The arrest of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, by the Donald Trump administration carried out through a cross-border operation and their transfer to the United States for prosecution constitute a turning point in the geopolitical dynamics of Latin America and the international system. It must be emphasized that this analysis does not remain confined to the description of a single event; rather, it treats Maduro’s arrest, irrespective of its operational and legal specifics, as an extreme geopolitical scenario, one that enables a concrete test of how non-Western powers respond under conditions of acute crisis. Even if the event were to involve operational complexities, constraints, or subsequent modifications, the reactions of China and Russia would still reveal a deeper logic in their foreign policies. a logic in which the boundaries between diplomatic support, economic interests, and security intervention are carefully calibrated.
This episode is significant not only from the perspective of international law and the principle of immunity of political leaders, but also as a concrete test of the reality of the so-called “multipolar order” and the degree of commitment shown by powers such as China and Russia toward their allies. The silence and limited reactions of Beijing and Moscow to this move immediately invited comparisons with their conduct during the Syrian crisis and the fate of Bashar al-Assad, revealing a deeper logic underlying the foreign policies of both powers. China is a commercially minded and economy-driven actor within the global system. This behavior is best understood in continuity with China’s long-standing foreign policy doctrine based on “non-interference” and “peaceful development.” a doctrine that restrains Beijing, even in relation to close partners, from undertaking hard security commitments or direct cross-border intervention. Despite its occasional sensitivity to global political and geopolitical issues, China places a particular emphasis on trade and economic considerations, often using them as instruments for advancing its broader political objectives. As a political ally and Venezuela’s second-largest economic partner, China limited its response to verbal condemnation and swiftly instructed all Chinese banks that had cooperated with Venezuela or extended loans to it to disclose their lending relationships. This reflects the economic and commercial logic of China’s foreign policy and its strong aversion to overseas military entanglement: China maintains only two military bases outside its territory, compared with roughly 800 operated by the United States.
Unlike Russia, which has used military intervention as an instrument to preserve geopolitical influence, China has deliberately avoided the securitization of its external alliances, substituting economic power for hard power in its foreign policy. At present, Beijing appears far less concerned about losing a loyal and anti-imperialist ally in what is traditionally regarded as the United States’ backyard—Latin America—than about the fate of the massive loans extended to President Maduro, estimated at over USD 100 billion, as well as the potential loss of substantial commercial resources in the region that would be seriously jeopardized by the collapse of a friendly government in Venezuela. In 2025, China exported approximately USD 141 billion worth of goods to Latin America and the Caribbean, part of which was driven by the trade tariffs imposed by the Trump administration and China’s efforts to identify alternative markets for certain strategic U.S. products, including soybeans and meat. Although China’s official trade with Venezuela remained relatively limited compared to its exchanges with other countries in the region, it was actively involved in informal transactions and the purchase of sanctioned Venezuelan oil to meet its energy needs as a major global consumer, making it one of the principal buyers of Venezuelan crude. For China, Venezuela has never been an irreplaceable strategic partner but rather one among several options for securing energy supplies and expanding economic influence in Latin America, a position Beijing is unwilling to defend at the cost of direct confrontation with the United States. Overall, China’s response to Maduro’s arrest ultimately conveys a clear message to the Global South: Beijing is prepared to act as an economic partner and a diplomatic supporter, but it will not serve as a guarantor of political security or regime survival in the face of direct Western pressure. From an analytical standpoint, China’s reaction to this episode can be interpreted through the lens of cold cost–benefit calculations and a logic of survival within the global capitalist system. Yet the implications of this behavior do not remain confined to the descriptive level; they also carry significant normative dimensions, as such an approach implicitly delineates the limits of China’s commitments toward its political partners in the Global South. In sum, the fall of Maduro would signify for China not the collapse of a strategic alliance, but rather an increase in economic risk and the loss of a key node in its network of commercial and energy influence in Latin America. Above all, Beijing would face the threat of non-repayable large-scale loans, more constrained access to discounted Venezuelan oil, and a weakening of its position within regional energy supply chains and emerging markets. Nevertheless, China’s extensive diversification of energy sources and trading partners ensures that these losses remain manageable and never rise to a level that would justify direct confrontation with the United States or security intervention to preserve Maduro’s rule.
Russia’s response to the arrest of Nicolás Maduro, likewise, contrary to the widespread perception of Moscow as an interventionist actor, was reduced to a limited level of verbal condemnation and diplomatic protest, a posture that above all reflects a logic of front prioritization in Russian foreign policy. Russia merely called on the Trump administration, in relatively restrained language, to release “the president of a sovereign country and his wife.” For Moscow, Venezuela, while a political and symbolic ally in opposition to the United States, does not constitute a vital or non-negotiable interest, particularly at a time when Russia is heavily preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, sweeping sanctions, and the reconfiguration of the balance of power in its immediate neighborhood. Unlike Syria, where access to the Mediterranean, the presence of military bases, and the country’s role in Middle Eastern geopolitics justified direct Russian intervention, Venezuela lacks the geopolitical weight necessary to legitimize the costs of a direct confrontation with the United States. From this perspective, Russia’s relative silence should not be read as a sign of weakness but rather as the outcome of a cold geopolitical calculation in which the preservation of resources and focus on priority fronts outweigh active support for distant allies. Even in Syria, where the geopolitical stakes for Russia were far higher, Moscow, after failing to achieve its objectives in restoring the hereditary rule of the Assad family, ultimately confined itself to offering refuge to Bashar al-Assad, without undertaking decisive operational efforts to keep him in power. Indeed, having accepted that Assad’s rule had effectively reached its end, Russia reportedly initiated negotiations with opposition forces to preserve certain interests, including its military base on the coast of Tartus, even before the official collapse of his government. This does not imply that Russia fully abandoned intervention in Syria or abruptly withdrew its support; rather, signs of an adaptive realism gradually emerged in Moscow’s policy, one in which safeguarding a minimum set of strategic interests was prioritized over unconditional backing of an increasingly exhausted regime.
With regard to Venezuela, the country has consistently represented an anti-American and anti-imperialist partner for Russia in close proximity to the United States; however, the depth of economic or strategic ties between the two has never matched the level of their political and security relations. Russia has not ranked among Venezuela’s leading trading partners, at least in the formal economy, and the volume of bilateral trade in 2025 amounted to only around USD 200 million. This limited figure is partly attributable to Russia’s comparatively weaker presence in global markets relative to China, as Russia functions primarily as a supplier of raw energy rather than a diversified exporter of manufactured goods capable of penetrating distant markets. While the scale of trade and exchanges in the informal sector remains unclear, Russia has played a notable role in this sanctioned segment of Venezuela’s economy in recent years, particularly as Iran’s role in Venezuelan oil operations diminished and as sanctions intensified pressure on Russia’s own economy following the war in Ukraine. In this context, Moscow sought to assist Venezuela in marketing and exporting its oil shipments. These cargoes were politically aligned, commercially attractive, and easier to move within a sanctions-resilient ecosystem on which both countries had come to rely.
Overall, for Russia, the fall of Maduro would signify less a substantial economic loss than the erosion of a political and symbolic lever in the United States’ backyard, one that Moscow has used to project extra-regional presence and to symbolically challenge the U.S.-centered order. Given the limited scale of formal trade relations and the Russian economy’s minimal dependence on the Venezuelan market, the direct economic costs of such a development for the Kremlin would be negligible. From a geopolitical standpoint, however, the loss of one of the few remaining anti-American allies in the Western Hemisphere would further constrain Russia’s political room for maneuver. Nonetheless, Moscow’s focus on more vital fronts, most notably Ukraine and its immediate neighborhood, means that this setback is ultimately regarded as acceptable and secondary within Russia’s broader strategic calculations.
