On November 5, 2025, Reuters published an article describing former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as a potential kingmaker in Iraq’s parliamentary elections slated for November 11. The Reuters report is barely a surprise to Iraqis who understand that despite falling from power in 2014, al-Maliki and his militia allies are preeminent players in Iraq’s fragmented yet highly polarizing political landscape. The perpetual domination of al-Maliki and other gilded politicians aligned with Shiite militias is often attributed to “Iranian influence” in the country, ignoring that it was indeed the United States that first rubber-stamped al-Maliki’s dismemberment of the post-invasion Iraqi state and second kept the Dawa Party in power even though they were largely responsible for the rise of ISIS in 2014. With the coming elections likely to produce a similar result—corrupt Shiite and Sunni stooges winning a majority of seats—it’s time for the United States to consider the prospects of shaking up Iraqi politics using whatever means necessary. In lockstep with Iraqis themselves, Turkey, and the Gulf states, it is possible to engineer authentic change that leads to win-win outcomes for the region and the world.
Like Libyans, Syrians, Sudanese, and Yemenis who reminisce over the “good old days” in which a strongman maintained stability before the tumultuous wave of uprisings, Iraqis who have suffered immensely over the last 22 years lionize Saddam Hussein due to both personal experience and matters of nostalgia. While the full range of Iraqis from all sectarian and ethnic backgrounds recognize the magnitude of Saddam’s crimes—incessant purges, invading Kuwait, waging war against rebellious Kurds and Shiites—they view the outgoing regime and the Baath Party as a symbol of political and security stability. These feelings, often the byproduct of disenchantment and disaffection over the state of Iraq’s current affairs, compel Shiites, Kurds, and Sunnis to assume that their country might be better off with one reformist ruler in power rather than a collection of corrupt politicians, militias, and a weak military plundering the state.
In October 2025, Heba al-Naib, a Sunni Iraqi influencer, surveyed her followers, asking them if they’d like to see Jamaal Mustafa, the husband of Saddam Hussein’s youngest daughter, Hala, take power in Iraq. Remarkably, 85% of the respondents said “yes,” cementing his popularity primarily among Sunnis within Iraq and in exile. Mustafa, based in Qatar, is viewed as a unifying figure given his close relations with Kurdish factions, his steadfastness in an American prison camp following the invasion, and his warm relations with Arab Gulf states. Saddam’s son-in-law is also viewed favorably because, unlike Shiite and Sunni exiles who endorse outside military action to topple the current government and engineer regime change, Mustafa is committed to a national project that addresses corruption, graft, nepotism, and kleptocracy. More importantly, Mustafa, secular-leaning, envisions a pluralistic Iraqi state where each sectarian and ethnic group enjoys equal rights.
While Shiites may never accept a Sunni strongman returning to power, the Tishreen uprising of 2019—largely orchestrated by disaffected Shiites—invited many of the same sentiments that shaped uprisings in other Arab countries: equality, justice, pluralism, and freedom. Many Shiites, primarily those who thrived during the reign of Saddam Hussein, likely acknowledge that Iraq’s current political elites—primarily affiliated with al-Maliki and his cronies—exploit the “Shiite card” to marginalize their nationalist-leaning Shiite competitors, moderate Sunnis, Kurds, and anyone who opposes the current status quo. These stakeholders, in any future balance-of-power shifts, could play a constructive role in stabilizing the Iraqi state under the leadership of a strongman and taking careful steps to redesign the multiparty system to mitigate the chaos that manifests today. Clearly, the Iraqi and Lebanese models prove that in small countries with competing sectarian, ethnic, tribal, and social factions, multiparty politics only lead to more schisms, divides, and discord.
Iraqis should not count on or yearn for the United States to bring a new regime to power on the back of an Abrams tank. Yet America’s undeniable involvement in Syria’s recent balance-of-power shift demonstrates that when the U.S. works in lockstep with regional powers—mainly Turkey—change is indeed possible. In Syria, the United States knighted Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former al-Qaeda commander, ISIS affiliate, and mass murderer who had a $10 million bounty on his head until recently. Mustafa and his supporters, unlike al-Sharaa and his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham militia, are not cut-outs of a foreign country, imports from Central Asia, or violent extremists guided by principles of revenge and religious supremacy.
For millions of Iraqis, especially those suffering in the South, years of rampant corruption have culminated in unbearable problems—whether it is water taps running dry, youth unemployment, or the failure of the oil-wealthy state to produce its own electricity. If the United States continues to overlook the chaos that it produced over the span of decades and the current direction of Iraqi politics, a worst-case scenario might arise: a resurgence of ISIS and a new caliphate competing with the fragments of the Iraqi state and its militant allies for influence and authority.
Mustafa has willing and capable allies on standby waiting to aid the reconstruction and redevelopment of the Iraqi state. Qatar’s constructive role in supporting the Iraqi people is a testament to the Gulf states’ desire to see a stable and prosperous Iraq led by a rational and nationalist-leaning leader vested in unifying armed factions and restructuring broken Iraqi institutions, including Parliament and the courts. The UAE’s recent role in revitalizing Mosul is another example of a Gulf state demonstrating a desire and will to guide Iraqis toward prosperity and development. However, under the current conditions and the malign influence of al-Maliki and militant factions that continue to pillage the Iraqi state, one outcome is guaranteed: more dissatisfaction with the Iraqi state and an uprising that could trigger a new sectarian war.
