Authors: Raymond Floreani and Dr.Julian Spencer Churchill
Today the debate rages over whether to cap the RCAF buy at 88 F-35As and 16 aircraft and purchase Swedish Gripen E fighters to operate a mixed fleet or just buy the entire lot of 88 F-35A fighters, as the RCAF brass desperately desires. In reality, the F-35A is entirely the wrong aircraft for the missions that the RCAF performs. At this time, when both the fighter and trainer fleets are aged out and need to be replaced, Canada needs to shop smart when replacing them, and of course, so far they are not. Canada is not endowed with unlimited budgets to buy and operate diverse fleets of trainers and fighters. We propose a way to make complimentary fleets both possible and affordable.
We had proposed, in our Canadian Forces expansion plan, to have an enlarged Air Force of 32,500 personnel by 2031. We predicate this vision on the RCAF basing its purchase decisions on economically and operationally smart choices. Aircraft designed around efficiently and effectively fulfilling core mission requirements in training and operational availability as well as making perfect supply chain and maintenance cost sense. In other words, the most bang for the buck. This means returning or selling the 16 F-35As committed to and instead buying an RCAF fighter fleet consisting of Gripen E/Fs for the NORAD air defense role, Eurofighter Typhoons for the NATO/strike role, and the Korean TA/FA-50 Golden Eagles for the advanced trainer role and as a light strike fighter to complement and enhance the interceptor and strike squadrons.
Why this particular choice of fighters and trainers? Because it makes strategic and economic sense for the missions required. The two standout bad things about the F-35 are the cost to maintain it and its mediocre mission availability, in spite of being in such widespread use. Even after 20 years of production, it is still wracked with delays, cost overruns, and software issues. Having any mixed fleet of aircraft is typically more expensive to own and operate than a single one, but by utilizing aircraft having common major components and overall lower costs to operate, those concerns can be mitigated. By utilizing a common engine and having overall similar flight parameters across training and operational aircraft, it improves fleet-wide training and operational efficiency.
One might ask, but why not buy F/A-18 E/F/G Super Hornets with the GE-F414 to do the same with the current F-414-equipped Gripen and F-404-equipped TA-50? It is a valid question, but there are two very important reasons not to. The first one is that the Super Hornet line is closing down; the order book is now done, and Boeing is winding down supplier contracts. The US Navy is now switching to fleet sustainment mode for its fleet of Super Hornets. The second reason is that these chosen aircraft meet our stated government policy of diversifying away from American arms and can be manufactured in whole or in part in Canada. With the release of the Trump Administration’s new National Security Strategy on Canada, that requirement becomes an even more important consideration.
All three of these chosen aircraft fly with or can accommodate the Eurojet EJ200 and its single-engine derivative, the EJ230. To be clear, the Gripen E and Golden Eagle do not currently offer that engine option for sale, given the initial certification with the GE engine. To replace the engine would require airframe modifications, testing, and flight certification, not an inexpensive or quick proposition. But the EJ200 has been offered as a direct replacement for both types, being almost identical in size, performance, and airflow specifications. It would mean Canada would bear those upfront modification costs, but in the environment and tensions we face with the US, we judge the costs worthwhile to bear to remain ITAR and veto free. Economically and efficiency-wise, having a single common engine type across the fighter and advanced trainer fleets saves money on maintenance training, repairs, and services and allows for greater aircraft availability through commonality of parts. Only one type rating would be required for engine maintainers, which means fewer personnel are ultimately required. It makes perfect logistical sense, allowing for a simplified supply chain and improved cost-effectiveness by purchasing in greater quantity. Quantity also justifies setting up local manufacturing as well. All three aircraft use or can use similar Leonardo radars, which again would save costs and supply chain issues, improve readiness rates, reduce training time needed, and finally, address ITAR issues.
The Eurojet-engined Gripen E/F is a great NORAD choice, well suited for the bomber interception role in Northern Canada. Designed specifically to operate in austere conditions and turnaround quickly from smaller strips or roadways. It would be able to deploy from the remote shorter airstrips throughout Arctic Canada if runway paving is also done to some of them. The F-35 is tied to longer strips and much more significant maintenance infrastructure needs. The Gripen E is fitted with a first-rate IRST sensor, very good AESA radar, and a superb EW suite, as well as the potent Meteor long-range air-to-air missile. It has higher mission readiness and lower costs to operate, it is the optimal air defense interceptor for Canada’s vast airspace and territory, and SAAB will build it in Canada. The primary mission for Canada’s strike fighter fleet is support for our NATO mission and our troops in Latvia, which is what the Typhoon was specifically designed for: the European battlefield. The British, Italian, German, and Spanish armed forces all fly it in that mission. It still is in production, Spain, Germany, and Italy having just ordered more. It has a mature local supply chain and is a superb, proven ground attack and highly maneuverable strike fighter, and Airbus has a Montreal production facility to build it in.
Granted, the Typhoon is not stealthy, but it can carry more weaponry, outturn and outfight the F-35, and even give the F-22 a good run for the money in a dogfight. Simply put, Canada doesn’t do the deep penetration, preemptive, or nuclear strike missions of the F-35A, so why waste tax money on buying it? The Typhoon can easily carry multiple Storm Shadow and other long-range missiles like Airborne LORA to do any deep strike mission, launching them safely from several hundred miles away. As to the Korean TA/FA-50 Golden Eagle trainer and light strike fighter, it is a versatile supersonic advanced trainer and light strike aircraft that can be fitted with the same EJ200 engine as the proposed Gripen and current Typhoon. It also can use similar Leonardo AESA radars as the Typhoon and Gripen.
This combination would allow seamless pilot and maintenance training with the TA-50 into the Gripen and Typhoon fleets and, by also equipping each operational fighter squadron with several FA-50s, allow operational pilots to fly their simpler mission training profiles on the lower-cost plane they are also familiar with. These light fighters have similar overall performance, allowing pilots to build their realistic mission skills and flight time at reduced overall ongoing operational training costs. A large buy would also definitely facilitate having Canadian assembly, given our suggested order size. The government’s and RCAF’s primary goal needs to be to buy a fleet of aircraft that is highly serviceable and available, performs the required missions effectively, and is affordable to own and upgrade. This allows the Air Force to maintain an experienced and proficient pilot pool to fight and win with them. Based on their known capabilities and economics, this combination of aircraft allows the RCAF to fit the bill to a tee.
Now, is the F-35 really that bad a aircraft? We have shown how the A model is not the proper aircraft for the RCAF or its required missions. The STOVL B version is a different animal; it certainly would be a welcome and desired purchase for the RCN. The F-35B is the perfect aircraft for Canada to order instead, facilitating the RCN getting back into the carrier game that it gave up in 1970 with the scrapping of HMCS Bonaventure. NATO partners Britain, France, and Italy all recently sent their own aircraft carriers into the Indo-Pacific region to show the flag and project power and help foster better partnerships with allies, a sorely missed Canadian capability. We have similarly proposed that the Canadian government expand the RCN and purchase Italian Cavour-class aircraft carriers and Trieste-class amphibious assault ships to similarly restore the RCN’s ability to project power and protect the greatly expanded Asian trade this government is pursuing to mitigate and reduce the outsized Canadian trade dependence upon the United States.
The F-35B is the perfect plane to equip these ships, giving the RCN a needed tool to project power and defend Canada’s interests and our allies in the Pacific, countering the naval threats in the region. We had advocated in our plan for the RCN to buy 2 Cavour-class CVLs and 2 Trieste-class LHAs, all based in Esquimalt, as part of this new expanded and muscular navy. These ships are optimal choices to create an RCN carrier force and establish an amphibious landing ability to support our Pacific allies. These two classes of vessels have efficiently sized ship complements compared to similar American ships. They are also less expensive to build and maintain, can employ fairly significant air wings, and are already designed to support the F-35B.
Showing you are willing to project hard power to assist an ally by committing an aircraft carrier or amphibious forces in support builds immense goodwill. These ships would be mobile sovereign territory in which to project your influence for hundreds of miles in every direction, and Canada needs that capability again, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Australia, India, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan are all significant trading partners; we can build better, stronger relationships by tangibly supporting them. The RCN operated aircraft carriers before, and the Canadian government knew well what they brought to the table in geopolitical power and credibility. The RCN needs to get back into that business of real power projection to showcase and defend Canada’s economic and geopolitical interests.
To summarize our position, cancel the RCAF F-35A buy entirely and sell the 16 already being built, as they are entirely the wrong aircraft for the RCAF today. Order 65 F-35Bs instead for the RCN and the Italian-designed carriers to fly them from, and order 86 Gripen E/F and 128 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft as well as 81 TA and 90 FA-50 Korean Golden Eagles for the RCAF, all being built in Canada. Sure, it will cost much more, but it will restore to the RCAF and RCN the now needed expanded combat capabilities they possessed just before the defense disaster that was unification in 1968 and into the 1970s. Please don’t buy the F-35A simply because you want to placate an unreliable ally or Air Force people who have a vested interest in wanting to be able to perform a mission that you will never realistically ask it to do. Buy aircraft that perform what the actual tasked missions require well and further enhance our sovereignty by being built and upgraded locally, by Canadians. Buy aircraft that will be available to fly reliably in significant numbers while still being affordable to maintain and fly. This combination will allow Canada to get the best military and economic value out of its very significant defense dollar commitments.
