The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have found themselves at the center of a major crisis following news investigations by leading U.S. media outlets that exposed their involvement in developing and deploying chemical weapons in the ongoing conflict against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
On Saturday, The New York Times and The Washington Post published dual investigative reports based on leaked intelligence materials. The files include approximately 150 documents, photographs, video clips, and intercepted communications, alongside thousands of text messages retrieved from the phones of Sudanese officers.
The evidence points to an alleged program established in 2024 to manufacture chlorine-based munitions. It details bomb design blueprints, testing operations, and a coordinated cover-up strategy initiated after the plot was uncovered by the United States. The records also outline plans to siphon chlorine gas from a civilian water treatment facility that had originally received the chemical from international aid agencies.
These revelations reignite long-standing allegations of chemical weapons usage that have shadowed SAF leadership since last year, significantly heightening international pressure on the military command.
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The United States previously imposed sanctions on Sudan in May 2025 over allegations that the military deployed chemical weapons during the conflict in 2024. The sanctions took effect on July 20, 2025. Authorities in Port Sudan have consistently rejected these accusations, maintaining that they do not produce, stockpile, or use chemical weapons, and emphasizing their adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
A Covert Program Amid Escalating Pressure
According to The New York Times, the SAF turned to chemical weapons early in 2024 to break a strategic stalemate, as RSF fighters held firm control over most of the capital, Khartoum.
Leaked records show that Brigadier General Tariq Hussein emerged as a central figure in July 2024, orchestrating the design, planning, and execution of the program. Intercepted messages reveal that Hussein proposed using chlorine to give army forces a tactical edge in the battle for Khartoum. He distributed prototype schematics for an explosive warhead integrated with roughly 33 pounds of chlorine gas, with production commencing that same month.
In messages published by the Times, Hussein noted that the hybrid munitions were designed to maximize lethality—either by shrapnel fragmentation or chlorine gas poisoning—asserting that the explosion would destroy all chemical traces of the attack.
On July 22, an Antonov cargo plane took off from Merowe Airport, roughly 200 miles north of Khartoum, to conduct a test launch. Following the trial, Hussein reported that the experiment was a “100 percent success,” attaching a video of a desert explosion and confirming that the munition “hit the target and released the gas.”
Brigadier General Amir Idris, identified in records as the supervisor of military drone operations, responded with a single directive: “Top Secret.”
Technical Hazards and Signs of Lethality
The communications reveal that the program faced severe technical flaws. Chemical leaks were a recurring issue; on one occasion, workers found dead insects and scorpions on the floor of a hangar after overnight exposure to leaking gas.
The incident underscored the volatile nature of the agent being handled long before it reached the battlefield. Concurrently, the program faced a critical challenge in securing a steady supply of chlorine.
Diverting Humanitarian Chlorine Supplies
According to The New York Times, 20 cylinders of chlorine gas were smuggled across the border from a neighboring country in late August 2024. Hussein calculated that this batch would yield roughly 1,100 bombs.
Hussein subsequently sought internal sources, turning to local civilian infrastructure in violation of international norms. He admitted to sourcing additional chlorine from the Al-Manara water treatment plant in Omdurman—one of the few remaining operational facilities amid the war.
“Al-Manara has some of those cylinders, and we took them from there,” Hussein stated in an August 26 voice message to Idris.
The diversion of these supplies carries significant gravity, as the chlorine at the plant was intended for emergency water purification during cholera outbreaks rather than military application.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) confirmed to the Times that it had donated 30 chlorine cylinders to the plant in 2023, while CARE reported delivering 35 cylinders across 2024 and 2025. A UNICEF spokesperson added that the organization supplied chlorine to six treatment plants in Khartoum, including Al-Manara, between 2023 and 2025.
By October 2024, Hussein reported manufacturing approximately 300 chemical munitions, most of which were stored at Merowe Airport.
Earlier in September, Hussein sent a notable message to a colleague stating, “They drank the gas,” describing an attack on RSF fighters at the Al-Jaili oil refinery north of Khartoum. This account aligns with claims made by the RSF on September 13, when the paramilitary group issued a statement accusing the army of firing “toxic” missiles at the refinery. Footage circulated online at the time showed men in civilian clothing inside the facility wearing oxygen masks.
Command Responsibility and Cover-Up Efforts
The New York Times indicates that the program was likely shuttered once U.S. officials detected its existence and moved to apply targeted sanctions.
Intercepted communications reveal that the head of Sudan’s Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, instructed Hussein to “erase all traces” of the operation. The response back was: “The operation was completed a month ago.”
During a subsequent round of measures in June, the U.S. sanctioned Hussein for importing explosives for bomb production, though that specific designation did not explicitly cite chemical weapons.
By that time, Burhan had established an internal committee to investigate the U.S. allegations. According to documents in the file, Hussein himself—the architect of the program—was appointed as an advisor to the panel.
The intelligence indicates that General Burhan was not merely informed after the fact, but was directly involved in overseeing the chemical weapons program. His direct knowledge was a primary factor in the U.S. decision to impose sanctions on him in January 2025.
While proving chemical weapons usage in conflict zones remains complex, arms experts consulted by The New York Times concurred that available evidence strongly points to their deployment in the Sudanese conflict. However, they stressed the necessity of an independent field investigation.
Addressing the findings, the Emergency Lawyers group, a Sudanese legal advocacy organization, issued a statement calling for a transparent international probe. The group urged that “international experts be granted safe, unconditional access to targeted sites, enable the physical examination of munitions fragments and delivery systems, and be permitted to interview witnesses and victims independently and securely.”
