“Never Again”, But for Whom and Where?

After World War II, Europe launched a moral and identity-based project grounded in the imperative of “learning from history.”

After World War II, Europe launched a moral and identity-based project grounded in the imperative of “learning from history.” This involved remembrance of the Holocaust, the rejection of racism, the expansion of human rights, and the establishment of institutions designed to prevent the recurrence of catastrophe. Over the following decades, this narrative became dominant, shaping the languages of law, education, art, and foreign policy. Thinkers such as Adorno and Habermas, as well as scholars like Michael Rothberg, emerged from this context. Adorno’s notion of “education after Auschwitz” insisted that the first task of education was to ensure that Auschwitz would never happen again. Habermas spoke of “constitutional patriotism” and the possibility of connecting local loyalties to universal commitments. Rothberg showed how Holocaust memory could enter into dialogue with other histories of suffering, from colonialism to racial discrimination, and enable a multidirectional and non-competitive understanding of human suffering.

            Yet the “Gaza crisis” has exposed a fissure that can no longer be treated as merely a topic for academic seminars. If “never again” is to have universal meaning, it must be tested precisely here: in the face of the suffering of an “other” who is not European, in a geography that is neither part of NATO nor central to Europe’s political imagination.

A Coherent Narrative in Ukraine, Stammering in Gaza

            After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe swiftly built a clear and coherent narrative: aggression, occupation, resistance, and freedom. This narrative quickly materialized into concrete mechanisms: successive sanctions packages against Russia, mobilization of financial and military aid, and the design of bureaucratic tools to sustain and monitor support for Kyiv. According to European institutional estimates, total financial, military, and humanitarian assistance from the “Team Europe” initiative to Ukraine has reached unprecedented levels.

            However, the same Europe has faltered deeply in its response to Gaza. United Nations OCHA figures indicate that from October 2023 to August 2025, over 61,000 Palestinians have been killed and tens of thousands injured. Healthcare and emergency systems have collapsed, while food insecurity and antibiotic-resistant diseases are spreading. Despite this, Europe’s response, both at the institutional level and among national capitals, has been fragmented, inconsistent, and often subordinated to short-term interests. European media and think tanks themselves have referred to this as a “diplomatic failure” and a case of “normative double standards.”

Symbolic Politics, Forgotten Legal Responsibility

            This contradiction is not a matter of mere diplomatic divergence; it signals a crisis in Europe’s postwar political philosophy. The very concept that framed “Europe” as a “normative power”, a power whose influence stems from norms and law rather than just hard force, is now structurally fractured. This is the same “capability-expectations gap” that Christopher Hill identified three decades ago: high expectations from Europe, but insufficient political capacity and shared will to meet them.

            This gap plays out on multiple fronts. The European Commission President’s rushed visit to Israel in October 2023, coupled with early statements emphasizing Israel’s “right to self-defense” while making scant reference to the explicit requirements of international humanitarian law, provoked domestic criticism in Brussels and other European capitals. At the same time, the same EU that took decisive measures in Ukraine, implementing sanctions and pursuing justice, showed hesitation in responding to the grave violations of humanitarian law in Gaza. Though the EU Council later released reports about Israel’s compliance with the human rights clause (Article 2) in the EU-Israel Association Agreement, noting “indications of violations,” the institutional response remained tentative.

            In one concrete instance where legal responsibility was translated into action, the Dutch Court of Appeal in February 2024 ordered the suspension of F-35 parts exports to Israel, citing a “clear risk” of participation in serious breaches of humanitarian law. The Dutch government was compelled to halt the exports and tighten its regulatory regime as a result. What is crucial here is that these examples are not mere differences of interpretation; they test whether Europe’s postwar ethical foundations can move beyond symbols and rhetoric when real costs are at stake.

Law, Not Just Ethics: The Test of Courts and Global Institutions

            The Gaza crisis is not solely a political dispute; it is also the subject of international legal proceedings. In January and May 2024, the International Court of Justice, under the Genocide Convention case, deemed parts of South Africa’s claims admissible and issued provisional measures against Israel, including obligations to prevent acts covered by the Convention and to ensure access to humanitarian aid. In 2024, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court pursued arrest warrants not only for Hamas leaders but also for Israel’s Prime Minister and Defense Minister, a process that had already confirmed the Court’s jurisdiction over the situation in Palestine.

            For Europe, which considers the rule of law a cornerstone of its identity, these proceedings should carry a clear message: failure to implement legal obligations—including the “Common Position 2008/944/CFSP” on arms exports, which requires the denial of export licenses in cases of a “clear risk” of IHL violations—is not just ethically problematic, but legally indefensible.

Double Standards and the Erosion of Moral Credibility

            Europe needs symbolic moral credibility to defend a rules-based international order, the very credibility it spent in Ukraine, earning admiration across much of the world. But every time the standards slip in Gaza, that credibility is depleted. When some member states suspend arms exports while others continue them; when parliaments or courts in one country take action while others remain silent or offer justifications; when the Commission initiates a review under Article 2 of the EU-Israel agreement but lacks the political will to enforce consequences, these inconsistencies weaken Europe’s normative credibility.

            Meanwhile, the process of recognizing a Palestinian state in Europe, from Spain, Ireland, and Norway in May 2024 to Slovenia in June, shows that parts of the continent are trying to bridge the gap between words and deeds. Yet, from the outside, the image is stark: for Ukraine, Europe enforced principles without hesitation; for Palestinians, those same principles were subject to endless compromise. This perception fuels accusations of “double standards” in the Global South and among Europe’s own youth, making future diplomatic efforts, whether in reinforcing consensus against Russian aggression or defending human rights advocacy, more difficult.

What Is to Be Done? Reconfiguring Postwar Ethics in Five Practical Steps

To repair this moral failure, rather than merely manage a public relations crisis, Europe requires tangible reconfigurations.

            First, the universality of “never again” must be affirmed. The ideas of Adorno and Habermas must be brought out of the libraries and into living policy: “never again” must mean the protection of human beings everywhere. Humanitarian law standards must be non-negotiable and universally applied, in Kyiv and in Gaza, without exceptions.

            Second, Europe must rely unequivocally on existing legal mechanisms. When the International Court of Justice issues provisional measures and the International Criminal Court pursues investigations, the EU and its member states must declare active, public, and unambiguous cooperation with these processes, from supporting investigations to fulfilling territorial obligations for implementing orders.

            Third, the arms export control regime must be harmonized under the “clear risk” criterion. The 2008/944 Common Position must be transformed into a binding, transparent instrument with clear operational thresholds. If verified reports, from OCHA, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, or the International Committee of the Red Cross, document patterns of serious IHL violations, export licenses must be automatically suspended unless proven otherwise. The Dutch experience demonstrated that courts and legal systems can open a path for action when political will is lacking.

            Fourth, preferential relations must be conditioned on Article 2, with real consequences. If “respect for human rights” is defined in the EU-Israel Agreement as an “essential element,” then non-compliance must result in more than expressions of concern. From suspending trade privileges to halting sensitive joint projects, both legal and political tools are available—if the will exists.

            Fifth, memory politics must be multidirectional, not competitive. As Rothberg’s theory of “multidirectional memory” illustrates, recognizing diverse forms of suffering is not a threat to universality but a precondition for it. Europe’s politics of memory must move away from monopolizing suffering and return to a shared language of dignity and liberation.

Why Now?

            Because each day of delay means more lives lost in Gaza and further erosion of Europe’s moral and symbolic credibility. The international community is watching as the same EU that showed legal and political resolve in confronting Russia now raises the flag of “balance” to such an extreme in Gaza that it has effectively reached normative inaction. Even within Europe, voices are rising to correct this trajectory: from the recognition of Palestinian statehood by several member states to parliamentary and judicial efforts to suspend arms exports or review preferential agreements.

            Reports from the United Nations and independent bodies continue to warn of casualties, famine, disease, and the collapse of essential infrastructure. If Europe wants to remain a “normative power” in the world of tomorrow, it must demonstrate that norms are not only norms when aligned with its geopolitical interests. If “never again” is to mean anything at all, it must apply to everyone, everywhere, at all times, not merely within museums or the borders of the continent.

Final Word: From the Ethics of Display to the Ethics of Action

            Now is the precise moment to return to the spirit of Europe’s postwar charter: the universality of human dignity. The path forward is clear; unconditional adherence to international legal commitments; translating normative principles into measurable policies, from arms exports to trade agreements; and investing in a politics of memory that does not treat suffering as indivisible.

            If Europe wishes to remain “postwar,” it must show it can step beyond its comfort zone and bear the moral cost, not only in Ukraine, but also in Gaza.

Brian Hudson
Brian Hudson
I am Brian Hudson, a political science graduate from Bates College with a keen interest in international relations. I work as a freelance commentator specializing in geopolitics and counter-terrorism.