The 2026 U.S. NDS and the Scenario of Prolonged Military Confrontation in the New World Order

The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS 2026) reflects a fundamental adjustment in Washington’s security thinking amid intensifying great-power competition.

The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS 2026) reflects a fundamental adjustment in Washington’s security thinking amid intensifying great-power competition. This article analyzes NDS 2026 as an indicator of the “normalization” of prolonged military confrontation within the contemporary international order. By identifying China as the pacing threat shaping U.S. defense planning, NDS 2026 demonstrates that the United States no longer bases its strategy on assumptions of short wars or decisive victories but instead prepares for protracted, dispersed, and multi-domain conflicts. The article argues that the core of NDS 2026 lies in a shift from deterrence aimed at avoiding conflict toward the management of long-term confrontation, with the growing importance of the defense industrial base and alliance networks. In this regard, NDS 2026 is not merely a military policy document but also reflects the emergence of a new world order in which prolonged military confrontation has become a structural feature of great-power competition.

From “Preventing War” to “Preparing for Prolonged War”

The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS 2026) marks a significant shift in Washington’s military and security thinking. Whereas previous strategy documents emphasized deterrence as a means of avoiding conflict, NDS 2026 demonstrates that the United States has entered a different phase—one in which it is seriously preparing for the possibility of large-scale, prolonged, and systemic military confrontation.

The core significance of NDS 2026 does not lie in whether the United States “seeks war,” but rather in the fact that Washington now treats high-intensity conflict as a scenario with a sufficiently high probability to warrant a comprehensive reorganization of its military posture, defense industrial base, and alliance structures. This represents a fundamental transformation in the global security order.

Historically, U.S. National Defense Strategy documents have reflected not only perceptions of threats but also Washington’s understanding of the nature of future warfare. NDS 2026 reveals a qualitative change in this understanding: the United States no longer views major military conflict as an extreme contingency to be avoided at all costs but as a systemic possibility that must be prepared for and sustained over an extended period.

This approach reflects a broader shift in the international order, from a condition of relative stability to one of prolonged power competition, in which military conflict may no longer be decisive, yet becomes a persistent and recurring feature of global politics.

China as the Power Shaping Future Warfare

For the first time in the history of modern U.S. defense strategy documents, China is identified not merely as a “strategic competitor,” but as a pacing threat—a threat that defines the tempo, scale, and very nature of U.S. military planning. This explicit designation indicates that future U.S. military activities will be framed primarily in response to China’s patterns of escalation, with China serving as the benchmark against which Washington calibrates its strategic and operational responses.

Such “naming and defining” reflects a significant shift in strategic assumptions. A U.S.–China military conflict, once widely regarded as implausible or irrational, is now treated as a potential scenario, particularly as flashpoints such as Taiwan and the South China Sea increasingly witness assertive and coercive actions by this Northeast Asian power.

More importantly, NDS 2026 does not construct its strategy on the assumption of a rapid and decisive war. On the contrary, the United States is preparing for a protracted, dispersed, and multi-domain conflict in which space, cyberspace, supply chains, and the defense industrial base play decisive and foundational roles alongside traditional battlefields.

This approach reflects a fundamental adjustment in U.S. thinking about warfare—from seeking decisive victory toward managing long-term confrontation. In this context, the strategic objective is no longer the complete defeat of the adversary but the preservation of relative advantage, the prevention of the opponent’s political objectives, and the sustained maintenance of one’s own capabilities over time.

Prolonged Confrontation: From Decisive War to Managed Wars of Attrition

By prioritizing investment in supply chains and the defense industrial base, the United States has effectively acknowledged the prospect of a long-term strategic struggle with China. High-end military technologies remain necessary, but they are no longer sufficient, particularly as Beijing continues to demonstrate both its growing power and its expanding capacity for military production. Recent conflicts, such as the Thailand–Cambodia confrontation, have illustrated China’s gradual introduction of domestically produced weapons into real-world operational contexts. This development has compelled Washington to reshape its strategic thinking, placing the development and sustainment of defense industrial capacity at the core of future warfare—viewed as a vital and indispensable factor in conflicts expected to be protracted.

Accordingly, NDS 2026 concentrates on three core priorities: the reindustrialization of the U.S. and allied defense sectors; the construction of capabilities to sustain long-term military confrontation; and the preparation of political and societal readiness for a confrontation that will not conclude within a single presidential term under Donald Trump. The United States is thus preparing for a “new form of Cold War”—one characterized by localized, recurring kinetic escalations—rather than a single, decisive war. Within this framework, other conflicts around the world are likely to emerge as cascading consequences of U.S.–China great-power rivalry and are unlikely to be resolved or terminated quickly.

The Role of Partners and Alliances in Prolonged Warfare

Unlike during the Cold War, the United States under NDS 2026 no longer assumes the role of bearing the full costs of war. Instead, Washington has shifted toward a model of integrated deterrence, in which the United States serves as the central hub for command, advanced technology, and nuclear deterrence, while allies and partners take on frontline roles, logistics, production, and risk dispersion. This approach clearly reflects the traditional “hub-and-spokes” model, whereby allies and so-called “like-minded partners” function as spokes that rotate around the U.S. hub.

Historically, the hub-and-spokes system relied heavily on the United States as the core, with allies playing largely auxiliary roles. In a scenario of prolonged military confrontation with China, however, this division of labor is being recalibrated. Japan, South Korea, and Australia are positioned as forward pillars; Europe provides industrial depth and logistical support; and partners in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region serve as intermediate strategic spaces. This configuration allows the United States to reduce its direct military burden while enabling partners to assume more substantive roles, thereby transforming confrontation into a system-wide contest in which China is compelled to disperse its resources across multiple fronts.

This logic of resource dispersion is already being applied effectively by China in relation to the Taiwan issue. In international relations, when a state is forced to spread its resources thinly, overall effectiveness inevitably declines. At the same time, such dynamics draw the international system into long-term, localized strategic ventures, reinforcing a pattern of protracted and fragmented confrontation.

Russia, the Middle East, and the Stratification of Strategic Priorities

In NDS 2026, Russia remains a serious threat, but it is no longer regarded as the actor shaping U.S. long-term strategic planning. Washington is likely to pursue a strategy of attrition and containment toward Russia through NATO and Ukraine, rather than preparing for a direct and prolonged military confrontation with Moscow itself.

Similarly, Iran and North Korea are categorized as regional threats that must be managed and contained, rather than as central actors in long-term military confrontation. This prioritization reflects a fundamental strategic reality: the United States lacks the resources to sustain multiple protracted conflicts simultaneously, and China has therefore emerged as the primary strategic priority. These hierarchical priorities are also reflected in the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy, underscoring the expectation that future conflicts will be persistent and prolonged rather than discrete or easily resolved.

Implications for the Security Order in the Asia–Pacific Region

NDS 2026 indicates that the regional security order in the Asia–Pacific is entering a phase of quiet yet persistent militarization. This process is not characterized by large-scale, total wars, but rather by the steady expansion of military presence, the deepening of defense cooperation, and the institutionalization of long-term conflict scenarios. For middle powers—particularly those in Southeast Asia—this dynamic creates a complex strategic environment. While these states may not be overtly compelled to choose sides, they are increasingly drawn into broader deterrence structures and preparations for large-scale, protracted conflict.

Normalizing Prolonged Military Confrontation in the New World Order

The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy reflects a notable strategic reality: prolonged military confrontation is gradually becoming a “normalized” condition in the thinking of major powers. The United States does not seek war, yet it accepts that if war occurs, it is unlikely to be short, decisive, or easily concluded. In this context, the objective of defense strategy is no longer the absolute prevention of conflict but rather the management of conflict in ways most favorable to the balance of power.

NDS 2026 can therefore be viewed as an outline of a new international order in which peace and conflict are no longer clearly opposing states but are instead interwoven within an extended cycle of power competition. U.S. preparations for a scenario of prolonged military confrontation are not merely a strategic choice but also an acknowledgment that the world is entering a phase of structural instability, in which war is no longer an exception but an integral part of the order itself.

Bui Gia Ky
Bui Gia Ky
Bui Gia Ky is a Vietnamese political and international researcher. His focus is Vietnam, the US, China, India, Israel, Germany, geopolitics, and nationalism. Contact: giaky9898[at]gmail.com