Kinetic action starts the moment persuasion fails, and the US-Iran adventure is one classic example of that. The US had it all planned out; it still has a blueprint. No, it does not know what it is doing; it has no endgame, it does not have an objective, it is being used by Israel to fight its war, and more. These have been the narratives, statements, and analyses that are infinite in number and ruling the social media at the moment. The conflict has expanded in nature and in scope, and everyone is talking about almost everything. To put things in the correct order, it is necessary to understand it from a different lens. The purpose of this article is to take you through the naval suasion, how it failed, and the resulting kinetic action, a joint operation that is now in its 22nd day.
Naval suasion is not a new concept; it was propagated by Edward N. Luttwak in his book “The Political Uses of Sea Power” in 1974. It can be categorized into latent and active suasion. In the latent phases, the naval strength itself can be a sign enough to deter or deliver a message not to mess with that state, and active suasion would require states to go for a build-up, positioning, and communication to deliver the incoming threat. One interesting aspect is that, simultaneously, table talks could be in the loop too. With respect to the US-Iran situation. The Armada near Iran before the confrontation started was naval suasion in its active phase, and at the same time, talks in Oman and Geneva were being carried out. This was not gunboat diplomacy but rather a classic case of naval suasion.
In addition, changing the course of the carrier strike group and positioning them in the Arabian and Mediterranean Seas was naval suasion in the active phase. The armada in the Arabian Sea was Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 3, which included the flagship USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72), Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 9, guided missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay (CG 53), and the guided missile destroyers of Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 21. Now combine this with the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 12, which included the world’s largest aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 8, Destroyer Squadron TWO (DESRON-2), assigned destroyers, and USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81).
Simultaneously, there were talks till 26 February in Geneva in their third round. Mediator, Oman, declared that significant progress had been made and more discussion would be held in Vienna. The Foreign Minister of Iran said that though progress was made, differences remain, and there is no immediate response by POTUS(President of the United States). In the US House of Representatives, there were talks regarding forcing a vote next week for a bill that would bind Trump to seek congressional approval before a possible attack on Iran. The reservation within the US existed because of the warning, the threat, and the buildup that was directed at Iran by President Trump.
There were reports from different sources that were broadcast on electronic media that there is a chance of a potential attack on Iran by Trump. Eventually, active persuasion failed. Iran was negotiating, but according to Trump, now it was the time for kinetic action, as the demands he wanted were not surrendered to.
With all the conspiracies aside, it is crucial to understand that this set a new precedent for naval buildup and is now not merely relying on persuasion but kinetic action. First, the demonstration of naval suasion failing and kinetic action taking place was witnessed in Venezuela, and swift victory was achieved. Though the case of Iran is different, the regime is different, and the geography is different. The naval buildup was great for persuasion in Iran. Kinetic action was unnecessary, as the war did not bring swift victory, and that has resulted in ambiguity of US objectives, endgame, and whatever it is doing right now.
It is imperative to understand that the Persian Gulf is not something where the US can enter without choking itself along the way, as it is not prepared for asymmetric and prolonged warfare, as is quite evident through its seeking drone expertise from Ukraine. The Strait of Hormuz is not that easy to take the fleets through; even to keep it open for the world cannot be achieved just by the US alone. There was a reason the US was seeking help in the name of another operation meant for countering the strategic blocking of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran. Though it was brave of them to calculate the strategic risk, prioritize their national interests, and do what is more rational for them. Cold War allies are now being tested, and Trump appears to be agitated by their response. However, he clarified that they do not need them; he just wanted to see their reaction—a prudent action indeed.
Due to the Middle Eastern fiasco, there have been contradictory statements from US official representatives regarding the objectives and endgame, and all of them appear to be the victims of quicksand. A sunk cost fallacy has been committed by the US, and with its feet in quicksand, it is facing a dilemma of whether to quit or not, and if it quits, then how. Though it would have been more rational and pragmatic to use naval suasion than to initiate a kinetic action from which there is no coming back the easy way. As Machiavelli said: “wars begin when you will, but do not end when you please.’’
