In August 2026, Kazakhstan will hold an unusual election. The newly established unicameral parliament—the “Kurultai”—will, for the first time, be formed entirely through party lists. Independent candidates and regional representatives will no longer enter the core of state power. As a representative institution of so-called “steppe democracy,” the Kurultai has undergone multiple transformations throughout history, both in its functions and in the composition of its participants. According to recent constitutional arrangements, this mechanism has been elevated to an unprecedented level. This raises a key question: what direction does this transformation reveal in the current round of political modernization?
Historically, the Kurultai functioned as an important mechanism of consultation in steppe society, not as a system of mass participation, but as a platform composed of multiple layers of elite actors. Its participants included khans and sultans who held political authority, biys who were responsible for adjudication and governance, military leaders who organized mobilization in times of war, as well as tribal elders and influential akyns and zhyrau who shaped public discourse. In addressing critical issues such as succession, warfare, and internal conflict, the Kurultai did not rely on formalized procedures or fixed institutional rules. Instead, decisions were reached through authority, negotiation, and consensus. Although ordinary people did not possess direct institutional channels of participation, their interests and attitudes indirectly constrained decision-making through tribal structures, public opinion, and their willingness to comply with and implement decisions.
During the Soviet period and the early years of Kazakhstan’s independence, the Kurultai gradually lost its function as an operative political institution and became a symbol of historical memory and cultural identity. It was not until 2022, amid a serious crisis of political trust, that this traditional symbol was revived and institutionalized as the “National Kurultai,” reintroduced as a new format of public dialogue within the framework of state governance. Its declared purpose is to strengthen interaction between the government and society. In terms of composition, the National Kurultai formally continues the tradition of “broad participation,” including regional representatives, members of parliament, professionals from various sectors, and leaders of social organizations with a degree of public influence. However, this diversity is largely structural rather than functional. It reflects broad inclusion, but does not necessarily translate into a substantive mechanism for reconciling competing interests. The institution lacks the capacity to independently coordinate diverse social demands.
Moreover, the agenda-setting process and operational logic of the National Kurultai remain distinctly top-down. Key issues are primarily defined by the state, while participants tend to act as interpreters and endorsers of pre-established policy directions. In this sense, “consultation” often takes the form of explaining and legitimizing the state agenda. Through the participation and symbolic endorsement of elite actors, the state is able to construct an image of “broad public dialogue,” thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of its reform agenda. In this respect, the National Kurultai should not be seen as a simple continuation of a traditional consultative institution, but rather as an institutionalized platform for political communication and discursive integration. Its core function lies not in generating genuinely competitive policy alternatives, but in organizing a process of “consensus production” aimed at shaping values, mobilizing society, and reproducing the legitimacy of ongoing reforms.
In 2026, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced a major reform of Kazakhstan’s parliamentary system, proposing the transition to a unicameral “Kurultai Parliament.” Its members will be elected entirely through proportional representation based on party lists. The reform abolishes both the presidential quota and the special quota previously allocated to the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. At the same time, quota guarantees for women, youth, and persons with disabilities will be retained, but incorporated into party list mechanisms rather than being directly allocated by the state.
From the perspective of institutional design, this reform strengthens the role of political parties as key intermediaries within the political system, positioning them as the primary channel through which social demands are transmitted to the state. In the context of electoral competition, parties are expected to secure support by more effectively representing public interests, while also integrating fragmented social demands. Compared with the previous mixed model of representation, which included multiple categories of actors, a party-centered system enhances the coherence of political positions: social demands are systematically aggregated and restructured before entering the political arena, thereby improving, to some extent, the efficiency of policy articulation and decision-making.
Building on this, if meaningful and substantive competition among political parties can be established, this model has the potential not only to integrate social interests but also to more fully reflect the diversity of social groups. Political parties could function not merely as instruments of organization and coordination, but also as a crucial link between diverse societal demands and the process of state decision-making—balancing efficiency in representation with breadth and inclusiveness.Under such conditions, the consultative model of the Kurultai may gradually evolve from an elite-driven mechanism of integration into an institutionalized system of interest articulation grounded in party competition, thereby enhancing, to a certain extent, its capacity for bottom-up representation.
