What does Beijing hate most? Chaos. What’s the deadliest kind of chaos? Integrating “American teammates” into the Chinese system.
In discussions regarding China and Taiwan, commentators occasionally revisit the concept of a “Chinese Commonwealth” in hopes of peacefully resolving the issue through this institutional framework. However, from any perspective, China will not accept the idea of a “Chinese Commonwealth,” and this rejection will be reinforced this year, as 2025 marks the 20th anniversary of China’s enactment of the “Anti-Secession Law.”
Since the political mainstream is “anti-secession,” a “Chinese Commonwealth,” which implies division, is naturally unacceptable.
What is the “Chinese Commonwealth”? There are two main approaches to this concept: one akin to the supranational organization of the European Union, and another similar to the federal system of the United States. These proposals are collectively referred to as “Chinese Federalism.”
This is a topic with a long history. As early as during the revolutionary period (1905) when Sun Wen – still honored as the Father of the Nation in Taiwan and known as the Forerunner of the Revolution in Mainland China – overthrew the Qing Dynasty, he rejected the idea of a “Commonwealth of China” and firmly opposed the idea of letting China follow the federal system of the United States. He was adamantly opposed to the idea of letting China follow the American federal system. In his view, such a system was unsuitable for Chinese society and encouraged secession.
However, before the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1922, it supported a “free federalism” for China’s frontier provinces, Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang. This idea was aimed at opposing the political reality that China was ruled by the Kuomintang at that time.
Afterward, the concept of federalism became a subject of political struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and up to the period when the two parties were engaged in a civil war immediately after the end of the Second World War, the Communists still proposed federalism at the negotiating table, which was categorically rejected by the Kuomintang (between 1945 and 1949).
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party won, and the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan. The CCP changed the country’s name and established a new China. The federalist idea was effectively concluded with the political victory of one party over the other. The CCP no longer supported federalism, but replaced it with the concept of “one country, two systems”, which was closer to centralization of power, during Deng Xiaoping’s rule.
From a political reality perspective, the dominant political factions in China will not support “federalism”; only factions at a disadvantage would do so because “federalism” is a tool for the weaker party to seize power, and the dominant party will not accept an institutional arrangement that shares power.
From a historical viewpoint, China, since the end of the feudal Qin Dynasty (221 BC), has thoroughly rejected the political system of “one central government, multiple states.” Before the Qin, China resembled today’s EU, which was rife with disputes and wars under such a system.
From a historical point of view, as early as the Qin Dynasty (221 B.C.), which ended the feudal system in China, the political system of “one central government and many states” was completely rejected because before the Qin, China resembled today’s EU, which was rife with disputes and wars under such a system.
From an ethnic point of view, the Chinese are, on the whole, a particularly polemical people. China has left behind a more complete history than any other civilization and a multi-perspective historical narrative, which shows that it is a dissenting people, with a political character that prefers to be a king rather than a follower. The fact that there are more than 50 ethnic groups in the pan-Chinese land and that even the majority Han Chinese speak different languages are all factors for division.
From a geographical condition, China’s economic center has shifted southward since 1300 AD, with significant regional economic disparities and a large population, making resource distribution a major issue. Serious allocation problems can lead to war.
World War II resulted in 70 to 85 million deaths, but many Western observers might not know that one civil war in 19th-century China led to 20 to 30 million deaths. This means that once internal chaos erupts in China, it inevitably results in massive casualties.
From this, it can be seen that for the Chinese, the idea of “anti-secession” comes from a profound historical lesson, for the land is full of various types of fault lines, and it is necessary to maintain a centralized system of power in order to maintain stability and promote development.
In other words, to understand contemporary China, one must remember the keyword — maintaining stability. Any factor that could cause chaos is considered the primary enemy of Chinese politics. During the COVID-19 Pandemic, China was willing to suffer economic losses by locking down cities with populations over tens of millions to maintain social stability, which is evidence of this approach.
Thus, it’s not hard to imagine that “Chinese Federalism” would definitely be seen by Beijing as a factor of chaos. They would not tolerate the existence of local governments on par with the central government, nor would they accept Western-style democracy. Simply put, China lacks the conditions, tradition, and historical precedent for such a system.
Currently, three types of people still advocate for “Chinese Federalism”: first, those who wish for China’s division, including dissatisfied Chinese and foreigners who do not want China to become too powerful; second, Taiwanese and foreigners who support the independence of Taiwan; third, foreigners hoping for regional stability or to prevent global economic disruption due to war.
Regardless of their intentions, whether for public good or private interest, these three groups will not receive a positive response from Beijing and will be seen as part of “foreign interference” .From China’s perspective, the civil war has not ended due to foreign interference, and the process of ending it should not involve foreign intervention.
Advocates of such proposals must recognize that Beijing’s deepest fear comes from internal chaos, especially from the chaos of its people, and internal unrest often stems from foreign interference, such as color revolutions or terrorism.
Looking back at Hong Kong events in 2019, what Beijing fears most is not the independence of Hong Kong but the spread of this trend to the mainland. No matter how much outsiders criticize China’s treatment of Hong Kong, one cannot deny the fact that Chinese armed police did not enter Hong Kong, nor did the military intervene. Why? Because at the time, Beijing assessed that this color revolution would not spread to the mainland; the risk was manageable, so no form of force was needed; otherwise, the outcome would have been very different.
In fact, implementing the National Security Law in Hong Kong was not an urgent matter for Beijing; otherwise, it would not have been delayed until 2020. This means that Beijing has its own set rhythm in the blueprint of China’s rise. Currently, as long as external factors do not affect the interior, Beijing is not eager to deal with political issues in the border regions.
Similarly, why does Beijing show such aversion to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te? It’s not because Lai encourages Taiwanese independence but because his pro-independence rhetoric easily stirs up anti-Taiwan sentiment among mainlanders, leading to internal social unrest. The key point is that Beijing does not currently want a large-scale public demand for military reunification with Taiwan; if nationalism rises, Xi Jinping would be forced into a harsh military response against Taiwan, disrupting Beijing’s planned pace for unification.
In other words, Beijing is not in a hurry to handle the Taiwan issue, so why would it accept “Chinese Federalism,” which allows Taiwan to enter its own system with external interference? Moreover, if Taiwan becomes an equal member with the central government, wouldn’t Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong demand the same treatment? Would the Chinese people accept such a scenario of division?
Simply put, this would be inviting trouble.
For instance, if a Chinese Commonwealth were established, could Taiwan maintain its military like an EU member or have a “State National Guard” like U.S. states? Could the U.S. still sell weapons to Taiwan? Could foreign warships continue “freedom of navigation” in the Taiwan Strait?
Such actions would complicate the issue, and the benefits would be a member not swearing allegiance to China, possibly even an “American ally.”
China’s neighbors, who hope for regional stability or to prevent global economic disruption by war, along with countries with economic ties to Taiwan, tend to urge both sides to resolve issues peacefully at the negotiating table, which is also Beijing’s desire since Xi Jinping does not want to start a war to disrupt China’s rise. However, using a federal system as a negotiation incentive is not a good method.
Given China’s current strength, employing a “quarantine strategy” to gradually erode Taiwan’s control over its air and sea space without hindering its overseas economic activities is far more effective than institutional incentives. Quarantine isn’t a blockade or military action; it’s not even quasi-military action, so other countries have no grounds to intervene unless they formally recognize Taiwan as not part of China and establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
This is what Taiwanese military leaders have described as the “anaconda strategy,” achieving the ultimate goal with minimal cost at a pace that does not alarm others.
Those Taiwanese who support Taiwan’s independence and advocate a “Chinese Federation” are in the minority, and although their wishes won’t come true, they are somewhat rational. In Taiwan, most supporters of independence are products of populism, rejecting any scheme for cross-strait unification, even if it were an EU-like model.
This reality gives Beijing even less reason to consider promoting peace talks through the concept of a “Chinese Commonwealth,” as any peace proposal aimed at incorporating Taiwan into the Chinese system would be accused of bad faith by the Taiwanese government and decisively rejected, pushing the goal of peaceful reunification further away.
Currently, Beijing tends to believe that a unification plan completely eschewing military tools is unrealistic. Forcing Taiwan to the negotiation table with hard measures while avoiding bloodshed and regional turmoil is possible.
The key remains how the U.S. will respond to changes in the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, and there are no signs that China and the U.S. will reach a consensus on the concept of a “Chinese Commonwealth.”