq, the odds and chances of success will be greater.
In such a situation, is it possible that Iran could return to Syria? There is some speculation that Iran could rebuild its presence and influence in Syria. One option for Iran is the Kurds.
The Syrian Kurds, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, are now close allies of the United States, with American forces stationed alongside them in Syria. But it is clear that they also have covert ties to Iran.
The Syrian Kurds, however, have a major enemy, the biggest ally of the new rulers in Damascus: Turkey, which insists on the complete destruction of the Kurdish autonomous government in Syria. The reason is simple. They are the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. The PKK is the biggest security threat in Turkey. The US and Europe consider the PKK a terrorist organization, but not only did they support its Syrian branch in the fight against ISIS, but many members of the main Turkish PKK also participated in this battle.
The US also armed not only the Syrian branch of the PKK, but also its main Turkish branch, which was based in Syria, but a significant part of the weapons that the US gave them were used against the Turkish army forces, which angered Turkey. Even now that the US is present in Syria, Turkey is bombing Syrian Kurdish positions. If the US withdraws from Syria, there is no doubt that Turkey will end the political and military life of the Kurds. For this reason, the Kurds once sought connections with the Baathist government in Syria and Russia, and now they have no other chance but Iran. But it is clear that the Syrian Kurds’ closer proximity to Iran through Iraq will have serious consequences for them, and they will be cautious in this regard. What they are looking for is more of a covert connection with Iran, because they know that a closer alliance with Iran means being targeted by the US and Israel.
Another option for Iran might be to engage with the new rulers of Damascus through some of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood movements, such as Hamas in Palestine and other Brotherhood groups in Lebanon, Libya, and other countries. Of course, they will not forget Iran’s alliance with the Syrian Baath government and Iran’s participation in the Syrian civil war. But perhaps Iran’s hope is that some movements among them will gradually develop an anti-American and anti-Israeli orientation, which will provide a capacity for Iran to play a role. It must be said that this possibility is very weak, perhaps even close to zero. The likelihood that the ruling movements in Syria will take anti-Iranian and anti-resistance actions (for example, in Lebanon and Iraq) is much greater than that they will develop an anti-American and anti-Israeli orientation. Tahrir al-Sham leader Jolani has spoken of the need for direct engagement with the United States on various issues (from the issue of the remaining Syrian chemical arsenal to the missing American citizens in the country). It is clear that, under the guidance and guidance of Turkey, he is solely seeking to gain the consent of the United States and Israel.
Another option is Iran, the Alawites, and the Syrian Shiites (Ismailis). The Alawites are in a very difficult situation. Although the main base of the Assad regime was among the Alawites, they have not been the least bit popular among them in the last year or two. The Alawite-populated areas of Syria, namely Tartous and Latakia, have not shown the slightest resistance to the onslaught of the armed opposition to Assad, and the possibility of creating an Alawite canton in the coastal areas of Syria has been lost. The possibility that the Syrian Alawites will embark on a mass migration abroad is also not small; especially since many of them who were in the army, intelligence or political institutions of the Assad regime are now facing prosecution and execution, and there is no news of their pardon from the new Syrian government. Other Syrian Shiites, like the Ismailis, are also very small in number and have no intention of taking armed action, nor are they even close to Iran’s political and ideological positions. In short, Iran currently has no chance of regaining its presence in Syria and should be more concerned about the spread of hostile actions from the new Syria towards the other two Shiite countries in the Middle East, namely Lebanon and Iraq.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah, which has gone through a heavy war with Israel and is still not in a state of peace but in a ceasefire, may witness the infiltration of armed movements or the sending of weapons from Syria to the Sunni movements in Lebanon. Especially since both Israel and the United States, as well as some political movements within Lebanon, want to create a new political order in Lebanon in which a strong Hezbollah has no place. The same issue may happen in the case of Iraq, although with less probability and chance, which could create costs for Iran. The only remaining option for Iran to help Hezbollah through the sea is the only option that is under serious consideration, because the naval blockade of Lebanon by Israel and the UN peacekeeping forces is in place. Therefore, Iran’s only hope in the future is that the political and military forces within Syria do not reach an agreement for a political transition and turn on each other; especially since Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may be concerned and unhappy about the expansion of Qatar’s and Turkey’s influence in Syria.
Let us not forget that the Emirates has spared no effort in attacking political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood that has ruled in Libya, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia, and will most likely take similar steps in Syria. All of this, of course, may lead Syria to a direction that turns the tide against the interests of the United States and Israel without Iran incurring any costs in Syria. Although it must be said that there are no signs of such a development at the moment. Syria is tired of war, and it is unlikely that neither the political currents nor the Syrian people will welcome the start of a new round of conflict and civil war. Regional actors are also tired of the long 14-year war, and it is unthinkable that they will spend their resources on new proxy or direct adventures in Syria.
