The recent wave of Iranian missile and drone attacks across the Middle East has revealed the vulnerabilities of the region’s security structure. Many of the countries that are directly exposed to Iran’s threat already possess advanced anti-air and missile defense systems, which include Patriot, THAAD, and South Korea’s M-SAM II. Nevertheless, such capabilities have not translated into effective deterrence. The key problem is the absence of integration, rather than the weapons systems themselves.
South Korea has faced similar challenges in confronting a missile-heavy North Korea. Instead of relying on missile defense alone, Seoul structured a comprehensive framework called the Three Axis system—comprised of the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), the Kill Chain, and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR). Although the Middle East operates under different geopolitical and political constraints, the underlying logic of the system is highly relevant. Iran’s increasingly evolving strategy—that combines ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and proxy forces—requires a response that integrates not only defense but also disruption and retaliation into a single structure.
The first pillar of such a framework would be the Middle East’s equivalent of KAMD. As pointed out, this region already has much of the necessary hardware. Patriot batteries are fielded across a number of Gulf states, the UAE has long operated THAAD, and Saudi Arabia has recently started to operate its own THAAD. Meanwhile, South Korea’s M-SAM II is emerging as a crucial component of the mid-tier interceptor layer through major export contracts, while its recent performance in the Iranian conflict has consolidated its reliability as an interceptor. The major problem is that these systems are not working as a unified network.
Therefore, the Middle Eastern version of KAMD should be built as a regionally integrated air and missile defense system instead of a collection of national shields. This necessitates a layered structure that is comprised of shared early warning, upper-tier, mid-tier interception, and low-tier interception against drones and missiles. Among these, the mid-tier—that operates Patriot PAC-3 MSE and M-SAM II—would likely assume the greatest operational burden. At the same time, low-tier defense would also be important, since this layer remains underdeveloped despite Iran’s growing reliance on inexpensive drones to saturate defense. If this layer is not strengthened, the Middle Eastern countries would confront a risk of depleting high-end interceptors in order to respond to low-cost platforms.
In addressing this gap, South Korean weapon systems would play an important role. While M-SAM II would provide a mid-tier defense solution that has expandability and interoperability, the introduction of L-SAM in the future would reinforce the upper-tier defense capabilities of countries including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Above all, South Korean systems could contribute to standardizing the architecture across multiple states, facilitating regional security integration.
The second pillar is a Middle Eastern adaptation of the Kill Chain. In the case of South Korea, Kill Chain is closely connected with the preemptive strike concept against an imminent missile launch. However, considering the political constraints and operational realities in the Middle East, it is difficult to apply the concept without regional adaptation. Iran’s launch platforms are mobile and distributed, while some of them are operated by proxies. Therefore, a rigid preemptive strike doctrine is neither realistic nor sustainable.
Instead, the Middle Eastern Kill Chain should be understood as a left-of-launch system that is primarily designed to reduce the effectiveness of an attack before or immediately after launch. To make this possible, it needs uninterrupted ISR against Iranian territory and proxy networks, early identification of launchers and command-and-control nodes, and the integration of non-kinetic tools such as electronic warfare and cyber operations. Here, selective kinetic tools like precision airstrikes and maritime interdiction could complement these capabilities.
The key task is not the availability of individual tools but the integration of these functions into a common decision-making structure. In many countries in the Middle East, intelligence, defense, and strike functions remain compartmentalized. An effective kill chain demands that these elements operate within a single decision-making loop so that detection can swiftly be translated into disruption.
South Korea’s contribution to this pillar would be relatively limited, yet meaningful. Even though the command-and-control system would likely be largely dependent on U.S. and regional cooperation, South Korean weapon systems—most notably, the Chunmoo guided rocket & missiles—could offer precision strike capabilities that are equipped with mobility and expandability. In countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, such capabilities could contribute to strengthening the link between detection and response.
The third pillar would be a Middle Eastern adaptation of KMPR. The South Korean KMPR is designed to impose overwhelming costs on North Korea in the case of a large-scale attack. However, in the Middle East, such an approach should be modified due to the different political environment and escalation risks. Rather than focusing on a massive decapitation mission, structuring a precise, proportional, and credible retaliation system would be more realistic.
This requires three elements. First, reliable attribution is essential, especially since Iran has the tendency to use proxies. Second, response thresholds should be clarified in connection with specific types of attacks—such as strikes on energy infrastructure or civilian facilities. Third, precision strike capabilities that could be employed repeatedly are needed. This would enable continuous retaliation without triggering uncontrolled escalation.
Even in this field, South Korean weapon systems can make a meaningful contribution. Platforms, including the Chunmoo, could buttress a proportional retaliation strategy by providing a flexible and repeatable strike option. While not all countries need such capabilities, they are particularly relevant for Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are best positioned to anchor the retaliatory pillar of the architecture.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of the Middle Eastern three-axis system will be determined by the operational method, rather than the individual weapon systems themselves. This region must move toward a system-centric approach that includes shared threat assessment, automated alert levels, and the integration of decision-making on both defense and attack. At the same time, preparation for prolonged warfare is a sine qua non. Modern missile warfare will be determined not only by interception capabilities but also by stockpile management, maintenance, and endurance. Without sufficient stockpiles and maintenance capabilities, advanced systems could be neutralized in a long-term conflict.
Not every country should replicate the full model. Considering the scale, resources, and sustained investment in air defense and strike capabilities, Saudi Arabia is the most likely central node. The UAE could function as a high-end defense and limited retaliation hub. Kuwait and Bahrain are adequate as highly dense defense nodes—closely connected with the United States—while Oman and Jordan could contribute through maritime surveillance and early warning functions. As for Iraq, an effective command-and-control system must first be established before building a fully capable three-axis system.
Consequently, what the Middle East needs is an integrated structure, and not more individual weapon systems. Iran’s strategy is grounded in saturation, distribution, and ambiguity. To effectively respond, a system that combines defense, disruption, and retaliation into a single deterrence structure is necessary.
South Korea’s experience illustrates that such a system is viable. Its relevance to the Middle East lies not only in the weapons but also in the underlying strategic logic. For the Gulf states that are facing an increasingly complex Iranian threat, the most important question is not whether they could intercept incoming missiles or drones. It is whether they can build a system that makes launching them a losing strategy.
