Myanmar’s crucial role in both Chinese and Indian national security and dominance in the Indo-Pacific is most palpable in their responses to the 2021 Myanmar coup d’état by the Tatmadaw (– Myanmar military). The international community condemned the coup and voiced outrage against human rights violations in Myanmar with most democracies refusing to recognize the junta takeover as legitimate. In contrast, the emerging Asian giants, China and India, took a more measured approach to the unfolding situation. Even though India condemned the violence, it steered clear of explicit or harsh criticism of the Tatmadaw regime. China made no substantial comments on the mere regime change in order to strengthen its relations with the Tatmadaw leadership. Neither country has stopped engaging with the Tatmadaw, both rather having focused on maintaining regular communications and cordial relations with the Tatmadaw.
The global outcry aside, tactful foreign policy gives Myanmar a decisive role in the superpower rivalry in the ‘Asian Century’. Both Min Aung Hlaing’s (Tatmadaw leader) three-day November 2024 visit to Kunming, meeting high offices of the Chinese government, as well as The Indian Council of World Affairs hosting delegates from the Tatmadaw, civil society and political parties from Myanmar during the same month indicates the silent undercurrents that inform the role that Indian and China plays in Myanmar’s domestic politics.
India’s Stakes
Despite India’s democratic credentials, India has not been shy in her engagement with the Tatmadaw on several occasions. India benefits by keeping multiple channels of diplomacy open with all stakeholders in the immediate neighbour. Indian has been more than willing to engage with the Tatmadaw, pro-democracy political parties, ethnic militias and civil society stakeholders from Myanmar. Yet, this willingness to engage with the Tatmadaw was not evidence of India’s lack of commitment to democratic ideals but rather an attempt to realize India’s strategic ambitions in South-east Asia, whether Myanmar falls under military or civilian rule. This balancing act on part of the Indian government between democratic idealism and a necessity to engage with Myanmar’s military government reflects the importance of Myanmar in a counter-China strategy is a prudent one. India has gone as far as to deport asylum seekers form the 2021 coup to deny any adversarial intent against the ruling Myanmar military.
Myanmar is vital to India’s ‘Act East’ and ‘Neighborhood First’ policies. The long border shared between Myanmar and north-east India provides cover to various separatist groups and facilitates cross-border movement of militants, illegal arms and drugs via the porous border. The Indian Army has long relied on the policy of “constructive engagement”- to conduct joint military campaigns with Myanmar in combating extremism in the North-East; in turn aiding the Tatmadaw to contain Myanmar’s ethnic insurgencies. Moreover, New Delhi already faces the threat of China along its northern frontier and that of Pakistan from the west, and therefore, is reliant on cooperation with the Myanmar to ensure India’s eastern front. The increase in Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean has also heightened threats to peace in Indo-Pacific. Myanmar sits at the intersection of India’s Neighbourhood First Policy, motivating heavy investment in Myanmar’s economy through the SAGAR Vison. Counterintuitively, primacy of Beijing in Myanmar’s economy leaves India hesitant to alienate the Tatmadaw. India is unlikely to deviate from her policy of non-interference and will, in all likelihood, continue to call for peace without taking any steps to condemn or undermine the Tatmadaw.
China’s Stakes
On the other hand, the People’s Republic of China intends to utilized the crisis to further its economic and military interests in the region. China realizes the geo-political importance of Myanmar as a bridge into the Indian Ocean. Ergo Chinese ports (e.g. the Kyaukphyo Port) in Myanmar provide an alternative for China against India’s presence in the Bay of Bengal, strengthening its ‘string of pearls’ strategy. Additionally, China wishes to control the Myanmar corridor that will benefit its landlocked western provinces and provide solution to China’s overdependence on the narrow Malacca Strait for sea trade with the West and fuel supply from the Middle East. Further, Myanmar provides a ready market for Chinese commodities and has potential to became a key source of timber and gems for China. Reliance of Myanmar on the Chinese Communist Party has steadily increased since the 2000s – as economic sanctions piled up during the 2017 Rohingya Crisis, Myanmar became increasingly dependent on China for investments in infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative and for diplomatic support at the world stage. Although the Tatmadaw has been suspicious of China’s intentions in financing and arming ethnic armed groups in the country’s north and criticised the National League for Democracy, Myanmar’s prior (democratic) government, for the nation’s increased reliance on China; the Tatmadaw seems increasingly open to Chinese friendship as most countries isolate and distance themselves from the regime.
Beijing’s pragmatic approach and transactional relationship with Myanmar has translated into closer ties with the Tatmadaw vis-à-vis limited criticism and blockade of meaningful United Nations Security Council resolutions against the junta. Even though China had found Myanmar’s civilian government more conducive to Chinese economic expansion, China’s lack of efforts in condemning the coup d’état and recent visits by the Chinese Foreign Minister to senior military generals have fuelled speculation on their approval and role in the coup. Virtual Chinese support to the junta have also resulted in anti-China sentiments within Myanmar and its diaspora, resulting in active campaigning against Chinese influence in Myanmar politics through boycott of Chinese-owned businesses and demonstrations outside Chinese embassies throughout the world. China’s attempts to strengthen grip over the Indian Ocean presents a contemporary threat to India and its south-east Asian rivals.
Myanmar Hedging
While, for India securing a friendly Myanmar is crucial to border security and immigration control in Northeast India. India’s pours border with Myanmar makes susceptible to human trafficking, and the illegal arms and drug trade. Increasing military cooperation between Myanmar and China, with recent deliveries of FTC-2000G jets induce new risks for Indian in the northeast. For China, access to Myanmar is a strategic concern, countering India’s chokehold over Chinese fuel routes out of naval bases in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal. Any form of international intervention against Tatmadaw rule is counterproductive, and both Indian and China find more sense in finding common footing with the government of the day. Being a buffer state, Myanmar finds itself at a unique and headstrong position to play advantages with both players. This has enabled the Tatmadaw regime to respond little to domestic pressures, whether from ethnic insurgencies or mass resistance, because of the laxed posture of its immediate power states, who are embroiled in confrontation against each other. With South-Asia coming to a boil, be it the economic devastation of Sri Lanka or the political turmoil of Bangladesh, it is seemingly more unlikely to see any swift or dramatic shift in the Indian or Chinese position towards the Tatmadaw regime in Myanmar.
It is important to view the Sino-Indian ambivalence and downright tacit consent to militarism in Myanmar as a reference to locating Myanmar in Asian diplomacy. The proof of both China and India’s necessity in scoping an alliance rather than antagonism with Myanmar, with the Asian giants racing to court and appease Myanmar’s government of the day. This has left the Tatmadaw emboldened in its capacity despite losing domestic legitimacy. The Sino-Indian rivalry has largely been at the cost of a stalemate in terms of how boycotts and isolation from international community could have been leveraged against the Tatmadaw to secure a reestablishment of democratic government. With both Indian and China having skin in the game, dissent against the Tatmadaw in the international forums have been toothless. Myanmar’s geostrategic capital has allowed the Tatmadaw to hedge or pit one against the other, completely derisking any form of diplomatic pressures – adversely encouraging continuation of the status quo military rule in Myanmar.
