Authors: Rahul Mishra & Peter Brian M. Wang*
In a shocking turn of events, the US has twice supported Russia in votes at the United Nations to mark the third anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This first-ever move in decades on the part of the US not only included opposing a European-drafted resolution that was aimed at condemning Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also contained a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution, drafted by the US itself, calling for cessation of the conflict but without any criticism of the Russian misadventure.
Trump’s approach on Russia-Ukraine conflict is in sharp contrast with the rest of the ‘West’ and its NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) allies indicating a deep divide between the US and Europe, which will have far-reaching consequences.
Trump’s return to the White House has posed a new set of challenges to global stability and strategic equilibrium. From the America First Trade Policy (AFTP), MAGA, and tariff imposition on neighbours, friends, and competitors alike to a unilateral and whimsical Gaza plan, walking away from global multilateral institutions, and shirking long-standing security commitments with NATO members, Trump 2.0 has brought a diplomatic tsunami of sorts to the world, compelling countries across the world to take preventive countermeasures.
Trump’s shifting commitments indicate the looming erosion of the liberal international order and its foundational principles. While argued by some as a response to China’s rise and to restrengthen the U.S. economic and military prowess, these developments suggest that the U.S. itself is on a mission to dismantle the Liberal International Order, of which it used to claim itself as a guardian and the leader. Rather than championing an existent rules-based order, the U.S. is prioritizing economic nationalism and strategic retrenchment from friends, leaving the future of global governance uncertain.
Trump’s tariff war represents a fundamental rethinking in American economic security thinking. Traditionally, liberal economic thought has posited that economic interdependence reduces conflict and enhances stability. The America First Trade Policy (AFTP), however, recasts economic reliance as a liability, challenging the foundational principles of free and open international trade. By framing trade as a component of national security, the U.S. is moving away from the assumption that economic liberalization promotes peace and stability, instead embracing a zero-sum approach that prioritizes national economic sovereignty over free and open liberal multilateral trade.
Trump’s withdrawal from the global human rights institutions – UNHRC and UNHCR – further illustrates a retreat from global governance and a shift towards a transactional and short-sighted foreign policy approach, where the U.S. prioritizes material benefits over its global leadership roles claimed by Trump’s predecessors. This shift is particularly evident in Trump’s insistence on trade surpluses and economic leverage over cultivating soft power and diplomatic influence.
Prioritizing the U.S. interests at the expense of allies is exemplified by the imposition of tariffs—25 per cent on Canadian and Mexican exports and 10 per cent on Chinese imports. While these measures are officially justified by concerns such as illegal migration and fentanyl trafficking, they also reflect a broader strategy aimed at addressing trade imbalances and countering China’s economic rise. Given that Canada, Mexico, and China are among the largest sources of U.S. imports, these policies indicate a broader strategy of economic decoupling rather than mere punitive actions.
The potential expansion of these tariffs raises further concerns. During his election campaign, President Trump warned that the Europe would “pay a big price” for failing to purchase sufficient U.S. goods. Similarly, the key U.S. partners in Asia—Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and India—may also face trade restrictions. The 2022 World Integrated Trade Solution data suggest that these countries maintain significant trade surpluses with the U.S., making them potential targets for future economic measures.
The WTO and the Looming Risk of a Global Trade War
The long-term viability of these measures remains questionable within the framework of U.S. commitments to the WTO. Under WTO rules, tariff increases must remain within bound commitments. Given the U.S.’s historically liberal trade regime, exceeding these commitments would signal a broader shift away from WTO compliance, raising the spectre of a global trade war.
The consequences of such a trade war could be profound. A WTO study on the previous U.S.-China trade war found that it led to considerable trade diversion and reorganization of supply chains in East Asia. If the U.S.-China tensions escalate further and they pursue aggressive supply chain decoupling, the economic landscape could shift dramatically, disrupting global trade routes and altering patterns of trade interdependence.
While some third parties may benefit from trade diversion, these gains would be short-lived. As Aufa Doarest and Maria Monica Wihardja argue, any advantages derived from supply chain reconfiguration could be offset if geopolitical tensions continue to escalate. Increased U.S. scrutiny of supply chains to prevent circumvention of trade restrictions would further complicate global trade dynamics.
Security Implications of Shifting American Strategic Priorities
Beyond trade, the U.S. is signalling a strategic shift in security commitments. In a recent statement, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth emphasized that European nations must assume greater responsibility for their security, making it apparent that the U.S. is unwilling to address global threats alone. While this does not signal a complete abandonment of NATO, it does reflect growing frustration with the alliance’s burden-sharing dynamics—a sentiment echoed by previous U.S. administrations – from Bush Junior to Biden.
This apparent shift is occurring alongside an evolution of security frameworks in the Indo-Pacific. Minilateral security arrangements such as Quad, AUKUS, TSD, JAPHUS, and JAROKUS are expanding, while bilateral agreements—such as those between the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea—are becoming more prominent. These evolving security architectures suggest a broader restructuring of global defence alignments, albeit in a fragmented manner that has yet to reach NATO’s level of institutional coherence.
Perils of Choosing Economic Nationalism Over Liberal Institutional Norms
Pundits of International relations and diplomacy have long examined how and why states behave, interact, and exercise power as they do in pursuit of their national interests. This analysis extends to how states organize themselves through institutions and guiding principles, collectively forming what is known as the international order.
Today, great power competition remains a central force in shaping global dynamics. The U.S.-China systemic rivalry is fundamentally reshaping the international order, though perhaps not in the way dominant narratives suggest. In a Foreign Affairs op-ed, “China’s Alternative Order,” Elizabeth Economy (2024) argues that China is actively working to transform the international system, ensuring its centrality while expunging Western values from global institutions.
While acknowledging the need for reform, she questions China’s ability and intentions to lead such a transformation. Instead, she calls for the U.S. and its allies to present an alternative based on “openness, transparency, rule of law, and official accountability”—principles that are the hallmarks of the world’s market democracies.”
Ironically, recent developments suggest that it is the U.S.– the so-called crusader and protector of the liberal international order that appears increasingly disillusioned with these principles, actively working to dismantle the liberal international order without offering a viable alternative. Trump’s withdrawal from institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Paris Agreement, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), coupled with his “America First” trade policy and sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC), underscore a shift towards prioritizing U.S. interests at the expense of multilateralism and global governance structures.
The America First Trade Policy (AFTP), in particular, challenges the liberal institutionalist premise that economic interdependence fosters global stability and security. Instead, it frames economic dependency as a strategic vulnerability, advocating for protectionist measures such as tariffs, reshoring supply chains, and industrial policy to reduce reliance on foreign economies.
If the U.S. continues down this path, it runs the risk of not only alienating allies but also undermining the very institutions it once helped build. The world may soon find itself in an era defined less by cooperative global governance and more by fragmented, transactional power dynamics—one where stability is no longer guaranteed, and the costs of disengagement become increasingly apparent.
*Dr. Peter Brian M Wang has held various positions in the Malaysian government, primarily at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). He is currently attached to the National Institute of Public Administration (INTAN), where he lectures and undertakes research on economic and international relations. He tweets @PBMWang
