Türkiye hosts the largest number of refugees worldwide, with an estimated 3.2 million Syrians among its displaced population. In the initial years of the Syrian civil war, Türkiye’s extensive humanitarian efforts were widely praised, reflecting its commitment to sheltering those in need. In the initial years of the Syrian civil war, its contributions were widely recognized and justifiably praised; the country launched extensive humanitarian efforts, providing refuge to millions in need. Yet, despite still sheltering millions, Türkiye’s approach to the management of its refugee population has grown increasingly complex — and controversial.
The December 8 collapse of the Assad regime, triggered by a rapid offensive from a Hayat Tahrir as-Sham (HTS)-led rebel coalition, has ushered in a new dynamic, deepening the uncertainty for refugees and intensifying the complexities of Türkiye’s efforts to manage this protracted challenge.
Refuge and Response: Türkiye’s Approach to Syrian Displacement
Türkiye has a long history of hosting refugees, shaped by its geography and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, which saw waves of Muslim migrants from the Balkans, Caucasus, and Crimea. Unlike modern Türkiye’s Syrian refugee policy, the Ottoman Empire viewed refugees as permanent settlers and integrated them socially and economically. Refugees were seen as contributors to economic development, though often as low-cost labor. This strategic resettlement approach facilitated their integration into society.
In the modern era, the first significant wave of refugees to Türkiye came from Iran after the 1979 revolution, with around 1.5 million Iranians entering Türkiye, many en route to other destinations but some staying and eventually gaining Turkish citizenship. In 1988, approximately 60,000 Iraqi Kurds sought refuge in Türkiye, followed by 500,000 more in 1991. Bulgaria’s 1984 “Revival Process,” aimed at assimilating minorities, drove nearly 310,000 ethnic Turks back to Türkiye by 1989. Türkiye also provided refuge to 25,000 Bosnians and 18,000 Kosovars during the Balkan wars.
Facing an unprecedented refugee influx, Türkiye implemented an “open-door” policy, initially expecting a quick resolution to the Syrian conflict and the prompt repatriation of refugees. Early on, officials and government documents referred to the displaced Syrians as “guests” rather than refugees, reflecting this assumption of temporariness. For example, a 2014 report by the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) was titled Syrians Guests in Türkiye. Accordingly, Türkiye’s initial response to the Syrian refugee influx in 2011, coordinated by AFAD, centered on delivering humanitarian aid and setting up refugee camps in border provinces.
At first, Türkiye’s open-door policy was a source of national pride, and Türkiye was lauded for its emergency care. The government aimed to counter perceptions of Syrians as a threat, though a 2012 poll revealed that 66% of Turks already believed refugees should be turned away at the border. In March and again in August of that year, facing an increasing refugee influx, Erdoğan, then Prime Minister, called on the United Nations to create a “safe haven” within Syria.
Recognizing the prolonged nature of the Syrian crisis, Türkiye revamped its refugee policies. In 2013, Parliament passed the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which took effect in 2014 (revised in 2017), creating a national asylum framework. The Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR), adopted later that year, set out rights and procedures for those under temporary protection, granting them access to basic services including education and health care but generally requiring them to live in the province in which they are registered.
Beginning in the second half of 2014, Türkiye faced three new challenges that necessitated a reevaluation of its approach to Syrian refugees: 1) the rise and expansion of ISIS in border territories, 2) an increase in the influx of Syrians entering Türkiye, and 3) the need for a long-term, sustainable solution due to the protracted nature of the conflict. Addressing these challenges required moving beyond the initial short-term emergency assistance policies that had previously guided Türkiye’s response.
Türkiye – Europe’s Gatekeeper
The inflow of Syrian refugees into Türkiye spiked between 2013 and 2016, fueled by escalating violence, including fierce battles in urban areas and high civilian casualties. This influx had significant implications for Türkiye-European Union (EU) relations.
As the refugee numbers surged, Türkiye assumed a pivotal role in the EU’s migration management strategy. In March 2016, the EU and Türkiye signed a landmark deal, known as the EU-Türkiye Statement, a significant milestone in the externalization of the EU’s migration policies. Under this arrangement, Türkiye agreed to prevent irregular migration to Europe in exchange for six billion Euros in financial assistance, visa liberalization discussions, and the prospect of renewed EU accession talks. However, Türkiye’s strategic control over migration flows also became a point of leverage in its relationship with the EU, leading to recurring tensions as Türkiye periodically used its position to press for greater support and concessions, especially during periods of heightened domestic and regional pressures.
In effect, irregular migrants and Syrian refugees became bargaining chips between Türkiye and the EU. In March 2020, for example, Türkiye temporarily opened its borders with the EU, prompting a rush of asylum seekers toward, and sparking tensions with Greece. The policy shift appeared designed to compel the EU and NATO to support Ankara’s military actions in Idlib and extract more European aid for the four million refugees inside Türkiye. EU leaders responded with €485 million in aid, revive discussions on visa liberalization for Turkish citizens, and provide for a substantial increase in funds for migration and border management in the EU’s budget for 2021-2027.
The Anti-Refugee Turn in Turkish Public Sentiment and Politics
Since the 2016 refugee deal with the EU, attitudes toward Syrian refugees in Türkiye have soured. When President Erdoğan raised the prospect of granting Syrian refugees Turkish citizenship in July 2016, public opposition was swift and strong.
By the latter half of 2017, intercommunal violence between host communities and Syrian refugees had risen sharply, highlighting the daunting challenge of integrating refugees in a country already burdened by socio-economic pressures and political tensions. In late 2017 and early 2018, Istanbul and nine provinces bordering Syria suspended registration of newly arriving asylum seekers. However, Ankara remained reluctant to craft a long-term integration strategy for Syrians, primarily due to its desire to encourage their return when feasible and to concerns over a potential public backlash if it were perceived as supporting their permanent settlement.
According to Human Rights Watch, Turkish authorities arbitrarily arrested, detained, and deported hundreds of Syrian refugee men and boys to Syria between February and July 2022. The deportations stand in sharp contrast to Türkiye’s record of generosity, having hosted more refugees than any other country globally — nearly four times the number in the entire European Union (EU), which has however allocated billions of euros for humanitarian assistance and migration management.
In May 2022, President Erdoğan announced plans to return one million Syrian refugees to Turkish-administered zones in northern Syria, a stance reflecting mounting domestic pressure ahead of the 2023 election. Türkiye restricted Syrian refugees from visiting northern Syria for Eid after opposition criticism that they should remain there if they could travel freely. The government also introduced a 25% cap on non-Turkish residents in neighborhoods, relocating Syrians from areas exceeding this threshold and barring new arrivals in 16 provinces.
In February 2023, two devastating earthquakes hit southeastern Türkiye, causing extensive destruction and intensifying the needs of both Turkish citizens and refugees in the region. The 11 affected provinces, home to roughly 14 million people — including 1.75 million refugees, or over 40% of Türkiye’s total refugee population — were placed under a state of emergency. This disaster worsened existing challenges for Syrian refugees, leading to increased discrimination, reduced access to services, heightened political hostility, and critical shortages of housing and employment opportunities.
Amid disaster recovery, Türkiye’s election campaign turned ugly, with the vilification of refugees a central theme of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) campaign, and to a lesser extent, that of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). CHP candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu vowed to return Syrians within two years, while President Erdoğan proposed repatriating a million Syrians to Turkish-occupied areas of northern Syria. The xenophobic Zafer Party spread rumors of Syrian looting in quake-hit Hatay, fueling rising anti-refugee sentiment and hate crimes nationwide. The far-right ATA Alliance, holding a decisive 5% of the vote, played a key role in making immigration the top issue of the presidential runoff.
Well ahead of the election, anti-refugee rhetoric had already fueled a rise in hate crimes, including the 2021 Ankara riots after a refugee reportedly stabbed a Turkish youth, the deaths of three Syrians in an Izmir fire, and a Syrian refugee’s killing in Istanbul. This surge in violence reflects a shift in Turkish public sentiment, as economic strain, a declining currency, and soaring inflation fuel perceptions of refugees as a burden. Rumors and reports have accused Syrians of causing various, often contradictory, problems: from receiving government salaries without working to increasing the number of people begging. This July, anti-refugee riots erupted in central Türkiye, targeting Syrian-owned properties following allegations of assault. The Stockholm Center for Freedom’s June 2023 report, Hate Speech and Hate Crimes Against Syrian Refugees in Türkiye, reported a growing trend of negative political rhetoric and hate speech directed at refugees and minorities.
Neither Full Integration nor a “Voluntary, Safe, and Dignified Return”?
Most Syrian nationals as well as refugees and stateless persons from Syria who have arrived to Türkiye individually or en masse since 2011 hold Temporary Protection Status (TPS). The TPS regime establishes a safeguard against the return of individuals with temporary protection status to Syria against their will. However, Syrians under Türkiye’s TPS face a precarious reality, navigating the benefits and restrictions imposed by it while grappling with increasing pressure from the Turkish government to leave.
Despite TPS offering temporary security, it limits movement and rights — Syrians can access healthcare, education, and free movement within their registered provinces but cannot legally purchase vehicles, establish businesses, or work without specific permits. The regime’s structure, supported by the EU Facility for Refugees in Türkiye (FRIT), effectively restricts Syrians’ mobility.
Following the Türkiye-EU Statement, Syrian children were integrated into the Turkish educational system. In addition, a regulation allowed temporary work permits for Syrians was issued; however, most Syrians remain in precarious, informal work. Still, though many still work informally. A November 2023 study by Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung found that, despite challenging living conditions, refugees in Türkiye have become an integral part of society. However, the study also highlighted that racism and discrimination continue to worsen socio-economic outcomes for migrants, limiting their ability to participate fully in society.
Over the past two years, Türkiye’s stance on Syrians has hardened. In the wake of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s close re-election, Türkiye launched a quiet campaign to reduce the refugee population, particularly targeting Syrians. Although “voluntary” repatriation is the official goal, Syrians have faced deportation for minor infractions, such as failing to reside in their registered cities. Policy changes, including tighter residency registration restrictions, have rendered many undocumented, making them vulnerable to deportation. Law enforcement has intensified efforts to locate and detain unregistered migrants.
In parallel, Türkiye is pushing a repatriation initiative under the guise of voluntary return. With the issue of repatriation looming large in the presidential election runoff last May, Erdoğan announced plans to deport one million Syrians to Turkish-occupied northern Syria. This repatriation effort has been bolstered by initiatives such as the “Aleppo Model,” supported by the Qatar Fund for Development (QFD), to build a quarter million housing units across Idlib and Afrin, adding to the 75,000 briquette homes already constructed in Idlib and 107,000 in Aleppo. Meanwhile, as a joint investigation coordinated by Lighthouse Reports recently disclosed, EU-funded “reception centers” in Türkiye have been repurposed into 32 removal centers, signaling a shift toward deportations.
At the same time, the far-right nationalist İyi (Good) Party has petitioned Türkiye’s highest administrative court to revoke Turkish citizenship from nearly 500,000 naturalized foreigners, primarily Syrians, claiming they pose a national security risk, disrupt social cohesion, and threaten Turkish identity. This rising hostility reflects broader anti-Syrian sentiment within Türkiye, exacerbated by political and social tensions.
President Erdoğan’s efforts to mend relations with the Assad regime and thereby facilitate refugee repatriation — even as he has sought to expand Türkiye’s occupation of much of northern Syria — have seen little progress. The Assad regime remains uninterested in cooperating, lacking the capacity and desire to reintegrate returning Syrians, leaving many in limbo as deportations and voluntary repatriations continue to rise.
Despite international financial support aimed at improving conditions for refugees, the growing pressure from Turkish authorities and limited opportunities for legal work have made life increasingly difficult for Syrians in Türkiye.
Conclusion
The trajectory of Türkiye’s refugee policy raises significant questions about the long-term implications for both refugees and Turkish society. As the government increasingly emphasizes repatriation over integration, the potential for social cohesion diminishes. Simultaneously, Türkiye is not alone in grappling with the challenges associated with major inflows of legal and undocumented foreigners; countries across the globe, including the US, Europe, and beyond are facing similar issues, marked by widespread public backlash against immigrants and refugees, alongside rising xenophobic populism. In this environment, as economic challenges and public sentiment turn against refugees, the rights and welfare of millions hang in the balance. The path forward requires a concerted effort from both Turkish authorities and the international community to foster genuine integration and protect vulnerable populations from further marginalization. Addressing these shared challenges is essential not only for the well-being of refugees but also for the social fabric and stability of host nations.
Türkiye may see promise in the capture of Aleppo — the first major Syrian city that fell to the rebels prior to the toppling of the Assad regime — given its infrastructure and economic base, which appear well-suited to support refugee returns. Yet, without a stable transitional phase, Türkiye would struggle to direct economic aid effectively toward fostering conditions for these returns. More troublingly, Syria’s potential territorial fragmentation — driven by power struggles among competing factions — threatens to exacerbate instability, making return unsafe and potentially triggering an even greater refugee influx into Türkiye. Achieving significant returns will hinge on establishing relative stability and avoiding further security chaos.
Throngs of Syrian refugees have already assembled at Türkiye’s southern border crossings, eager to return home in the wake of Assad’s fall. However, with only hundreds making the journey in these early days, they represent a small fraction of the Syrian refugee population in Türkiye. Turkish municipalities governed by the CHP are offering transportation services to support the process but returning home poses difficult questions. Years spent in Turkey, with many children now rooted in Turkish culture, have left Syria unfamiliar. Moreover, the country’s crumbling infrastructure — lack of electricity, water, healthcare, and education — presents formidable reintegration challenges.
While Türkiye’s ability to influence the transitional phase will be pivotal in shaping the future of refugee returns and aligning Syria’s reconstruction with long-term regional stability, this challenge is far from Türkiye’s alone. Ensuring sustainable returns will require a coordinated effort that balances local reconciliation, robust international aid, and a collective commitment to fostering stability in a deeply fragmented post-Assad Syria.
