On 8 October, Prime Minister Netanyahu broadcast a chilling message to the Lebanese people instructing them to get rid of Hezbollah or face the same fate as Gaza. The Lebanese know that neither they, nor their weakened state, can confront Hezbollah. More important, they know that the wide constituency in the Shi’a community loyal to the movement will remain an essential part of the national consensus. Their role will be vital in preserving a tolerant and multi-confessional Lebanon.
The forced displacement over the past two weeks of 1.2 million inhabitants of the South of Lebanon and the sprawling Dahiyeh area of Beirut, and the destruction of their homes and infrastructure, already begin to feel like Gaza. Something remarkable – though not unexpected – has happened. The rest of the country has opened its homes and support networks to those fleeing the bombardment. The instinctive sense of Lebanese solidarity has reasserted itself, challenging the narrow sectarianism championed by Hezbollah and a few Christian leaders.
Other changes are in motion. It is clear to the more far-sighted Lebanese, such as the veteran Druze leader Walid Joumblatt, that Hezbollah’s military power is already diminished. Lebanon’s national options have opened up. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, was given a cool reception when he flew to Beirut to urge support for Hezbollah’s policy of military solidarity with Gaza.
The immediate impact of the war and displacement has been absorbed, hand to mouth, but substantial international assistance is urgently required. With the United States actively encouraging the Israeli assault on Lebanon, and saying nothing to counter Netanyahu’s threats, no help can be expected from that quarter. France has led the way for Europe in promising support. Turkey too has been quick to send emergency relief.
The major assistance though seems set to come from the Gulf States. Building on an extensive humanitarian campaign in Gaza that has seen hundreds of humanitarian and medical evacuation flights, as well as the construction of two field hospitals (one of which is in Gaza), Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE, was the quickest to respond, pledging $100 million on 30 September. This was followed by airlifted medical aid and the launch of a “UAE stands with Lebanon” campaign. Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq have sent food and medical supplies.
This response is reassuring, tapping into deep popular Arab sympathy and solidarity with the Lebanese people. Politically, though, things have not always been straightforward.
The goodwill that Lebanon enjoyed following the end of the 1975-91 war has been eroded, first by the rise of Hezbollah as an Iranian proxy, and second by the rampant corruption practised by successive governments in Beirut. The UAE, for example, now has a strict policy of not providing direct funding, but instead works through the UN agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO). Generous funding for the rebuilding of Beirut after the August 2020 explosion was channelled through international philanthropic institutions.
Further down the road, the question will be who pays for the rebuilding of the South, Dahiyeh, and other parts of Lebanon yet to feel the impact of Netanyahu’s iron fist policy.
As in the case of Gaza, no donor – however generous – will pay for reconstruction just to see Israel destroy it all over again. This is why the UAE and other Gulf States are insisting on a solid political future that averts further conflict. After comparable destruction in Israel’s 2006 war on Lebanon, Hezbollah had the means to do most of it on its own, elbowing out other donors such as Kuwait. This time round looks likely to be different.
While a political settlement for Palestine and Israel is essential, it is also highly problematic. A political settlement in Lebanon may prove more attainable, but has many complex parts and will take time.
In order to avert future hostilities with Israel, it would need to exclude, or at least sideline, the Iranian strategy of fighting through its Lebanese proxy. The disarming of all militias provided for in the post-war settlement of 1989 and cheated on by Iran and Syria in the case of retaining Hezbollah’s arms, is once again a prospect.
This aim will be pursued by the Lebanese parties. Its chances of success are far from clear. If presented as an Israeli and American demand, its chances will be even dimmer. However, if the Gulf States, Iraq and Egypt could be the midwives of an internal accord, and stay on as guarantors, that might work.
There is a widespread feeling that US influence, already derailed by President Biden’s failure to restrain Israel in Gaza and now Lebanon, is not going to deliver solutions in the Middle East. The time for Arab leadership of the solutions seems to have arrived, and Lebanon may be the first test case.
