Since becoming a net oil importer in 1993, China has deepened its ties with the Gulf, transforming the region from a peripheral energy supplier into a central pillar of its geopolitical strategy. Under Xi Jinping, this engagement has intensified, with the Gulf elevated as a testing ground for China’s vision of a multipolar order shaped by economic statecraft and non-interference.
The June 2025 crisis—triggered by Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military facilities and Iran’s retaliation—has sharpened the stakes of this strategy. The Gulf’s status as a zone of convergence now risks becoming a flashpoint, with serious implications for China’s ambitions, U.S. influence, and Gulf states’ agency.
From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping: Strategic Evolution
China’s foreign policy is deeply embedded in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideological framework, particularly the principle of evaluating the “overall situation” (da ju, 大局)—that is, to discern the “trends of the time”—to guide long-term planning. During the Deng Xiaoping era, this assessment was defined by caution, economic development, and a low-profile foreign policy. Deng famously asserted that “peace and development are the themes of the times,” shaping a doctrine that prioritized domestic growth and minimized external entanglements.
Accordingly, from the 1980s through the early 2000s, China’s Gulf engagement was driven almost entirely by the imperative of energy security. The region was viewed primarily as a source of oil to fuel China’s industrialization, but it remained a second-tier concern in Beijing’s broader foreign policy. China practiced strict non-interference and avoided involvement in the region’s complex conflicts or alliances.
Under Xi Jinping, however, China’s worldview has undergone a significant recalibration. As part of this reassessment, the Gulf has emerged as a key node for advancing China’s strategic interests across multiple fronts: energy, trade, technology, diplomacy, and regional security. The current Israel-Iran crisis, however, is testing the resilience of this recalibrated approach, as Beijing is forced to confront the hard limits of its non-interference doctrine and the fragility of its regional partnerships in the face of military escalation.
This ideological shift has also influenced how China engages internationally. Its approach emphasizes “win-win” partnerships, non-interference in domestic affairs, and the promotion of state-led investment—a model that resonates strongly with many Gulf states.
Multipolarity and Gulf Engagement
The Gulf’s importance in China’s foreign policy stems from its role in advancing Beijing’s vision of a multipolar world—one in which power is more evenly distributed and developing countries have greater influence in international affairs. The Gulf is central to this vision due to its energy wealth, geopolitical importance, and status as a strategic crossroads linking Asia, Africa, and Europe.
China’s relationships with Gulf countries have evolved from narrowly defined, transactional engagements into comprehensive strategic partnerships. This shift is rooted in three interrelated motivations: securing vital economic lifelines, projecting global influence, and providing a non-Western model of development and diplomacy—one that emphasizes sovereignty, infrastructure-led growth, and pragmatic cooperation, rather than democratic reform or conditional aid.
However, the June 2025 Israel-Iran conflict has exposed the vulnerabilities of this multipolar vision. The rapid escalation has forced Gulf states to reconsider their hedging strategies, as the risk of being drawn into a broader regional war—potentially involving the United States—has increased dramatically. For China, the crisis has underscored the limitations of its ability to mediate or protect its interests through economic statecraft alone, as the specter of hard power and military intervention has returned to the fore.
The Gulf as a “Strategic Convergence Zone”
Amid China’s growing capabilities and expanding global reach, the Gulf has come to represent a strategic convergence zone—where economic interests, technological ambitions, political ties, and security considerations intersect.
Energy remains the bedrock of China’s Gulf engagement. Over 40% of China’s crude oil imports come from the region, with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the UAE as top suppliers. But this engagement has evolved beyond simple buyer–seller transactions. China increasingly embeds energy deals within broader commercial and strategic frameworks.
China has also shown growing interest in the region’s renewable energy potential, partnering with Gulf states to develop solar and green hydrogen projects—initiatives that serve both China’s decarbonization agenda and its long-term energy footprint in the region. For both sides, stable energy ties are viewed not merely as economic necessities but as pillars of national security.
The Gulf has also emerged as a key node in China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR), a technological extension of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Chinese tech giants such as Huawei, ZTE, and Alibaba Cloud are central to building the Gulf’s digital infrastructure—from 5G networks and cloud computing hubs to AI platforms and smart cities—often in close collaboration with local governments and state-owned firms.
This technological engagement dovetails with Gulf states’ long-term transformation agendas, such as Saudi Vision 2030, the UAE’s Centennial 2071, and Qatar National Vision 2030. China is helping shape the digital architecture of future Gulf societies. The result is a deepening technological symbiosis that not only fosters mutual economic benefit but also gives China influence over data governance, digital standards, and cybersecurity frameworks—with long-term implications for regional surveillance norms and tech dependency.
China’s physical infrastructure investments further reinforce the Gulf’s strategic role. Projects such as the development of Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi, the expansion of Jizan and Yanbu industrial zones in Saudi Arabia, and transport initiatives linking the Gulf with Central and South Asia are emblematic of Beijing’s long-term intent to anchor the region in its broader vision of transcontinental connectivity.
Yet, the June 2025 crisis has exposed the fragility of this convergence. Israel’s attacks on Iranian nuclear and military facilities and Iran’s subsequent missile and drone strikes on Israeli territory have raised the specter of a broader regional war. The prospect of Iranian retaliation against Gulf energy infrastructure or the closure of the Strait of Hormuz threatens to disrupt the very energy flows that underpin China’s economic security. Chinese investments in digital and physical infrastructure are also at risk, as the conflict increases the likelihood of sabotage, cyberattacks, and collateral damage. In this new environment, the Gulf’s role as a strategic hub has been recast as a potential epicenter of global instability.
Diplomatic Recalibration and Global South Solidarity
China’s rise in the Gulf has been accompanied by a rebalancing of regional diplomatic alignments. Once tightly tethered to U.S. security guarantees, Gulf states are now hedging their bets by engaging with multiple great powers. China has capitalized on this trend by positioning itself as a credible and constructive diplomatic actor. Its mediation of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement in 2023 was widely viewed as a diplomatic coup and a sign of China’s growing readiness to play a peacemaking role in the region.
Beijing’s approach is also shaped by its self-identification as a champion of the Global South. It consistently advocates for greater equity in international governance and aligns itself with positions that resonate with Gulf states—including support for Palestinian statehood and opposition to Western military interventions.
However, the eruption of the Israel-Iran conflict has severely tested China’s diplomatic posture. Beijing’s inability to restrain its Iranian partner or to offer credible security assurances to Gulf states has exposed the limits of its regional influence. Moreover, as the possibility of U.S. military intervention grows, China’s role as a mediator has been marginalized. The crisis has also complicated China’s efforts to present itself as a champion of the Global South, as Gulf states now question whether Beijing can deliver on its promises of stability and non-interference in a region on the brink of war.
China’s Security Posture: “Security by Subtraction”
China’s security presence in the Gulf is defined by restraint—a doctrine of “security by subtraction” that avoids military entanglements and projects minimal hard power. Instead of deploying troops or building alliances, China relies on economic statecraft, diplomacy, and symbolic security actions to protect its interests.
Its modest naval presence, participation in counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and the establishment of its first overseas base in Djibouti reflect a careful calibration: staying relevant without becoming entangled. This low-profile posture is seen by Gulf states as non-threatening and thus welcome.
However, this minimalist model may face future dilemmas. If a regional crisis erupts—whether involving Iran, maritime chokepoints, or domestic unrest—Beijing may be pressured to take on greater responsibility. “Security by subtraction” may eventually give way to a more assertive, if still non-allied, security role.
The current conflict has brought these dilemmas to the forefront. The threat of Iranian missile strikes on Gulf oil infrastructure or the closure of the Strait of Hormuz directly imperils China’s energy security. At the same time, the risk of U.S. military intervention—whether in support of Israel or to contain Iran—raises the prospect of a broader regional war that could engulf Chinese assets and personnel. Beijing now faces a stark choice: maintain its traditional posture of restraint and risk losing influence, or take more assertive action to protect its interests, potentially at the cost of deeper entanglement. The crisis has thus exposed the inherent limitations of China’s security model, as the realities of hard power and military escalation threaten to overwhelm the logic of economic engagement and diplomatic balancing.
U.S. Strategy and Competitive Overlay
Contrary to perceptions that the United States has “departed” from the Gulf, Washington maintains a robust and evolving presence in the region. While the widely discussed “pivot to the Indo-Pacific” has shifted some strategic focus, the Gulf remains central to U.S. global strategy. Ongoing military deployments, arms sales, and deepening defense cooperation demonstrate that the U.S. has not disengaged but rather recalibrated its approach to address emerging challenges—chief among them, China’s expanding influence.
The U.S. Fifth Fleet continues to be anchored in Bahrain, while key airbases in Qatar and the UAE remain foundational to the region’s security architecture. The United States is still the Gulf’s principal defense supplier, with bilateral security agreements growing increasingly sophisticated. Simultaneously, American economic interests—from energy and infrastructure to digital technology—are closely intertwined with those of Gulf monarchies.
President Trump’s return to the White House has dispelled lingering notions of a U.S. withdrawal from the Gulf. His May 2025 visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE underscored a pivot toward—not away from—the region. Backed by a $142 billion arms sale and a $600 billion investment package, the trip marked the start of a new phase in bilateral ties.
In turn, the U.S. is likely to impose stricter conditions on Gulf partners, tying future defense and tech cooperation to reduced engagement with Beijing. This intensifying competition has not only made the Gulf a focal point of geopolitical contestation but also strengthened the Gulf monarchies’ leverage, allowing them to extract greater concessions from both sides while navigating a multipolar order on their own terms.
The Israel-Iran crisis has dramatically reframed the U.S. role in the region. The Trump administration now faces a stark dilemma: whether to intervene militarily in support of Israel and risk triggering a wider regional war or to pursue urgent de-escalation—potentially at the cost of undermining U.S. credibility with both Israel and Gulf partners.
The prospect of U.S. strikes on Iranian targets, or direct engagement with Iranian forces in the Gulf, has introduced a new layer of strategic uncertainty, as Gulf states weigh the risks of supporting U.S. action against the dangers of Iranian retaliation. For the Gulf monarchies, the crisis has exposed the limits of their agency, as their traditional strategy of hedging between Washington and Beijing is rapidly being overtaken by the imperatives of hard security and alliance politics.
Conclusion
China’s approach to the Gulf reflects a broader reassessment of global power shifts. Once focused narrowly on energy, the region now anchors Beijing’s strategic interests across energy security, infrastructure, technology, and diplomacy.
China’s ability to project influence while avoiding overt entanglement has made it an attractive partner to Gulf monarchies eager for diversification and geopolitical flexibility. Yet the June 2025 crisis has exposed the limits of this model. Beijing’s emphasis on non-interference and economic engagement offers little insulation from hard security shocks—particularly when core energy routes and strategic investments are at risk.
The Gulf’s centrality in U.S.-China rivalry has narrowed space for hedging. While competition has increased Gulf leverage, it has also intensified external pressures. Regional actors now face more acute choices between strategic partners.
For China, the threat of U.S. military intervention and regional instability risks upending years of careful positioning. Whether the Gulf remains a zone of strategic convergence or becomes a fault line of great-power conflict will depend not only on Beijing’s next moves but also on whether Gulf states can preserve agency in an environment shaped by confrontation, not cooperation.
