Since the collapse of the Assad regime in December, Syrians have been free to breath and dream, again. This moment, however, did come cheaply, and the costs will be borne by generations to come. With infrastructural recovery estimated at up to $1 trillion and tremendous human physical and emotional tolls for which there can be no dollar approximation, the road ahead for this proud and ancient country will be no cakewalk. Where there was once only despair, however, there is now hope; but Syria needs more than sanctions relief to put the past behind it. The wounds are too fresh and immediate needs too great for the future trinkle down effects of foreign investments and Diaspora dollars to stave off potential backsliding into civil strife.
The escalating situation in the country’s south at this very moment is a stark reminder of deep scars that cannot be ignored, if Syria is ever to have a shot at stability. Intervention last week by the new regime in Damascus, initially to quell fighting between Druze and Sunni tribal communities has only led to mounting casualties, and Israeli airstrikes in the heart of Damascus. With its own Druze population estimated 150,000, Israel was never going to be a mere bystander to developments on its northern border, not with an Al Qaeda affiliate at the helm of government in Damascus. With historic antipathy towards any central authority in Syria, whether Ottoman, French or Syrian Arab, the Druze are just one Syrian community, among others, whose fears about the nature of the new government make it highly susceptible to provocation, perceived or otherwise, and external interference.
The downward spiral in the south, if one happens to be a Syrian minority (or outside observer), likely portends increasing sectarianism and further strife as the country struggles with the legacy not only of a brutal civil war that left a million dead and millions displaced, but also of the colonial dismemberment of the region after WWI, which left the Druze, for one, divided between three new states – Israel, Lebanon and Syria. Given the recent suicide bombing of a Christian church in a Damascus suburb, following upon revenge-inspired killings of Alawis on the coast earlier in the year, it is not surprising that negotiations between Damascus and US-backed Syrian Kurdish forces in the northeast have seemingly hit a roadblock. Anyone who thought the road ahead for Syria post-Assad would be easy has not studied the region’s history.
Despite initial public optimism after the fall of the Assads, bolstered by the U.S. announcement of a lifting of crippling sanctions in May, the Syrian Humpty Dumpty is going to prove difficult to put back together again – perhaps even more difficult than post-colonial governments, including the Assads, found in keeping it together, as hard as that might be to believe. Federation or decentralization are potential long-term solutions to myriad communal grievances, but Syrians did not rebel in 2011 and sacrifice so much in the decade after to rid themselves of dictatorship only to see their country split into pieces. The majority, also, did not rise up to see one “ism” replaced by another – Baathism by Islamism.
One need not be a soothsayer to grasp that the outlook at this time is cloudy and urgent action is needed, preferably now while a majority of Syrians are still fatigued by a decade of war; that the enormity of the challenges confronting the country are beyond the capacity of the new government to manage both effectively and judiciously, left to its own devices. With countervailing forces, including some aligned with the new regime, less interested in Syria’s territorial integrity and stability than in securing respective strategic ambitions (think: Russian ports, Iranian terror networks, global Caliphate), it will be up to the West, supported by regional allies to ensure the current moment – a once-in-a-generation opportunity – is seized. This will require more than the relatively easy pen strokes of sanctions relief, which will prove critical over the long term, but will not stem the current drift.
Seizing the moment in Syria – assuming international consensus to avoid a relapse into genocidal civil conflict – requires urgent, present and sustained U.S. and E.U. diplomatic engagement with the new regime to moderate, monitor and reward it, accordingly; proactive engagement with Syria’s neighbors and regional benefactors to keep potential spoilers at bay; and the provision of appropriate technical and material assistance, neither of which the regime possesses, to extend the writ of Damascus to the periphery, including the south, to stabilize sources of grievance and begin reconciling competing communal narratives. There are few easy options in Syria today, but one thing is assured: leaving the new regime in Damascus to sort out turbulent domestic dynamics on its own is not a recipe for success, either for Syria or the region. Sanctions relief is a bet on the future; Syria needs help now.
