The Horn of Africa is undergoing a period of profound political transformation, with Ethiopia—by far the region’s demographic and geographic heavyweight—at the center of this volatility. The country is rapidly entering uncharted waters as it grapples with a resurgence of ethnic and regional conflicts across multiple fronts. Less commonly acknowledged, however, is that much of the current instability is rooted in a deliberately engineered system of governance introduced in 1995 by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which institutionalized ethnic divisions through an ethnic federal arrangement designed to entrench its minority rule over Ethiopia’s diverse and populous society.
Originally presented as a progressive framework for managing Ethiopia’s diverse ethno-linguistic groups and rectifying historical injustices, ethnic federalism enshrined the right of ethnic regions or “nations and nationalities” to self-governance. In practice, however, ethnic federalism embedded identity politics into the core of the state, transforming ethnicity from a social and cultural marker into the primary basis for political power and territorial administration. Rather than promoting inclusion and harmony, the system incentivized ethnonationalist competition, fostered localized elite capture, and weakened the coherence of the central state. Therefore, as Ethiopia navigates this critical juncture, the question remains whether its leadership will confront the inherent contradictions of ethnic federalism or continue to manipulate it, risking further unraveling of the state. Many view this constitutional entrenchment of ethnic identity as the country’s “original sin.” To put it simply, if the Benishangul region—where the country’s Grand Dam, GERD, is located—were to attempt secession by invoking Article 39 of the Constitution, would it be allowed to do so? And what if the Oromia or Amhara regions—two vital regions whose absence would significantly alter the very fabric of Ethiopia—sought to secede? Would that be permitted? This highlights the flawed and ill-conceived nature of a constitution designed to enable a minority to rule through the permanent threat of the secessionist card, rather than to foster genuine national unity and stability.
Indeed, over the past 30 years, ethnic federalism has had a profoundly divisive impact within Ethiopia. It fragmented national identity, empowered regional elites, and sustained the political dominance of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—a small ruling clique—until 2018. When this system ultimately unraveled, the TPLF lost its grip on federal power, marking a historic turning point in the country’s political trajectory. In the wake of this collapse, Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s first prime minister from the Oromo ethnic group, rose to power, stepping into the political vacuum left by the downfall of the old order. His ascent was widely seen as a response to the growing public frustration with the dysfunctional state and conflicts sowed by ethnic federalism. However, instead of undertaking meaningful reforms to correct the structural flaws left behind by the TPLF, Abiy’s administration has been engaged in repurposing the same federal framework to consolidate power—this time by reinforcing the dominance of the Oromo political establishment, from which he hails.
This has deepened the perception among many ethnic and regional communities that the system continues to be used not to unify, but to centralize power in the hands of one group at the expense of others. While federalism may have been conceived as a response to Ethiopia’s complex history of centralized domination and marginalization, its rigid ethnic architecture has deepened divisions and eroded prospects for long-term national unity. The decision to enshrine ethnicity as the cornerstone of the state thus stands as a defining—and deeply contentious—legacy of the post-Derg transition that took place in Ethiopia in the mid-1990s. In a nutshell, three decades later, its consequences are starkly evident: a fragile federation prone to internal fragmentation, ethnic violence, and contested sovereignty. By institutionalizing ethnic identity as the basis for political organization and state structure, ethnic federalism has become a foundational decision that continues to shape and destabilize the nation’s political landscape.
Squandered Reform: Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism and the Erosion of a Multiethnic State
Since 2018, many regional observers have called on Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to dismantle Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system and replace it with either a unitary state or a form of federalism that removes ethnicity as the organizing principle of governance. They argue that only by moving away from ethnic-based territorial divisions can Ethiopia restore national cohesion and avert further fragmentation. In this context, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has been the most prominent and consistent critic of Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism. For nearly three decades, he has warned that structuring the state along ethnic lines would deepen divisions, polarize society, and ultimately erode Ethiopia’s social fabric. While his critiques were often dismissed or downplayed—seen by some as politically motivated or ideologically rigid—developments in Ethiopia over the past several years have, in hindsight, lent credibility to his concerns. Today, the escalating ethnic conflicts and weakening of central authority in the country suggest that the Eritrean president had a prescient understanding of the long-term risks embedded in Ethiopia’s constitutional arrangement. The 2018 diplomatic rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia raised hopes that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, encouraged by President Isaias Afwerki, would dismantle ethnic federalism and establish a more functional governance structure. These hopes, however, were not realized. Unfortunately, Abiy’s administration has often appeared more interested in managing ethnic rivalries for political advantage than in pursuing genuine reconciliation or constitutional reform. Moreover, recently he has even extended ethnic tensions beyond Ethiopia’s borders by advancing his agenda—labeled as Oromummaa—which seeks to create a Cushitic state under Oromo domination and with access to the Red Sea in the Horn of Africa. This ambition has escalated regional tensions, drawing in neighboring countries, particularly Djibouti and Eritrea, both of which have voiced strong opposition to what they perceive as aggressive and unlawful attempts to secure maritime access by force.
It has now become clear that the ongoing crisis in Ethiopia is unlikely to be resolved as long as the current constitution remains in place. Equally evident is that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity Party are neither willing nor capable of implementing the necessary reforms. As a result, they squandered the critical opportunity presented after 2018 to reshape the system and safeguard the integrity of the Ethiopian state.
Is there still a future for a unified Ethiopia?
Indeed, the question of whether Ethiopia can survive ethnic federalism and the immature leadership of Abiy Ahmed is both bold and relevant—yet it remains conspicuously absent from mainstream discourse. The unfolding crisis within Ethiopia demands a sober reassessment of the country’s trajectory, particularly given the current leadership’s apparent failure to grasp the gravity of the situation. Abiy Ahmed’s administration has demonstrated neither the political will nor the institutional capacity to pursue meaningful reconciliation or reform. Therefore, unless Prime Minister Abiy steps down to allow for a credible transitional process grounded in broad-based national dialogue, it is increasingly unlikely that Ethiopia will emerge from its current socio-political and economic turmoil as a unified state. International actors—particularly European diplomats—are gradually coming to recognize that Abiy is no longer a viable leader to guide a country of over 120 million through this volatile period. Yet, distracted by more pressing global crises, the international community has thus far avoided serious and coordinated engagement with Ethiopia’s deepening crisis. This diplomatic ambivalence risks enabling further fragmentation, as the state edges closer to collapse under the weight of its unresolved structural contradictions. Certainly, the urgency is compounded by the rapidly deteriorating security situation across the country. Ethnic-based conflicts have become a defining feature of Ethiopia’s political landscape under Abiy’s rule—ranging from the devastating Tigray war and ongoing unrest in Amhara to resistance in Afar and the southern regions, as well as the spread of insurgencies within Oromia. These conflicts are deeply rooted in longstanding grievances over ethnic marginalization and power struggles.
By and large, given the cumulative effect of three decades of ethnic federalism and the accelerating breakdown of national cohesion, the prospect of Ethiopia remaining unified under its current structure is increasingly doubtful. Without a radical reimagining of the state—one that transcends zero-sum ethnic politics and builds a more inclusive national identity—the country risks further fragmentation. It is highly unlikely that Abiy Ahmed’s waning regime can deliver such a transformation, which would require broad consensus and sustained dialogue over months, if not years. In reality, the regime appears to have run out of both time and political capital. Moreover, the deeply entrenched nature of ethnic politics and the dominance of identity-based affiliations over a shared Ethiopian identity present formidable obstacles to any meaningful reform.
Despite the delay, the moment to act may still be salvaged. The path forward can still begin if Ethiopia’s political elites rise to the challenge and unite to form a transitional council, free from the influence of the current prime minister. This body must urgently initiate a genuine national dialogue aimed at addressing the country’s deepening crisis. Only through such an inclusive and autonomous platform can Ethiopia begin to chart a sustainable course toward political stability, institutional reform, and true national reconciliation. Encouragingly, regional dynamics are shifting: leaders of Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia have all recently voiced criticism of Abiy Ahmed’s leadership. As a result, regional support for a transitional process appears increasingly attainable, with neighboring states in the Horn of Africa growing progressively disillusioned by Abiy’s destabilizing impact on both Ethiopia and the broader region.
