President Trump’s periodic mentions of attempting a third presidential run have largely been dismissed as jokes throughout the last decade. Recently, however, these instances seem increasingly serious. Since 2018, he has alternated between quipping about remaining in office for 10 years, to admitting he wouldn’t be able to run, before publicly asserting the existence of “methods” to make a third term possible. The Trump Organisation is already selling red ‘Trump 2028’ caps (brandished by Trump at a rescheduled White House Correspondents’ Dinner this year). Trump has told NBC he was “not joking” about the possibility (NBC, 2025). In a meeting with Zelensky, the president appeared to imply the US 2028 election could be cancelled if the US were at war, saying “During the war, you can’t have elections?… three and a half years from now, if we happen to be in a war with somebody, no more elections? That’s good” (C-SPAN, 2025). Aside from being a direct violation of the US Constitution, genuine discussions of a third term may be symptomatic of a wider democratic backsliding pattern in America.
The Mechanics and “Methods” of a Third Term
The 22nd Amendment of the US Constitution directly forbids a president from being elected more than twice, and that norm has been consistently enforced since the Amendment’s ratification in 1951. Franklin D. Roosevelt, in power before the Amendment, is the only president in US history to serve more than two terms. Constitutional amendments require significant supermajorities of support: two-thirds of Congress or two-thirds of states calling for a convention, followed by ratification by three-quarters of states. This process is critical in allowing changes without needing to overturn entire governing frameworks, but also functions as a double-edged sword which can lock in bad practices, be weaponised in polarised culture wars, and aptly demonstrate the democratic populace’s vulnerability to the age-old ‘tyranny of the majority’ problem.
Despite constitutional provisions, there are indeed methods to bypass the 22nd Amendment. One method suspected by observers is the interplay of the 22nd and 25th Amendments, the latter ruling that presidents who die, resign or are otherwise incapacitated will be replaced by their Vice President. In the case of Trump, some have suggested an ally (such as J.D Vance) may stand in the 2028 election, then immediately resign and hand the reins back to Trump, allowing a third Trump presidency without a third electoral victory. The 12th Amendment, however, could stand in the way of this strategy, as it prohibits those constitutionally ineligible for the presidency from the office of Vice President. When asked about this possibility, Trump called the method “too cute”, and said people wouldn’t like this play (Horley and Versteeg, 2025). While speculative, the comments reflect Trump’s willingness to continue entertaining extra-constitutional possibilities, something consistent with his own history of contested elections and incited (then pardoned) violent insurrection.
Stay ahead of the geopolitical week.
MD Briefing delivers expert analysis across five global fronts — the Indo-Pacific, energy, geoeconomics, European security, and the Middle East — every Monday morning. Free.
Trump may instead choose to push for a further constitutional amendment – or a general rewrite. A Columbia Law Review paper from Versteeg, Horley, Meng, Guim and Guirguis (2020) found constitutional amendment was the most popular method chosen by presidential overstayers around the globe. Success of the method depended upon the incumbent’s power and the strength of the nation’s constitution. To the US population, the Constitution is more than a historical document; it is seen as a guarantor of personal freedoms, an assurance of national stability, a framework for democratic empowerment, and a source of civic identity. Article V of the Constitution rules that state assent is determined by states’ elected representatives, not direct voter referendum. Thus, while Trump’s popularity ratings may be low, his actual power in the government and his strong support base among purposefully appointed loyalists have expanded significantly – meaning constitutional amendment, while still politically difficult, cannot be dismissed outright despite possible voter opposition.
Another route to a third term could operate through the US judicial system. While the courts cannot formally amend the Constitution (due to strict textual amendment limits and the, contemporarily shaky, separation of powers), the courts can radically change the meaning, interpretation and impact of constitutional provisions. Whether this power means judges are able to act as unelected lawmakers, or is a vital part of the Constitution’s dynamic ability to adapt to new national contexts, is a cornerstone of the enduring debate between those who see the Constitution as ‘living’ and those who prefer an ‘originalist’ approach. The same Columbia study found that courts are often involved in overstay attempts, and opposition action, civil movements and elite defection are far more reliable obstacles to constitutional manipulation.
In this case, the courts may choose to allow the interplay between the 22nd and 25th Amendments, deciding the 22nd’s term limit doesn’t necessarily qualify as a 12th Amendment ‘ineligibility’. The 25th Amendment exists to prevent power vacuums in the absence of a president, and the 12th to ensure Vice Presidents’ eligibility to become the president if necessary. These original motivations could be cited by courts both in support and opposition of a third Trump presidency, or the stabilising intention of the 25th may be seen as more important than the more incidental and administrative designs of the 12th. The courts could also choose to focus on the idea of the “stolen” second term, referencing the unbacked claims from Trump (over 100 times in six months (Reuters, 2020)) that the 2020 election was rigged against him. The courts could nullify a previous term to allow him to make up for “stolen” time in a Putin-esque clock reset. There is, however, no historical precedent or textual basis for such a conclusion. Finally, Trump may simply file the paperwork to run for president in 2028. If, as is likely, state election officials refused to put his name on the ballot in line with the 22nd Amendment, there would be an immediate lawsuit brought to the Supreme Court by Trump’s legal team – probably arguing that states lack the authority to intervene on major party nominees on federal ballots. The Supreme Court would be faced with either creatively interpreting the Constitution to allow Trump’s run (in a serious departure from prevailing constitutional interpretation), or with accepting the authority of individual states to determine ballot access – thereby exposing unresolved tensions between state autonomy and national electoral uniformity.
Some find it unlikely for the US Supreme Court to support presidential overstay. Conservative Justices often have originalist, textualist constitutional legal philosophies. An amendment of this extremity – seemingly for the benefit of a single individual – may be diametrically opposed to their values. To defer to Trump’s influence would erode the legitimacy of the Supreme Court as a reliable, non-partisan, constitutionally-loyal institution. Even Trump’s own Supreme Court nominees largely refused to support his efforts to overturn the 2020 election.
That said, the fact remains that justices are presidentially-nominated, then secondarily Senate-confirmed. Nominees are, to some extent, politically motivated. The judicial review acts as a key check on presidential and congressional power, but the Constitution assumes judges are independent reviewers, not politically motivated loyalists. If the institution’s appointments are based on ideology, not good faith, then that check faces serious potential erosion. Traditionally, Republican presidents favour judicial conservatism. Yet Trump is no traditional Republican; while he espouses the same general right-wing ideology, he diverges from post-war conservative traditions toward populist-conservatism: challenging political norms and institutions, expanding executive authority, emphasising personal loyalty and blurring the separation of powers. As the nation at large polarises into radical left and alt-right, more Trump-loyalist potential Justices may enter the running for Supreme Court vacancies before the next election. Trump’s lower federal court nominees, when asked earlier this year, refused to answer whether Trump could attempt a third term (Forbes, 2026). While the US is yet to have a true ‘pack court’, these developments highlight the worrying possibility of partisan lower-court loyalists legitimising and popularising fringe third-term notions, creating enough disagreement in the judiciary for temporary legal chaos.
Constitutional Vulnerabilities
Any discussion of constitutional amendment, interpretation, and intention necessarily entails a degree of examination of the Constitution itself; whether it is ‘fit for purpose’ and foundational, or outdated and inadequate. The textual gap between the 22nd and 25th Amendments exemplifies the adequacy contention, since there is no enforcement mechanism clarifying the difference between being elected and serving. The Constitution’s gap-based vulnerabilities arguably impact the country it governs, which is thus led by an alterable, interpretable and anachronistic text.
Examining the document’s anachronism, two further vulnerabilities are highlighted. The amendment and convention thresholds (significant supermajorities), codified in the Constitution, assume a baseline of interparty consensus and cooperation exists within Congress. In today’s highly polarised political environment, that level of bipartisan agreement is rare. This means meaningful (and preventative) constitutional amendments, for example to prevent Trump from exploiting any of the loopholes explained above, would be extremely difficult. The same thresholds preventing rash constitutional change can also be obstacles to vital reforms.
The document also relies on norms and their enforcement: everyone in both the nation and its ostensibly representative political class must agree on the ultimate authority of the Constitution, not just its existence as a foundational text, in order for its rules to be observed. If a populist strongman is able to incite an insurgent riot over something as democratically central as elections, there may be scope for the same individual to rouse serious public demand to re-examine, and retrofit, the Constitution itself.
The Fallibility of Beauchamp’s ‘Formidable Obstacles’ and Wider Patterns Backsliding in the US
Beauchamp (2025) suggests Trump’s “increasingly cogent plan for destroying American democracy” faces formidable obstacles, including federalism, the independent judiciary, the free press, and public skepticism. Beauchamp offers careful optimism on this basis: federalism can hinder executive aggrandisement, courts can block unlawful action, independent press can document misdeeds, and the US public retains its democratic powers of (dis)approval. Beauchamp carefully qualifies this optimism, emphasising that democracies often careen between democratic recovery and backsliding before overall authoritarian outcomes, and that modern backsliding is generally incremental and iterative.
Now, even Beauchamp’s cautious optimism appears to have been slightly misplaced. At the time of his writing, Trump had domestically deployed federal troops, encouraged politically aligned billionaires to take over cynical media outlets, and attempted to persecute political opponents. Today, executive authority has been aggressively expanded by the administration across most policy spheres, senior civil servants and officials have been ousted in favour of loyalists, and pressure on independent actors (universities, state governments etc) has significantly intensified. Away from home, America’s democratic conduct has also left much to be desired, arguably acting beyond its brief in pursuit of hegemonic primacy. The ‘formidable’ obstacles informing last year’s optimism are increasingly, incrementally fading into the background, while backsliding indicators like executive aggrandisement are moving quickly to the foreground.
Scholars of democracy generally agree that backsliding involves moving away from three pillars; free and fair elections, the protection of basic political rights and liberties, and the existence of horizontal checks of executive discretion – including the rule of law. Each of these pillars arguably faces a serious threat from the Trump administration. January 6th exemplifies the threat to the first pillar; even after winning the 2016 election, Trump insisted on widespread (since disproven) voter fraud. Following the lost 2020 election, Trump submitted lawsuits, led pressure campaigns directed at state officials, implored legislators to reject certified votes, pressured the Department of Justice, and attempted to delay certification – eventually leading to the storming of Capitol Hill. Regarding rights, protections, and liberty, the administration has been consistently accused of ignoring basic international human rights provisions (e.g. non-refoulement, detention centres). Families implicated in new legislation on immigrants are separated indiscriminately, mass deportations are in the works, floods of reports of serious abuses of detainees are being revealed – regarding the treatment of both adults and children alike. On the third pillar of executive discretion, Trump has signed more total executive orders in his combined 5.5 years in office (489 total orders) than his recent two-term predecessors did across full, uninterrupted eight-year tenures (Ballotpedia, 2026). Many law firms have objected to these orders (269 so far this term), and the DoJ, claiming political ‘lawfare’ has then targeted said firms. Methods of targeting include revoking security clearances for firms’ attorneys and instructing federal agencies to terminate contracts with the firms and their clients. Trump has made emergency declarations, has bypassed Congress, and has generally ruled ‘by’ law, not followed the rule ‘of’ law, from inside the executive office whenever possible.
Looking at these sustained attacks on these three pillars of democracy, it is clear that mentions of a third term are the latest installment in a protracted journey of authoritarian decline. The journey is slow, incremental, distractingly sensationalist and dizzyingly contentious – but the journey is undoubtedly underway.
Elite Interests: An Absent Obstacle
The aforementioned Columbia Law identifies elite defection as a key corrective element in democratic backsliding, but this depends pivotally on whether political and economic elites have distinctly heterogeneous interests. Heterogeneity ensures overreach by one threatens the other, and explains political phenomena like whistleblowing, regulation, campaign funding and lobbying. Under Trump, this separation has seemingly collapsed; political and economic elite interests have converged, and opposing the executive has become both materially costly and irrational to elites who find that the current administration serves their own interests.
At Trump’s inauguration, this collusion was evident. Some of the most influential tech industry figures (Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, Tim Cook etc) were front and centre in the rotunda, placed among Trump’s family and in front of his cabinet picks. AI deregulation illustrates this reciprocality. Biden’s AI-safety executive order was swiftly replaced with a federal pre-emption policy preventing AI safety rules and red-teaming requirements. Tech billionaires directly lobbied Trump to derail safety orders – and succeeded. Elite influence is now not just passive assent to friendly policy, but active co-authorship. The Department of Government Efficiency has used AI tools itself to draft plans for federal regulation retrenchment. Trump has also signed a crypto-currency executive order establishing a presidential working group (chaired by billionaire David Sacks) tasked with building friendlier federal regulation frameworks for the industry. Despite US conflict-of-interest laws preventing officials (not explicitly naming presidents and vice presidents) from participating in matters affecting their own finances, Trump has earned over $1.4 billion from his family’s cryptocurrency ventures since 2025 (MS NOW, 2026), and even more from general securities trading – buying stock in companies affected by his own policy choices and promoting companies in which he owned shares (CNN, 2026).
In a world where money increasingly informs political power, perhaps the threats to the constitutional limitations on the executive office aren’t just coming from the political sphere, but from overt collusion with its economic counterpart, too.
Presidentialism: Exploitation of Inherent Flaws
Linz (1990) suggests the “perils” of the presidential system explain is its positive correlation with democratic backsliding. Presidentialism produces rival power centres while reducing incentives for compromise and the presidency itself attracts powerful strongmen with no necessary political allegiance who can gain popularity simply by critiquing the existing system. Linz also offered two reasons for US exceptionalism to this diagnosis: the US public’s political moderation/intolerance of extremism, and the presence of heterogenous parties with a wide variety of perspectives.
Both reasons for exceptionalism, unfortunately, no longer hold. The US public is overwhelmingly divided along hostile partisan lines. Ideologically-constrained beliefs have expanded massively, and party identification/membership is a far more reliable indicator of a whole host of issue positions than in the mid-century. Extreme public polarisation is a favourable condition for autocratisation. In the case of the third term, the polarisation condition means the consensus needed for a third-term-preventative-amendment is highly unlikely. Despite consistently opposed rhetoric, neither the ‘republicrats’ nor ‘demicans’ offers meaningful commitments to the litany of issues faced by the US public which would actually require significant overhaul of existing arrangements and a substantive break from entrenched, moneyed interests. Trump’s success can, at least partially, be attributed to radical, anti-establishment messaging which speaks to the disillusioned American electorate.
The presidential system’s destructive tendencies, identified by Linz, include poverty, inequality, violent crime and corruption; all of which cater to authoritarian shifts. In his characteristic extremity, Trump has arguably taken these inherent flaws and intensified them. Compromise has flown out of the American political window, while polarisation, celebrated majoritarian interests, disdain for liberal democracy, eroded electoral legitimacy, and curtailed civil liberties have all entered to take temperance’s place. If, by some twist of fate, Trump achieves a third term in office, there are few methods at the disposal of the American people to prevent these extremes from being taken even further – and few political groups united enough to present a comprehensive defense.
The International Sphere: Raised Stakes and Comparative Cases
In the wider world, of the ten countries with the largest movement toward autocracy in the last decade, nearly all were initially liberal or electoral democracies (V-DEM, 2025). Like Trump, both Orban (Hungary) and Erdogan (Turkey) restructured their judiciaries to remove judges perceived as insufficiently aligned with the government and both have been accused of concentrating media ownership among allied oligarchs. Like Trump, both claimed exclusive representation of the “real” people of their respective nations in the face of threatening enemies, and both attacked the legitimacy of elections and opposition. All three have reduced checks on executive authority and massively expanded the remit of the president’s can influence. Rather than using a traditional coup to destroy democracy outright (despite Trump’s best efforts), all three have illustrated that elected leaders can gradually weaken liberal-democratic checks and balances while continuing to ostensibly operate in democratic systems.
Unlike Hungary or Turkey, the US is the principal architect, overseer and guarantor of a large part of the post-1945 international ‘liberal’ order. Central to the UN(SC), NATO, Bretton Woods-based financial hegemons (IMF, World Bank), global trade architecture, international security, sanctions enforcement and so on, US democratic backsliding has the potential for far greater global consequences than similar developments in Turkey or Hungary. Like the contested ‘domino theory’ of the 20th century, political scientists often describe democratic erosion as contagious. If the US, a nation which has historically intervened on democratic abuses elsewhere, weakens its judiciary, refuses to accept elections and politicises both its law enforcement and its constitutional applications then a two-stranded erosion becomes possible: not only do these things become acceptable as the global Overton window shifts toward autocracy, but nations will also engage in these activities with far less fear of US retaliation – the US, if only in terms of categorisation, will join the autocratic ranks. Despite a messy, often wealth-driven intervention history, US funds and support help with global election monitoring, independent journalism, anti-corruption and judicial reforms. An increasingly authoritarian government may withdraw funding (a process already in motion) and fail to prevent similar backsliding abroad.
This prediction, of eroded norms, is notably not the worst-case scenario. The prediction assumes the US will remain relatively benign; tacitly endorsing autocracy but not dismantling or derailing the world order at large. A more cynical assessment would take note of America’s unparalleled global power, the world’s largest military budget, hundreds of overseas bases, extensive intelligence alliances and massive nuclear arsenal. It would look at serious recent sovereignty violations in Venezuela, proposed actions in Greenland, continued sanctions on Cuba, and dissatisfaction with centrist EU politics (BBC, 2025). It would worry an unchecked strongman at the helm of a hegemonic powerhouse could pose a genuine threat to the stability and freedom of the rest of the world. Factoring in the US dollar, which remains the world’s reserve currency, the economic consequences of an unstable US autocracy could be catastrophic for global capital markets, international banking, investment, and exchange rates. A constitutional crisis in the US would likely become a global financial event; and official conversations about the possibility of a third term (like Steve Bannon’s assurance that a ‘plan’ is in development in the White House) may be enough to create unease among investors and market speculators.
Conclusion
The third term proposals, whether jokes, foreshadowing or strategy, are important symptoms of a larger problem: the extended project of democratic erosion. As Linz exceptionalism theses and Beauchamp’s optimism increasingly seem like relics of a more liberal, moderate and tolerant past, as a convicted felon (on 34 counts) leads the ‘free world’ and as global politics errs more and more on the side of extremism, the third-term notion is much more than a discordant joke from an irreverent politician. Even if the notion is just a hollow show of strength (as suggested by scholar John Fortier (Levison, 2026)), the fact it has not been met with mass opposition, organised resistance and widespread dissent is a worrying one. More and more, the American populace is being exposed to undemocratic, unconstitutional, and extreme politics. As they become desensitised to their leader’s behaviour, one begins to wonder what exactly it would take for someone to stand in Trump’s way.
