Paul McGarr’s book Spying in South Asia: Britain, The United States, and India’s Secret Cold War focuses on the development of the febrile intelligence interaction between India, the United States of America, and Britain from 1947 when the Indian subcontinent was partitioned and India gained its independence till the mid-1990s. The relationships between Indian journalists, human rights activists, and politicians who either supported or disagreed with US and British intelligence agencies are extensively documented by Paul McGarr. The activities of these actors had a profound and long-lasting effect on the political and social fabric of South Asia.
In his book Spying in South Asia, Paul McGarr focuses on the challenges faced by India in the early years following its independence. During its dominion status till January 26, 1950, the nascent Indian Government was supposed to share intelligence with London, as well as other commonwealth countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and particularly its political masters, disapproved of this “business as usual” approach (p-21-23). At that time, V. K. Krishna Menon the Indian High Commissioner in London made an error of judgment by recommending the acquisition of Jeeps for the Indian Army from European vendors without following the set norms and the protocol for acquisition of this military hardware. The partial consignment of the delivered jeeps was deemed unserviceable upon delivery. The Indian media charged Menon with squandering £3 million of the Indian taxpayer’s money and keeping a sizeable part of it as a commission for himself, which at the time was considered a huge omission by the Indian Government. Consequently, this whole episode was considered the First Scam related to a defense deal in Independent India.
Some of Nehru’s conservative colleagues in the INC were alarmed by the rapid ascent of the Communist Party of India and its control over the peasants and trade unions. In South India, communism sparked a large-scale violent rebellion in the 1950s. This uprising was put down by India’s security forces. Distressed Western capitals, sometimes working with Indian Intelligence agencies, used the centre-run institutions in India to target the Communist Government in the State of Kerala which had become the world’s first democratically elected communist state.
There was a widespread belief that the Indian political and intelligence system was full of moles and spies working for the CIA, KGB, and the intelligence agencies of other countries. New Delhi was dubbed as the “Berlin of the East” during the Cold War (p-7). An interesting case comes into the fore of Coomar Narain where it was discovered that he had over a period given confidential documents about economic, foreign, and defense policies to some European embassies including France, West Germany, etc. in return for money. It became known as the “Photocopy Spy Case” (p-249). The main accused, apart from Coomar Narain was T. N. Kher, who had access to the PMO as he was the private secretary to Padinjarethalakal Cherian Alexander, who was the Principal Secretary to Mrs Indira Gandhi the Prime Minister of India.
Nehru’s goal was to establish friendships with the PRC and the Soviet Union. But Nehru’s administration and the PRC clashed in 1957 when Beijing declared plans to build a highway between Xinjiang and Tibet, which would have divided Indian-claimed territory in two. Two years later, following an unsuccessful uprising against Chinese control, India provided political sanctuary to Tibet’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, and hundreds of his followers, further worsening Sino-Indian relations. India had fought a war with Pakistan over Kashmir in 1965 and was reliant on the Soviet Union for military supplies by the late 60s. McGarr recounts the dramatic events of Svetlana Alliluyeva, Stalin’s daughter, entering the US Embassy in New Delhi in March 1967 and asking for political asylum. It took everyone by surprise. Before Washington could respond, the US Ambassador took prompt action and sent a FLASH telegram to Washington, arranging for Svetlana to be placed on the very next flight to Europe. Thus, he avoided a confrontation with the Indians, who would have faced tremendous pressure from Moscow to send her back to the Soviet Union.
McGarr touches upon in his work the two nuclear devices that the Indian Intelligence agencies and the CIA put in the Himalayas to spy on the PRC, as well as how the fiasco was handled when it was made public in 1978. According to McGarr, Indira Gandhi occasionally overstated the “foreign hand,” (p-181-182) but “her fears that the CIA was trying to overthrow socialist governments around the world were genuine” (p-201-203). Her darkest worries were vindicated in 1975 when Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman was assassinated in Bangladesh and in 1973 when Augusto Pinochet overthrew Salvador Allende in a military coup with the CIA’s assistance.
McGarr argues that in the 1980s American diplomats “continued to bristle at jibes from Indian leaders who, while willing to engage privately with the CIA, publicly accused the United States of undermining Indian democracy” This was despite several CIA covert operations being carried out with “full knowledge and support of India’s intelligence services and senior figures within the Congress party (p-261). McGarr further argues that Indian politicians strategically used the symbolic power of Western intelligence agencies like the CIA, and MI6 to strengthen their control over the newly independent nation.
To truly grasp the complex interplay between Western intelligence agencies and post-colonial India, “Spying in South Asia” is a crucial read. This book not only reveals the significant role of these agencies in the region but also highlights the often-neglected contributions of Indian intelligence services during the Cold War. It makes a significant contribution to the discussions concerning the development of South Asia’s connection with secret intelligence and its implications for the rest of the world.
