The U.S.-China Intelligence War and 2026 Forecast

In 2026, the intelligence conflict between the United States and China shifted from clandestine operations to an unprecedentedly open and technological confrontation, with Washington focusing on combining human power with technological superiority to penetrate Chinese systems. The US-China intelligence relationship, up to early 2026, witnessed an unprecedented escalation, which could be described as a comprehensive espionage war encompassing technological, military, and cyber domains. The United States’ use of espionage as a weapon in China is evident in its overt recruitment, human operations, and digital recruitment campaigns against China. In February 2026, the American intelligence agency CIA launched a public recruitment campaign using Mandarin Chinese videos on digital social media platforms like YouTube. This campaign targeted disaffected Chinese military officers and officials, aiming to cultivate new Chinese sources. Washington exploited internal crises in China to recruit Chinese agents for the CIA. The US intelligence services sought to capitalize on the fallout from anti-corruption campaigns within the Chinese military to encourage affected officers to cooperate with Washington.

This prompted a Chinese threat against these systematic US intelligence and military campaigns. Beijing pledged to take all necessary measures to counter these American attempts to confront it and combat foreign espionage. It launched public campaigns warning its citizens against dealing with Western and American agencies, further escalating intelligence tensions between the two sides. China’s counter-response to the US’s overt recruitment of Chinese citizens included increased Chinese intelligence attempts to infiltrate US government email systems, including targeting US congressional staff. These Chinese espionage activities aimed at penetrating US interests and systems have become more than just traditional espionage; they aim to enable China to activate the infiltration and cause rapid disruption to essential US services during geopolitical crises. The number of Chinese field espionage cases within the US has also increased. In January 2026, the US Department of Justice announced prison sentences for individuals convicted of spying for China, including a 200-month sentence for a former US Navy sailor.

This summary reflects the intelligence landscape between China and the United States up to 2026. The two countries are engaged in a race to modernize their espionage capabilities. Washington seeks to rebuild its previously damaged network, while Beijing strengthens its digital and physical security grip. Increased operations in technological and cyber espionage, as well as artificial intelligence warfare, have been observed. Washington focuses its intelligence efforts on gathering precise data on Chinese companies developing artificial intelligence and advanced computing technologies. Accusing China of violating US intellectual property rights, the White House accused China in April 2026 of conducting systematic operations to steal American artificial intelligence secrets through thousands of fake accounts. This prompted US intelligence to intensify its countermeasures to protect technological laboratories. The US has also employed techniques to hack into commercial satellite systems to monitor Chinese activities and movements. The United States increasingly relies on commercial satellite and radar networks capable of detecting through clouds and darkness to monitor Chinese movements in the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea.

The United States has also increased its use of military and field espionage technologies and spy planes against China. The US continues to regularly fly spy planes along the edge of Chinese airspace to monitor Beijing’s military activity. Simultaneously, it is monitoring (China’s nuclear program). US intelligence assessments published in 2026 revealed that China is developing a new generation of nuclear weapons, and Washington is monitoring these Chinese nuclear sites, such as Lop Nur, using advanced remote sensing technology. This places nuclear intelligence activity between China and the United States in the spotlight. The US is also employing space weapons in its conflict with China. Here, the United States is racing against time to develop (space weapons and maneuverable satellites) to counter (China’s satellite-destroying capabilities).

However, several current US intelligence and military challenges remain in the face of China, the most significant being the diversion of US attention. Washington’s involvement in other conflicts, such as the conflict with Iran, could affect the pace and strength of intelligence deterrence directed against China. This is precisely what the (CIA’s Annual Threat Assessment 2026) warned against. The American National Intelligence Estimate 2026 warned that China remains the most serious, widespread, active, and persistent cyber threat to critical infrastructure and government and private networks in the United States, with ongoing attempts by China to penetrate US government and private networks.

  In this context, the ongoing Iranian war in 2026 has deepened the trust gap between the United States and China, directly impacting the escalation of intelligence activity between them, transforming developments on the ground into an arena for indirect strategic competition. The effects of the current Iranian war on intelligence operations between Washington and Beijing have intensified. With increasing US accusations of Chinese espionage, Washington has accused Beijing of exploiting the current crisis to bolster its strategic position, deeming it an unreliable partner due to stockpiling Iranian oil and reducing exports of vital goods. Concurrently with increased US intelligence activity to monitor covert Chinese support for Iran, US intelligence has detected shipments of Chinese shoulder-fired missiles sent to Tehran. This has prompted Washington to closely monitor Chinese involvement, with US President Donald Trump threatening consequences if Beijing continues to supply Iran with new air defense systems.

The US-China intelligence war intensified after the 2016 Iran War, particularly concerning the target bank. The US escalated its intelligence operations to develop a precise target bank in Iran, including missile factories and commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Meanwhile, US intelligence reports indicated that some of Iran’s military capabilities remained intact despite escalating US strikes due to Chinese support. This suggests Iranian attempts with Chinese backing to conceal these capabilities. Espionage operations targeting energy interests also increased after the Iran war. Washington closely monitors China’s movements, given its status as the largest importer of Iranian oil. US strikes on facilities like Iran’s Kharg Island represent an effort to exert influence over oil resources and tighten the noose on economic alliances between Beijing and Tehran.

However, despite the tension and intelligence conflict between the US and China, there have been attempts at temporary de-escalation before summits, especially the anticipated summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Trump. Despite the tension, reports indicate a potential breakthrough and ongoing negotiations between the two sides. China has been careful not to criticize Washington directly to avoid economic repercussions, leading to a quiet intelligence-based management of points of contention before the leaders’ summits. In short, the Iranian war has become a tool to weaken Iranian military capabilities, which are supported by China, while the US maintains strict control over any Chinese movements or activities that might strengthen Tehran’s position against potential US-Israeli military strikes.

Dr.Nadia Helmy
Dr.Nadia Helmy
Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Politics and Economics / Beni Suef University- Egypt. An Expert in Chinese Politics, Sino-Israeli relationships, and Asian affairs- Visiting Senior Researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES)/ Lund University, Sweden- Director of the South and East Asia Studies Unit