The post‑Cold War era established a Western‑dominated global order, with the United States at its apex. Anchored by military alliances and backed by liberal economic institutions, this unipolar moment promised stability through American leadership. Yet the rise of China has exposed the vulnerabilities of that system. Leveraging economic statecraft, Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has forged new centres of gravity, challenging the economic, normative and institutional pillars of Western hegemony. Under Donald Trump, US retrenchment accelerated this contest, as Washington doubled down on NATO and “America First,” creating openings that China was quick to exploit. The result is neither a clear American triumph nor outright Chinese dominance, but a more contested multipolar landscape in which Western hegemony is being actively questioned and redefined.
A Richer Historical Canvas
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the United States unrivalled. NATO’s eastward expansion incorporated former Warsaw Pact states, while Washington forged bilateral security pacts across the Asia‑Pacific—most notably with Japan, South Korea and Australia. These alliances underwrote American deterrence, projecting power from the Baltic to the South China Sea. Economically, institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and the International Monetary Fund promoted an open, rules‑based system that aligned global markets with Western legal and governance norms.
Simultaneously, China pursued a cautious ascent. Deng Xiaoping’s reforms prioritised economic growth and domestic stability, steering clear of overt power plays. By the early 2000s, China had joined the WTO, embraced export‑led development and built foreign reserves. Under Xi Jinping, the BRI emerged as a strategic acceleration: a sprawling network of infrastructure projects designed to create economic dependencies and pull partner states into China’s orbit. Unlike post‑war US institutions, the BRI operates through state‑to‑state credit, sidestepping Western conditionality on governance or human rights.
This divergence reflected deeper contestation. Western hegemony relied on both hard and soft power: military alliances enforced security, while liberal norms spread through trade and cultural influence. Beijing’s model offered an alternative: economic inducements without political strings, institutional structures that run parallel to Bretton Woods bodies, and a normative vision premised on sovereign equality rather than democratic accountability.
Retracing the Unipolar Legacy under Trump
The expansion of NATO has long been a testament to Western hegemony: in 1999, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic became the first former Warsaw Pact members to join, followed by seven more states in 2004, including the Baltic republics, and Montenegro in 2017. This enlargement not only entrenched US strategic depth on Europe’s eastern flank but also signalled the open‑ended nature of the unipolar order. Yet it also sowed seeds of resistance in Russia, and stretched alliance obligations into new theatres, raising debates about burden‑sharing and strategic overreach.
Donald Trump’s first presidency then ruptured many assumptions of this system. By publicly questioning NATO’s value and demanding that European allies meet their defence‑spending targets, he cast doubt on America’s enduring security commitments. His threats to withdraw troops from Germany and public disputes with long‑standing partners undermined alliance cohesion and clouded the future of further expansion. In the Asia‑Pacific, Trump echoed these transactional demands: he insisted that Japan and South Korea shoulder higher costs for hosting US forces and withdrew the United States from the Trans‑Pacific Partnership, shifting from collective engagement to a more transactional diplomacy.
This retrenchment extended beyond defence. Exiting the Paris Agreement and UNESCO signalled a narrowing of US global leadership on climate and cultural affairs. Allies began to hedge, seeking alternatives to compensate for perceived American ambivalence. France’s calls for a more autonomous EU defence policy and ASEAN’s cautious embrace of Chinese infrastructure under the BRI both reflected an erosion of the unquestioned centrality that NATO once embodied.
The 2024 US presidential election, resulting in Donald Trump’s return to office, has further intensified these dynamics. On his first day back in office in January 2025, Trump signed Executive Order 14162, initiating the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement for the second time. This move has drawn criticism from environmental advocates and global leaders, who argue that it undermines international climate efforts and diminishes US credibility on the world stage.
In terms of NATO, Trump has reiterated his stance that US support for allies will depend on their defence spending commitments, specifically the 2% of GDP benchmark. This position has raised concerns among European leaders about the reliability of US security guarantees and has prompted renewed discussions about increasing European defence autonomy. The combination of these policies suggests a continued shift in the traditional structures of Western hegemony, with potential implications for global geopolitical stability.
Western Hegemony Under Strain
The core pillars of Western hegemony—military predominance, economic governance and normative leadership—are each being tested by China’s ascent. Militarily, US naval and air power still looms large in Asia, but its deterrent effect is complicated by strategic ambiguity and the proliferation of advanced Chinese capabilities such as anti‑access/area‑denial systems. Economically, the BRI and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) offer integration models that sidestep Western rulebooks and dissent over labour or environmental standards. Normatively, China’s emphasis on non‑interference and sovereign equality appeals to states frustrated by Western demands for political reform.
As a result, many governments now view Western hegemony not as the only viable order, but one option among several. This shift reshapes global forums: at the United Nations, China’s voting alliances have expanded; in development finance, the AIIB channels billions into projects that Western institutions once dominated; in digital governance, Chinese standards in 5G and AI challenge Western tech firms’ primacy. The contest for Asia’s future is thus also a contest over the legitimacy and durability of Western leadership.
America First and the BRI’s Economic Appeal
Trump’s “America First” agenda, intended to reinforce US power, often produced the opposite effect. The 2018‑20 trade war with China disrupted global supply chains, prompting Asian manufacturers to turn to Chinese‑financed infrastructure for reliability. By pulling out of multilateral bodies, Washington ceded soft‑power influence: Beijing’s vaccine diplomacy during the COVID‑19 crisis won goodwill precisely because Western donors seemed reluctant or tied to conditionalities.
In 2025, during President Trump’s second term, the “America First” agenda continued to reshape global dynamics. The administration escalated trade tensions by imposing steep tariffs on Chinese imports, prompting retaliatory measures from Beijing and causing significant disruptions in global supply chains. These actions led to increased costs for manufacturers and consumers alike, with sectors such as technology and agriculture particularly affected. Simultaneously, the US withdrew from key international organisations, including the World Health Organisation and the UN Human Rights Council, signalling a retreat from multilateral engagement. This withdrawal created a vacuum in global leadership, which China has sought to fill through initiatives like the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, aiming to expand its influence in international governance. As a result, the US’s traditional role in shaping global norms and policies has diminished, allowing alternative models of international cooperation to gain traction.
China’s loans for roads, ports and digital networks spoke directly to national development aspirations. Where US engagement emphasised governance reforms, China offered turnkey projects with financing attached to few political preconditions. Developing states, keen to close infrastructure gaps, often found this model more appealing—even as debt‑sustainability concerns grew.
Economics as Geostrategy
Xi Jinping’s BRI evolved from concept to core foreign‑policy instrument. By 2021, more than 150 countries had signed memoranda of understanding. Projects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, linking Kashgar to Gwadar, not only facilitated trade but created strategic access points on the Arabian Sea. The Digital Silk Road integrated Chinese telecommunications firms into foreign markets, extending Beijing’s influence in cyberspace.
Critics pointed to Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port as a cautionary tale of debt dependence, but China refined its approach with debt rescheduling and environmental safeguards. Nevertheless, the BRI’s expansion under Trump underscored the limits of Western power: US military assurances could not match the immediate economic benefits of Chinese infrastructure.
In Pakistan, CPEC has become synonymous with economic lifeline and strategic realignment. As US aid dwindled, Islamabad deepened its reliance on Chinese financing, recalibrating its foreign‑policy posture towards Beijing. Southeast Asia witnessed a similar dynamic: US freedom‑of‑navigation operations continued, but the absence of a comprehensive trade framework left ASEAN states negotiating their own bargains with Beijing. In Europe, Portugal and Italy’s entry into BRI MoUs revealed how economic pragmatism could override ideological solidarity with Washington.
Western responses to the BRI have taken shape in new coalitions. The Quad has intensified security dialogues while launching the Indo‑Pacific Economic Framework to set high‑standard investment norms. The Blue Dot Network, supported by the US, Japan and Australia, offers certification for quality infrastructure—an attempt to reassert Western benchmarks. The EU’s Connectivity Agenda seeks to mobilise public and private capital for projects that adhere to democratic governance and sustainability.
The US under Trump’s second term sought to counterbalance China’s influence through strategic partnerships and alternative infrastructure initiatives. Notably, the US collaborated with India on the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), aiming to enhance transport connections between these regions. Despite these efforts, China’s BRI continued to attract nations seeking rapid economic development, highlighting the challenges the US faced in presenting a compelling alternative to China’s expansive infrastructure strategy.
Still, these countermeasures face challenges. Coalescing diverse partners around a unified economic vision proves more complex than NATO’s military alliance, and funding commitments often fall short of BRI’s scale. Moreover, many recipient states view these initiatives as complementing, rather than replacing, Chinese finance.
Charting a Complex Future
A new era of hybrid order is unfolding. States will increasingly tailor security and economic partnerships to their varied interests, drawing on both Western alliances and Chinese infrastructure. Normative debates over governance standards, environmental safeguards and digital norms will intensify in bodies from the G20 to ASEAN.
Emerging powers such as India and the EU will play pivotal roles in mediating this transition, crafting third‑way approaches that seek to preserve Western advantages while engaging with China’s economic momentum. Technological competition—from 5G networks to artificial intelligence—will become as central as highways and railways in defining spheres of influence.
Conclusion: Beyond Hegemony
The rise of China has irrevocably challenged Western hegemony. China’s economic corridors offer an alternative path to development and influence, while US retrenchment under Trump exposed the fragility of alliance‑based power. The future will not be dominated by a single hegemon but by a fluid interplay of security alliances and infrastructure networks. Navigating this complexity requires a nuanced understanding of how economic statecraft and military deterrence interact, and a willingness to forge partnerships that can address global challenges without reverting to zero‑sum rivalries.
Only by embracing a multipolar reality—one that recognises both the strengths and the limitations of Western and Chinese models—can the international community build a sustainable order for the twenty‑first century.
This emerging landscape demands a strategic recalibration from all stakeholders. States must move beyond zero‑sum thinking and pursue tailored partnerships that combine security assurances with economic cooperation. Western democracies should refine their alliances to be more agile, integrating emerging partners and focusing on interoperability that extends to cyber‑defence, pandemic preparedness and climate resilience. Simultaneously, China’s state‑driven financing model requires greater transparency, environmental stewardship and respect for local governance norms if it is to be perceived as a long‑term partner rather than a fleeting benefactor.
At the institutional level, global fora such as the G20, World Trade Organisation and United Nations can serve as platforms for reconciling competing agendas. By updating governance rules to accommodate new centres of economic gravity and by reinforcing commitments to high labour, environmental and fiscal standards, these organisations can mitigate the fragmentation engendered by unilateral initiatives. In parallel, regional bodies—be it ASEAN, the EU or the African Union—can tailor hybrid frameworks that balance external partnerships with internal cohesion.
Ultimately, the success of a multipolar order will rest on shared norms and mutual accountability. Transparency in financing, respect for sovereignty and a genuine commitment to sustainable development must underpin every major infrastructure or security agreement. The twenty‑first century’s most pressing challenges—climate change, pandemics, technological disruption—transcend national borders. Only through collective ingenuity, principled cooperation and flexible coalitions can the international community transform the contest between NATO‑centred security and Belt and Road economics into a collaborative endeavour that benefits all.
This is the path to a stable, inclusive and resilient global order—one that honours the lessons of the unipolar past while forging a future capable of harnessing the potential of all powers, large and small, in service of common prosperity and peace.
