The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become one of China’s foreign policy instruments in pursuing its economic and security interests in the Southeast Asian region. China has been using this instrument since it decided to open itself up to ASEAN. Until around the 1980s, China was the only country in Asia that was oriented towards developed countries rather than its regional neighbors. China is also the only third-world country to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This distancing was partly due to the historical aspect of China that led to tight government control over relations with other countries. However, this attitude was transformed when the Cold War ended. In 1991, China became a Consultative Member of ASEAN, and in 1996, ASEAN officially made China a dialog partner at the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta.
Economic benefits can certainly be gained through China’s cooperation with ASEAN. According to Swee-Hock (2005), trade between China and ASEAN is ASEAN has experienced a very rapid development with an average growth rate of 20.8 percent from 1990 to 2003. As of 2005, ASEAN became China’s fifth-largest cooperation partner. Meanwhile, China is ASEAN’s sixth-largest cooperation partner. In addition to economic benefits, security benefits can also be gained in China’s interaction with ASEAN. The various frameworks of cooperation between the two parties are based on the interests that both parties want to pursue.
In November 2001, the progress of China’s interaction with ASEAN was seen when the two formed a free trade area (FTA) within a 10-year period. This agreement became effective on July 1, 2003, but the new FTA will be implemented from 2010 with the old ASEAN members Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand first. Other FTAs will begin in 2015 between China and new ASEAN members Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. In addition, the ASEAN Secretariat noted that the progress of this cooperation was also followed by the signing of the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues at the meeting.
Thus, both ASEAN and China actually have the potential for economic benefits if they continue to maintain positive interactions in the form of cooperation. However, what about the potential benefits for both parties in the context of China and ASEAN security cooperation? Does China pursue its national security and regional security interests by engaging military force in the framework of security cooperation? Can the motivation for China’s involvement in ASEAN security cooperation only be understood from a realist perspective?
ASEAN applies a common norm known as the ASEAN way. In addition, the changes that have occurred in China and ASEAN are able to unravel a variety of alternative explanations for China’s interaction with ASEAN. In ASEAN, intersubjective understanding is possible in every security case settlement. This can be explained by the constructivist perspective that believes in the construction of ideas through social interaction. ASEAN’s ability to shape regional order is not only influenced by material factors such as balance of power and self-help but also determined by the behavioral and procedural norms of the ASEAN organization.
This paper is analyzing the extent to which constructivism can explain China’s involvement in ASEAN security cooperation. With an understanding of these two perspectives, it is hoped that a constructive China-ASEAN framework for the ASEAN Security Community.
Based on a realist perspective, China’s involvement in ASEAN-level security cooperation can be explained through the following two main assumptions. First, the interaction is driven by the perceived security threats that China and Southeast Asian countries face. ASEAN views China as a powerful country with a large population, while China views ASEAN as a new market force for its country. In terms of geography, China looks close to India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Southeast Asia. With this condition, China’s dependency and attachment to these countries are created. On the one hand, China’s economic and political power can encourage Chinese people to build national pride, but on the other hand, this can potentially create fear for its neighbors.
The perceived threat to China is also felt by the US and other major countries. The West is less convinced by China’s seemingly peaceful demeanor. The West has this perception because of historical experience that casts doubt on the purity of China’s peaceful motivation.
For the second, the interaction is fueled by China’s perceived concerns about the US’ growing partnership with ASEAN. China’s perceived threat to its own existence lies in the increasing intensification of ASEAN’s partnerships with other countries, especially with the US. This partnership is getting closer because of the US commitment to exert its influence in Asia both in terms of ideology and moral issues as well as trade and power. In addition, Southeast Asian countries also expect Great Power involvement in the region in the framework of dialogue and the implementation of a code of conduct to prevent conflicts related to maritime and sovereignty issues, for example, in the handling of the South China Sea case. China sees ASEAN’s success in dealing with Cambodia, for example, and the success of the ARF as not due to ASEAN’s norms or institutional success. These successes are perceived to have arisen because of the support of powerful actors. China sees an opportunity for itself to expand its power through influence in Southeast Asia.
China’s interaction with ASEAN could give China more power to counter US influence in the region. This is evident in China’s full support for the launch of the ARF as Asia’s most important security dialogue forum, involving ASEAN and its ten dialogue partners. China was concerned that the ARF would be used by Western countries to seek support for a policy of encircling China. However, this concern can be dismissed by the fact that ASEAN’s balance of power strategy to deter major powers from dominating the Asia-Pacific region works quite well in supporting China’s security objectives.
Based on the constructivist perspective, it could be told if the whole interaction was supported by the social and cultural similarities. ASEAN has adopted the ASEAN Way, whose values are considered to be in line with Chinese political culture. The ASEAN Way is described as ASEAN prioritizing decision-making through in-depth consultation and consensus. The ASEAN Way allows for in-depth consultation in a unique, informal, consensus-building, and non-confrontational style that characterizes regional interaction and cooperation. These characteristics are in contrast to decision-making procedures in some Western multilateral negotiations. With these norms in place, the actions of ASEAN member states are based on norms that govern behavior rather than aggressiveness. This is certainly an incentive for China to choose to cooperate with ASEAN because the existing norms will reduce the potential for the use of aggressive force by ASEAN member states. The ASEAN Way emphasizes how ideas and values are constructed by ASEAN as the identity of its members.
Secondly, interactions are fueled by the creation of ‘self’ rather than ‘other’ identities. ASEAN has evolved in the formation of a regional community where both ‘self’ and ‘other’ identities are fostered. This is shown in ASEAN’s success in trying to create a common identity among its members in dealing with human rights-related issues. The ASEAN Charter, approved at the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore, has authorized the establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Body. This shows that communicative action is used to consolidate and formulate the concept of ‘self.’ The establishment of the Human Rights Council is an indicator or affirmation that ASEAN is creating boundaries of its identity as a single entity.
In addition to the expansion of issues that show the identity of ‘self,’ the fostering of identity. This is also done by expanding ASEAN membership and partnerships on behalf of ASEAN. ASEAN plus three, which embraces China, South Korea, and Japan as ASEAN partners, has shown that the definition or boundaries of ‘self’ are done by ASEAN. China’s interaction is also by ‘invitation’ from ASEAN, not by force. Thus, China also belongs to the identity of ‘self’ with ASEAN rather than the ‘other.’ ASEAN is not a party that is considered as ‘other.’ The interactions that have been established between China and ASEAN member states create the construction of ‘self’ and not ‘other.’ With the existence of a ‘self’ identity for China and ASEAN, it is possible to form a relationship that facilitates intersubjective understanding and discursive actions as a tool to interact on certain security issues, some of which are quite heavy, namely in resolving the South China Sea case.
