In the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the increasingly volatile strategic situation in Northeast Asia, North Korea is showing signs of leaning towards Moscow more clearly than ever. Is this a turning point in North Korea’s foreign policy strategy, or is it simply a timing calculation to serve immediate goals?
Russia – North Korea: Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
The rapprochement between North Korea and Russia is no coincidence. Diplomatic relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union (Russia) date back to 1948, before the founding of communist China. Throughout the Cold War, the two countries maintained friendly relations.
Today, as Moscow faces logistical shortages due to the more than three-year-long war in Ukraine, North Korea has become an emergency supplier, exchanging weapons for technology, satellite support, and even diplomatic patronage. Reports from the United States and South Korea indicate that tens of thousands of North Korean-made artillery shells and missiles have been shipped to the Ukrainian battlefield. In return, Russia is said to be helping Pyongyang develop a military reconnaissance satellite system—something North Korea has never done before.
More importantly, Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia in September 2023 was more than just a diplomatic gesture. The intimate images between Kim and Putin, along with statements of “personal friendship,” suggested that Pyongyang was seeking an alternative to the role China had played for decades. The relationship culminated in the signing of the Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership in June last year. Nor was the increasingly public appearance of North Korean troops on Russian soil to fight against Ukraine.
In an uncertain post-Cold War world, North Korea seems to believe that Russia needs it more than ever, even though both are isolated from a “like-minded” partner who is willing to support them both militarily and politically.
China-North Korea relations noticeably dim
In contrast to the development of Russia-North Korea relations, the relationship between North Korea and China has been quite quiet in recent years. Although China remains North Korea’s largest trading partner , accounting for about 90% of bilateral trade, the flow of goods has not really recovered as expected after the pandemic. More importantly, Beijing is no longer publicly supporting Pyongyang’s military actions or nuclear tests as strongly as before.
China, in its 12th year in office under President Xi Jinping, is clearly pursuing a stable foreign policy strategy, minimizing risks with an unstable partner like North Korea, in order to avoid being caught in the vortex of confrontation between the trio of Pyongyang, Washington, and Seoul. Meanwhile, Beijing still wants to maintain North Korea as a “geopolitical buffer zone.” Beijing no longer wants to be an absolute patron, especially when the country is caught in a comprehensive confrontation with the US under Trump on many other fronts.
Why did North Korea choose Russia?
For North Korea, a country that has been under sanctions for decades, the difficulty in developing resources is inevitable. Choosing Russia at this time is more of a “tactical opportunity” move than a complete change in strategy. Based on that, Pyongyang has three specific goals:
Maximizing immediate benefits. By selling weapons of war to Russia, North Korea earns foreign currency, technology, and food aid that China is not willing to provide easily.
Next, create a strategic balance. Getting closer to Moscow gives Pyongyang more leverage in deterring the hostile US-South Korea alliance, while still using China in its sphere of minimal influence.
Ultimately, it opens up a space for experimentation with new foreign policies. This could be a test to gauge the reactions of the parties, from which North Korea considers adjusting its foreign policy doctrine to be more flexible in the post-Covid-19 and Trump 2.0 period.
The Limits and Risks of the “Moscow – Pyongyang” Alliance
Still, the emerging alliance between Russia and North Korea has many practical limits.
Russia is now globally isolated, under sanctions, and struggling with its own war in Ukraine. Relying on such a partner could increase North Korea’s diplomatic risk, especially since Moscow is reluctant to send troops to defend Pyongyang against any attack from the US or South Korea.
If Russia loses the war with Ukraine (which is unlikely at the moment) or Russia falls into an internal political crisis, in either case, North Korea will lose its only current source of support other than China. This makes the pro-Russian option a “one-way gamble,” while Pyongyang still needs Beijing to maintain its economic survival.
Being too pro-Russian could provoke an unhappy reaction from China. Beijing does not want to lose its leading role in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, and Russia’s increased influence would force China to either respond more diplomatically or quietly reduce its economic support for North Korea, which neither side wants.
How did China react?
For now, Beijing is taking a “sit-still” approach. China has not publicly criticized Russia-North Korea relations, but it has not participated in any recent direct support initiatives for Pyongyang. Some analysts believe that China is “controlling from afar,” letting North Korea determine its own boundaries with Russia while maintaining control over its economic capabilities by maintaining minimal trade and closed diplomatic channels.
In another scenario, China might quietly increase its support if it felt Pyongyang was drifting off course. But that would only happen if Beijing’s core security interests, such as Taiwan, were threatened, or if North Korea triggered a genuine nuclear crisis, for example.
Future Scenario: Adjustment or Divergence?
The current situation suggests that Russia-North Korea relations are likely to remain tactical, temporary, and situational. However, if Russia continues to purchase weapons from North Korea, train its military, provide support at the United Nations, and covertly circumvent sanctions, the relationship could enter a more long-term phase.
Still, Pyongyang will not easily abandon China—an indispensable economic, political, and geopolitical partner. The North Korean leadership understands that putting all its eggs in the Russian basket is risky. Therefore, it is likely to continue its “triple-pole” strategy: using Russia to increase leverage, keeping China at a safe level, and keeping open the possibility of indirect dialogue with the US or South Korea.
North Korea’s tilt toward Russia may be one of the most notable short-term strategic shifts in Northeast Asia over the past year. But it is unlikely to permanently replace its relationship with China. In a world reshaping power structures, Pyongyang may simply be playing a flexible game of chess to maximize its gains, protect the Kim family regime, and keep itself from becoming a passive player in the great power game.
