For much of modern history, diplomacy had been the exclusive business of states. Governments answerable to citizens or institutions negotiated treaties, passed messages through ambassadors, and wars or alliances were decided on the basis of these negotiations. A new class of actors, however, has entered the diplomatic arena without elections, treaties, or constitutional mandates. Technology platforms based in Silicon Valley evolved to have an ever-greater role in determining the course of conflict, affecting foreign policy choices, controlling what people say around the world, and even determining the operational capability of states in wartime. The advent of digital platforms as a geopolitical actor is one of the most important transformations of international relations in the twenty-first century.
Social media companies now dominate these information ecosystems, which reach billions of people at the same time. Platforms owned by Meta alone connect more than three billion users across Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, and the opportunities and authority for corporate moderation teams to dictate political narratives are unprecedented. Researchers are increasingly claiming that these platforms have the ability to influence elections, incite protest and polarization, and damage diplomatic ties between states. In effect, choices that have previously been made by a ministry of information or foreign office are now to some extent being outsourced to the algorithm designers and executives.
One of the most obvious instances of platform power shaping geopolitics is the humanitarian crisis of Rohingya Muslims in Burma. Investigations by human rights organizations found that Facebook’s engagement-driven algorithms increased the anti-Rohingya hate speech and propaganda disseminated by Myanmar’s military. Amnesty International determined that the platform made a significant contribution to an environment that allowed for violence in a 2017 crackdown that caused over 730,000 refugees to flee into Bangladesh. Even though the agents in the commission of the atrocities were state actors, the misinformation propagated served to highlight the unintended side effects of algorithmic design decisions that can contribute to mass violence. There have been no explicit mechanisms of international legal accountability on technology companies, unlike the governments, and it is questioned whether corporate inabilities to censor themselves can have geometrically the same geopolitical impact as policy errors made by governments.
The platforms have also been involved in the warfare, diplomacy, and security decisions. During the Russia-Ukraine war, private tech companies were conducting operational roles that were historically held by allied governments. Recent efforts by companies, including Microsoft, have been used to support cybersecurity in Ukrainian networks against cyberattacks, and satellite connectivity of the Starlink Project by SpaceX helped Ukrainian military and civilian officials communicate without being struck by Russian infrastructure. The battlefield coordination and access to the internet are reported to have been maintained by Ukraine through the tens of thousands of Starlink terminals connected by the thousands of satellites. This reliance brought out a shocking reality. A private entrepreneur rather than a treaty ally was, in effect, controlling an important part of wartime communications.
Geopolitical implications became more evident as there had been arguments about whether the service could be limited or denied based on some conditions. Analysts warned that even blocking the connection between satellites would have a severe effect on military communication and morale on the Ukrainian side. Such influence is in some ways similar to coercive leverage that is traditionally ascribed to state power. A corporate executive’s decision had the same strategic implications as arms embargoes or logistical support agreements between governments. Diplomacy is increasingly about making deals with corporations whose infrastructure cannot be easily replaced by states.
Another case of platform diplomacy at work is made in content moderation choices during the combative moments. After the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, Meta eliminated organized disinformation groups on Ukrainian users and censored Russian state media platforms throughout the European Union at the request of governments. The totality of these acts brought the company closer to the foreign policy goals of the West, and this is an example of what it means when the governance of platforms makes or breaks coalitions based on geopolitical motives. Opponents argue that this leads to confusion between the application of corporate policy and the conduct of geopolitical rivalry.
The role of social media in information warfare has also grown enormously. Research that looked at the circulation of propaganda during the conflict in Ukraine found that only around 8 to 15 percent of posts linking to propaganda or poor credibility sources were removed across major platforms despite large-scale disinformation campaigns. Millions of people were victims of the fake news enhanced by bots and organized networks. Another large-scale study estimated that pro-Russian propaganda tweets reached around 14.4 million users early in the invasion, with more than twenty percent of accounts spreading the propaganda being considered bots. These figures indicate that algorithmic amplification is now one of the fields of struggle at the center of contemporary conflict.
The governments are beginning to consider platforms as diplomatic partners and not as neutral actors. The Digital Services Act of the European Union investigating platforms such as X (which was previously Twitter) in cases of misinformation and illegal content when dealing with conflict situations is an indication of mounting regulatory pressure. Fines of up to six percent of the world revenue or even regional bans were threatened by authorities in case of non-modulation of harmful content. The regulation in itself is now a digital diplomacy, with states bargaining with companies across multiple jurisdictions simultaneously.
Platforms also shape foreign policy indirectly through agenda setting and framing of the crises. Viral images, trending hashtags, and outrageous trends supported by algorithms can result in governments changing their diplomatic approaches. In times of conflict and humanitarian crisis, citizen journalism spread through social media has often influenced the global public opinion at a much faster speed than official diplomatic communication. Public pressure through online channels can help to speed up the debate on sanctions or humanitarian interventions and effectively make platforms a catalyst for foreign policy change.
The pandemic was another clear example of the increased use of social media diplomacy by governments. Research showing India’s foreign policy dissemination during the Covid nineteen outbreak found that digital communication using platforms like X became an important element in crisis messaging and reaching out to the public through diplomatic tools. Leaders are now communicating directly to the global audience without the ancient frameworks of traditional diplomacy that are reshaping how states project power abroad.
Yet this transformation has tremendous risks. Technology companies work for commercial rewards instead of democratic responsibility. Algorithmic engagement models favor attention and advertising revenue, sometimes amplifying sensational content or polarizing content. Scholars provide caution in the form of dependencies on privately owned digital infrastructure, as governments cannot control or regulate systems that are critical to communication, cybersecurity, or connectivity via satellite. The outsourcing of strategic capabilities to corporations runs the risk of letting market considerations determine geopolitical results.
At the same time, there are undeniable benefits of platforms. They reveal war crimes and provide diaspora advocacy and global visibility for marginalized communities. Without documentation of social media, many human rights abuses may be kept in the dark. Corporate intervention has been one way of disrupting disinformation campaigns and protecting fragile activists in some cases. The challenge is thus not to get rid of the influence of the platforms but instead to regulate it in a responsible way.
International law, unfortunately, has not yet caught up with this reality. Traditional diplomacy assumes that states are the main actors that can exercise coercion or negotiation. Today, however, platform executives are negotiating directly with governments around censorship demands, wartime services, and compliance with regulation. Their decisions have an impact on the logistics, public opinion, and cohesion of the alliances in the military. Due to the emergence of what might be termed corporate or media diplomacy, the concept of sovereignty is being reassessed by policymakers in a digitally interconnected world.
However, Silicon Valley’s rise as an informal diplomatic hub in no way amounts to a loss of power for states. Rather, authority has become dispersed across public and private actors, whose interests do not always overlap. As conflicts increasingly take place in cyberspace and information ecosystems, the question is no longer if platforms are foreign policy players. They already are. The burning challenge facing the international community is how to hold them accountable without ruining the innovation and connectivity that has made them indispensable to global society.
