For twelve consecutive days, Israel has waged an intense aerial campaign against Iranian nuclear and military sites. On June 22, the United States joined the offensive, striking three major nuclear facilities Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow. The military aggression, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claims is meant to prevent an “existential threat,” has killed hundreds, injured thousands, and caused significant damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. But beyond the immediate physical devastation, this coordinated assault may have far more consequential fallout: the collapse of Iran’s commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and with it, the unravelling of the global non-proliferation regime.
Iranian lawmakers have made no secret of their growing frustration. The head of Iran’s Parliament Foreign Policy Committee, Abbas Golroo, invoked Article 10 of the NPT, which allows a state to withdraw if “extraordinary events have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi also echoed this sentiment and warned that all options were now on the table to defend Iran’s sovereignty and security. With both the U.S. and Israel now openly attacking nuclear sites that were under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and without evidence from the IAEA that Iran was developing a nuclear weapon, Iran’s threat to withdraw from the NPT is no longer a bluster. It is an inflection point in nuclear diplomacy.
Iran’s nuclear program has long existed under the scrutiny of the IAEA and the international community. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), though abandoned by the Trump administration in 2018, had curbed Iranian enrichment activities and placed rigorous monitoring mechanisms on its nuclear infrastructure. According to the IAEA, “there remains no definitive evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.” Even so, Tehran has faced military aggression, first from Israel, and now from the United States.
Article 10 of the NPT stipulates that a member state may withdraw from the treaty if extraordinary events related to the treaty jeopardized its supreme interests. From Iran’s perspective, the coordinated military strikes by a nuclear-armed, non-NPT state (Israel) and an NPT-signatory (the United States) against its safeguarded facilities met that threshold. These attacks are not mere warnings or acts of deterrence, they are strategic, pre-emptive attempts to obliterate Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure under the presumption of future weaponization, not current violations.
This distinction is critical. A preventive war is not sanctioned under international law. Without evidence of imminent threat, these attacks amount to a violation of Iran’s sovereignty, and arguably of the legal spirit underpinning the NPT itself. If Iran chooses to walk away from the treaty, it would cite these attacks not only as justification but as an existential imperative.
Iran would not be the first country to withdraw from the NPT. In 1993, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw, only to suspend it during last-minute negotiations with the U.S. That effort eventually produced the Agreed Framework, although the deal later collapsed. In 2003, Pyongyang resumed its withdrawal and went on to develop nuclear arsenal. The diplomatic failure to preserve North Korea’s NPT membership has since haunted global non-proliferation policy.
Iran’s situation is eerily similar, but potentially more destabilizing. Iran has significantly greater scientific infrastructure, larger population, and more regional entanglements than North Korea. Unlike Pyongyang, Tehran had accepted IAEA oversight until recently. Its threat to withdraw now carries with it not only the prospect of nuclear proliferation, but the ripple effect of further erosion of NPT norms. If a treaty member under full IAEA monitoring can be bombed with impunity by a nuclear power, what incentive do other non-nuclear states have to remain compliant?
The moral and political asymmetry of the current moment is difficult to ignore. Iran is a signatory to the NPT and has, until recently, cooperated with international inspections. Israel, meanwhile, is not a member of the treaty and maintains a policy of nuclear ambiguity and it is widely believed to possess a robust nuclear arsenal. By targeting Iran’s nuclear scientists, bombing enrichment facilities, and assassinating top officials, Israel has consistently undermined not only Iran’s capacity but also the global norms that govern the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The United States’ role is equally troubling. While the Trump Administration insists that U.S. strikes have “substantially delayed” Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapon, their actual impact may have ignited a new chapter of confrontation. Washington’s decision to bomb an NPT-member state’s safeguarded facilities, especially after abandoning a nuclear agreement that was still functioning, sends a dangerous message: treaties are conditional on power, not principle.
If Iran withdraws from the NPT, the implications are vast. The country would no longer be legally bound to refrain from nuclear weapon development. It could expel IAEA inspectors, halt all safeguards, and bring its uranium enrichment to weapons-grade levels. According to IAEA, Iran already possesses more than 400 kg of 60% enriched uranium, just a short technical leap from the 90% threshold needed for a bomb. While Israel has assassinated several senior Iranian scientists, Iran retains the expertise and infrastructure (deep underground nuclear facilities) to restart and accelerate weaponization if it chooses.
Iran, with current development, is more likely than ever to pursue a bomb. The military strikes have removed the advantage of ambiguity Iran once maintained and made open the pursuit of nuclear weapons a logical, yet dangerous, strategic response. Far from neutralizing a threat of nuclear Iran, the U.S and Israeli campaigns may have catalysed it. Beyond Iran, the NPT itself may not survive the shock. Other countries, especially those in volatile regions, will be watching closely. If Iran is punished despite compliance, they may conclude that nuclear armament is the only reliable guarantee of sovereignty. The precedent could embolden nations like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or even Turkey to reconsider their nuclear posture.
Despite severity of the recent events, the announcement of a ceasefire between Iran and Israel by President Trump on Monday evening offers a fragile but vital diplomatic off-ramp. Iran has not yet officially withdrawn from the NPT and its ambassadors have reiterated a desire for peaceful resolution. But time is short and this window of opportunity is limited. Any violation of the ceasefire will only harden Tehran’s stance, therefore, the ceasefire must be followed by immediate, good faith diplomatic engagement. To salvage the situation, both the United States and its allies must use this pause to engage in renewed negotiations; that begins with halting further military provocations and engaging Iran in meaningful dialogue, possibly under new international mediation. Re-entry into the JCPOA framework or a revised agreement, could offer mutual assurances, economic relief, and a return to transparent monitoring. The alternative is a chain reaction of withdrawal, rearmament, and war.
What began as a series of tactical airstrikes may end as the most consequential blow to global nuclear order since the Cold War. Israel and the United States have gambled that force can substitute for diplomacy. If Iran now exits the NPT and restarts its weapons program in earnest, the consequences will extend far beyond the Middle East.
The world must decide whether international agreements are binding pacts or temporary conveniences. If they are to mean anything, then Iran must not be left to bear the cost of compliance alone. And if the NPT is to survive, the powers that claim to defend it must do so with law, not bombs.
