Graham Allison is an eminent scholar from Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, founding Dean of the Kennedy School and former Head of its Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Allison writes in Destined for War about Thucydides’s Trap, providing an in-depth analysis of the US-China rivalry, particularly in the twenty-first century. The author sheds light on the rise of China as a great power in contrast to the US, accentuating the historical parallels and war scenarios, where many rising powers challenged the position of the mighty ruling one. The book underscores a historical record of 500 years in which major powers of the time went to war while, on some occasions, avoiding confrontation by making painful but necessary adjustments.
Before digging deep into the discussion, the author starts by systematically dismantling Thucydides’s Trap, stressing its historical linkage with today’s security environment, explicitly the imbalanced relationship between the US and China considering their trade war and foreign influence in regions of interest. Thucydides, as known to many, an Athenian military commander and historian, pens in his book titled History of the Peloponnesian War about the situation of two Greek city-states, Athens and Sparta, who fought a series of conflicts for 27 years from 431 to 404 BCE. Renowned for its military prowess, Sparta was the dominant state among other Greek states (Athens, Corinth, Megara, and Thebes). However, “the relentless rise of Athens,” as Thucydides claims, “instilled fear in Sparta” that its predominance in Greece was undermining—thus making war inevitable between the two sides.
Taking notes from the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides has offered underlying reasons for Athens’s and Sparta’s transition from a peaceful to an adversarial relationship. In an equivalent manner, Graham Allison describes why war is inevitable between the rising China and the ruling US, emphasizing different means and channels through which both sides can circumvent the imminent disaster. The book is divided into four parts and sub-sections – each describing various facets that revolve around the main question the author has put forward: “Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?”
Part One of the book unfolds the inexorable upsurge of China as a giant economic and military power. On pg. 1 of Part One, Allison, while quoting Thucydides, articulates that just like Athens, for whom the success of plans was nothing in comparison to what they would be doing next, China, a nation that barely appeared on any global league tables, has leapt into the top tier quite hastily. The GDP of China in 1980 was hardly $300 billion; however, by 2015, it increased to $11 trillion—positioning itself as the world’s second-largest economy in terms of market exchange rates. Similarly, in 1980, China’s trade volume with regional and international actors amounted to less than $40 billion, while by 2015 it had reached $4 trillion. The author depicted data showing a comparison between the two sides in 1980 and 2015.
| China’s Economic Profile in Contrast to the US – 1980 vs 2015 | ||
| 1980 | 2015 | |
| GDP | 7% | 61% |
| Imports | 8% | 73% |
| Exports | 8% | 151% |
| Reserves | 16% | 3,140% |
*Source: World Bank.
The Chinese workforce by 2015 was one-quarter as productive as the American workforce—Allison claimed that if the ratio becomes equal over the next decade, China will have a four times greater economy than the US. Adding to that, the author stressed Chinese military modernization, the country’s role in establishing economic platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, and the initiation of infrastructure development and investment projects such as the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Given all the advancements, in one instance, the author quotes Stephen Bosworth’s words, who was special envoy to President Obama for North Korea in 2009, stating that when a crisis arose in 1998, Asian leaders were concerned: What would Washington think? Today, they first ask, What would Beijing think? calling it a “Rip Van Winkle” phenomenon.
Part two delves into patterns of historical wars between the major powers—offering lessons from history while denoting Thucydides’s Trap. Allison investigates the 500-year history, portraying 16 cases where the emerging power challenged the established one—out of which 12 rivalries resulted in war. He points out that the contemporary scenario between the US and China is not one of its kind but rather a repetition of events—referring to Mark Twain’s aphorism, “History may not repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”
Before highlighting the main idea in Part Two, the author develops his argument by spotlighting the situation of Athens and Sparta as explained by Thucydides in History of the Peloponnesian War. Sparta had a strong military culture—its citizens prized discipline, courage, and bravery. The whole society aimed to maximize the fighting strength of its forces. Spartan authorities would take seven-year-old sons from their families and train them for war, while physically weak infants were not allowed to live. Contrary to that, Athens was a port city, a trading nation, and a hub for merchants who bought and sold olive Oil, Textiles, Timber, and precious stones. Unlike Sparta, Athens was not a conservative society; students from across Greece would come here to study in academies.
After ruling for centuries, Athens instigated an experiment for a strong political system, called democracy, which aroused fear of expansion in the Spartan assembly. Also, though Athens achieved considerable feats in terms of economy and culture, its naval power and strategies were second to Sparta only. The two Greek city-states observed peaceful relations; however, the rise of Athens instilled fear in Sparta that their predominance would be challenged. Despite using diplomatic efforts to resolve a series of calamities, including the Thirty Years’ Peace truce, Thucydides remarks that it took very little to set the pyre alight.
Part three poses the question of whether the current trends in the US-China relationship should be seen as a gathering storm. Allison highlights the aggressive behavior and unwillingness of China to accept the international rules-based order that the US established after World War II, stressing that the incidents and accidents taking place between the two powers are reminiscent of 1914. On p. 97, Part Three, the author points out Xi Jinping’s ambition of making China great again, emphasizing the Chinese nation’s strong resolve and indomitable determination to regain historical greatness. The classical foreign policy of China comprised three central elements:
1. Regional “dominance”
2. Neighboring states to acknowledge Chinese “superiority”
3. Exert dominance and superiority to sustain “peaceful co-existence” with neighbors.
Here, the author draws attention to a solid duo between the foreign policy of China, which reflects Confucian teachings of using physical coercion as a last resort, and President Xi’s way of thinking and dealing with international actors—distinguishing China’s soft approach to bolster its economy and influence.
Further, on p. 127, Allison emphasizes the clash between American and Chinese cultures—identifying several key differences among them. The author highlights that America’s self-perception is to be “Number One,” while that of China is to be the “Center of the universe,” recalling the hierarchical characteristic engraved in the Chinese empires historically. Americans advocate for core values such as freedom and democracy, empowering people to decide their fate. In contrast, China adheres to Confucius’s principle: “Know thy place.” Chinese have a strong tenacity for order, hierarchy, and a centralized system—as Lee Kuan Yew noticed, “The track record of China’s history and culture manifests when the center is strong, the country thrives, and makes progress.”
Given the strategic thinking of America and China, the author draws scenarios for possible confrontation between the two sides. Xi has a firm resolve for the “Chinese Dream.” His continuous support for the “One China” policy in the context of Taiwan and claims over the South China Sea further complicates the issue. Contrary to that, the US advocates for an independent Taiwan and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, for which it has maintained a significant presence in the region. The massive Chinese military modernization and increased military drills in the region are a logical consequence of that. Allison continues that while both sides prepare for conflict due to high stakes, escalation from any side might result in a nuclear disaster.
In the Fourth Part, Allison tells us that war is not inevitable. While referring to his introduction section, the author argued that if America and China want to avoid war, they have to internalize two painful truths. First, considering the historical record and underlying reasons for the major powers’ confrontation, both sides must believe that they will certainly wind up at war on the current trajectory. Second, war can be avoided by making painful but necessary adjustments. Allison highlights historical clues – for instance, Portugal and Spain avoided war in the late 15th century by referring to a higher body (Pope Alexander IV). Today, America and China have the UN to resolve their differences. Similarly, Britain and the US made peace in the early 20th century by cooperating on issues, recognizing mutual interests and cultural commonalities. Or, such as the former Soviet Union and the US, avoided direct military conflict in the Cold War, realizing the mutual assured destruction (MAD), given the presence of nuclear weapons.
In conclusion, Graham Allison has provided an extensive analysis of the US-China competition. By drawing a comparison with the past events, the author provided several means for America and China to avoid war. The book is a must-read for scholars of international relations and security experts, given that it is timely and relevant considering the contemporary existing tensions between the US and China.
