The conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has become a geopolitical powder keg, with the potential to engulf the entire Great Lakes region. What seems like a localized war for mineral control actually conceals a far-reaching transnational security crisis, fueled by hegemonic ambitions, transnational criminal networks, and foreign interference. The Congo River Alliance (AFC), officially established in December 2023 under the leadership of Corneille Nangaa, marks a troubling evolution in the DRC’s conflict. This heterogeneous coalition unites the March 23 Movement (M23) – widely regarded as a military proxy of Kigali, according to UN reports – the political movement Action for the Dignity of the Congo and its People (ADCP), and the armed group Twirwaneho from South Kivu. By merging these disparate factions, the AFC has transformed an ethnically-driven rebellion into a systemic threat to regional stability. As a result, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned this alliance in July 2024 for its role in destabilizing the region.
A War Economy Fueling Fragmentation
North and South Kivu, the epicenters of this crisis, present a deadly paradox: their subsoil holds 60 to 80% of the world’s coltan reserves – a mineral critical for both military and civilian technologies – while their populations remain trapped in chronic insecurity. The M23, the AFC’s military arm, controls a lucrative coltan trade estimated at $800,000 per month, according to the United Nations, financing both its military operations and parallel economic circuits in neighboring Rwanda. This war economy, combined with the identity-based grievances of Congolese Tutsis, has become the catalyst for an escalation that now extends beyond Congolese borders. Moreover, the AFC’s recent incursions into Ugandan territory in March 2024 and its alleged ties to Burundian armed groups highlight the risk of regional contagion.
In addition, the AFC’s structure reveals a three-tiered destabilization strategy, with each pillar reinforcing the other in an inexorable cycle. On the ground, its military wing – comprising the M23 and Twirwaneho – deploys a hybrid force that blends asymmetric warfare with cutting-edge technology. With over 2,000 battle-hardened fighters, bolstered by Turkish reconnaissance drones and Israeli anti-tank missiles, they pose a direct threat not only to Kinshasa but also to regional capitals such as Kigali and Bujumbura. Meanwhile, the ADCP, serving as the coalition’s political front, promotes a sanitized discourse on “moralizing public life,” which resonates beyond Congolese borders, appealing to both European diasporas and diplomatic circles in search of “legitimate” interlocutors. This façade of legitimacy masks the coalition’s third pillar: an economic apparatus centered around controlling twelve key mining sites-including the coltan-rich concessions of Rubaya and Bisie -underpinned by opaque financial dealings with offshore investors based in the Gulf and Hong Kong. This interwoven network of local trafficking, offshore investments, and regional dependencies creates a self-sustaining system of war profiteering.
A Looming Regional Collapse
Besides that, this triptych of warfare, propaganda, and a gray economy has become self-perpetuating, with each component feeding into the others in a cycle that defies conventional responses. The U.S. sanctions imposed on the AFC in July 2024 – marking the first official recognition of its regional threat- have failed to curb its expansion. On the contrary, its entrenchment across five Congolese provinces and its reported ties with Central African warlords suggest an ongoing effort to reshape Central Africa’s geopolitical landscape. Rwanda, though widely accused of sponsoring the M23, is no longer the only external actor involved: Turkish arms shipments via Tanzania and suspected financial backing from Chinese mining companies have further complicated the region’s web of alliances.
Not to mention, the DRC’s complex conflict is exacerbating tensions on a regional scale. Burundi, already politically fragile, risks descending into pre-election civil war due to the spillover from the Congolese crisis. Similarly, Uganda fears a resurgence of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in its northern mining regions, rich in gold and tin, due to their connections with the AFC. Meanwhile, Zambia and Angola – key financiers of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – see their mining investments at risk. The Lobito Corridor, a crucial trade route linking the DRC, Zambia, and Angola to the port of Lobito, is essential for exporting strategic minerals. However, persistent instability in eastern DRC threatens this project, jeopardizing the economic and strategic ambitions of these nations. The DRC conflict thus has far-reaching economic and security repercussions for the entire region, endangering both stability and development in neighboring states.
Faced with this catastrophic scenario, regional security mechanisms such as the SADC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) appear overwhelmed. Their failure to contain the AFC, despite deploying 5,000 South African and Tanzanian troops, underscores the gravity of the challenge: this is no longer just a local rebellion but a sprawling network fueled by the DRC’s institutional weaknesses, inter-state rivalries, and global demand for critical minerals. Ultimately, without a coordinated and radical response – including governance reforms, resource traceability, and disengagement of foreign sponsors – the Kivu provinces could become the Sarajevo of a regional conflagration with continental ramifications.
Regional Actors & Accountability: A Web of Complicity and Inaction
While Rwanda and Uganda are frequently cited by international community as external sponsors of the M23, the broader regional landscape reveals a deeper web of complicity and strategic inaction. The Congolese government, despite its rhetoric of resistance, remains plagued by institutional weaknesses, corruption, and an overreliance on fragmented military responses.
Kinshasa’s inability to impose effective governance in the east has turned the Kivus into an ungoverned space where armed groups, foreign militias, and illicit trade networks thrive. Meanwhile, Burundi, whose security forces have reportedly clashed with AFC-linked factions, faces its own internal fractures ahead of upcoming elections, potentially turning the conflict into a domestic political tool. At the same time, Tanzania and South Africa, despite their military commitments under the SADC mission, lack a cohesive strategy to neutralize the insurgency, highlighting the shortcomings of regional security cooperation. Angola, a dominant player in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), remains hesitant to escalate its involvement, prioritizing economic stability over direct intervention. The absence of a unified regional approach has allowed M23 and its backers to exploit diplomatic rivalries, further entrenching instability. Without greater accountability from Kinshasa, a realignment of security priorities among regional stakeholders, and a more robust diplomatic framework to pressure external actors, the Great Lakes region risks deeper fragmentation under the weight of political inertia and economic opportunism.
Toward an Uncontrollable Crisis?
In this context, peace initiatives are paralyzed by deep-seated mistrust among stakeholders. The United Nations Security Council has adopted several resolutions, including Resolution 2666 (2022), which extended MONUSCO’s mandate until December 2023, and Resolution 2641 (2022), concerning arms procurement regulations in the DRC. Despite these efforts, the Nairobi and Luanda peace processes have failed to yield results, hindered by Rwanda’s refusal to cooperate and the diverging interests of regional actors. This situation highlights the complexity of regional dynamics and the challenge of establishing a sustainable peace.
Afterward, Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye’s call for intervention stands as a stark warning. His support for the SADC’s SAMIDRC mission, which deployed 3,000 South African and Tanzanian troops, represents a turning point. However, this force, ill-equipped and struggling with the region’s complexities, has been unable to shift the conflict’s trajectory. The fatal attack on a South African helicopter in April 2023- claimed by the M23 using sophisticated weaponry – exposes the limitations of a purely military approach.
Meanwhile, the escalating security crisis in Goma and North Kivu is no longer solely defined by the M23’s advances but is now part of a broader trend of transnational terrorism. The growing presence of the ADF, now affiliated with the Islamic State in Central Africa (ISCAP), represents a strategic shift in regional threats. Exploiting security gaps and the fragmentation of state authority, these terrorist groups use asymmetric tactics to expand their influence and sustain chronic instability. By targeting civilian infrastructure and engaging in indiscriminate violence, they have turned North Kivu into a hub for regional jihadism, fostering a hybrid form of terrorism that blends irregular warfare, criminal economies, and ideological radicalization—with dire security implications for all of Central Africa.
The DRC’s Paradox and the Looming Collapse of the Great Lakes Region
Despite the dire situation, the international community remains paralyzed by geopolitical rivalries. While the United States suspended portions of its military aid to Rwanda in 2023, Western investments in Rwandan coltan mines – ironically supplied through illicit Congolese channels – continue to fuel the conflict. The European Union’s regulatory framework on “conflict minerals” has attempted to cut off funding to armed groups, but opaque financial circuits in the Gulf, Hong Kong and Kigali have easily circumvented these measures.
At the same time, this crisis exposes the DRC’s paradox: a nation sitting on an estimated $24 trillion in mineral wealth, yet where 73% of the population survives on less than $2 a day. Long-promised mining sector reforms remain obstructed by a mafia-like system in which political elites, multinational corporations, and warlords share in the spoils. The 2022 Gécamines scandal, which revealed exploitative offshore contracts, exemplifies how economic predation sustains the region’s chronic instability.
If no decisive action is taken, the Great Lakes region may spiral into further fragmentation. As the M23 extends its reach from Goma to Bujumbura, it does not just draw battle lines-it deepens the fractures in an already fragile regional order. In a landscape where borders are porous and alliances are fleeting, fragmentation is not a distant threat but an imminent reality. Today, unity is no longer an abstract ideal- it is an urgent necessity to prevent the total collapse of an entire region.
Thus, from Goma to Bujumbura, the M23 is not merely redrawing battle lines – it is reshaping the geostrategic balance of the Great Lakes region. This conflict is no longer confined to territorial disputes; it has become a crucible where mineral wars, regional rivalries, and transnational criminal networks intersect. The absence of a decisive response will not only deepen fragmentation but will also embed instability as a permanent feature of the region’s political landscape. In Africa, the lines between rebellion, state power, and economic predation have blurred – whoever controls the minerals controls the future. If the Great Lakes region is to avoid becoming the epicenter of a new African disorder, then a fundamental shift in strategy is required: one that prioritizes sovereignty, economic governance, and a recalibration of regional security frameworks. Without it, the Congo’s war economy will continue to dictate the region’s fate, transforming instability into a lucrative commodity for external actors and local elites alike.
