Over the past century or more, China has generally looked to Europe for inspiration and tips for national rejuvenation of the ancient country. There is no question that the United States replaced the status of Europe since the end of the World War I when the Wilson Doctrine prevailed in China.
Yet, given that the U.S. is the brainchild of the European culture, China has drawn more from modern Europe which is seen as the “center of creativity”, such as the ideas of Communism referring to a strong and efficient leadership, technology-based productivity and social equality of women. Even now, European political and economic doctrines are obviously well-rooted in China’s academic domains although the U.S. theories are more popular among the home-made scholars involved.
The intellectual stagnation and military fragility have made European Union follow the Anglo-American axis. Some of academicians and political elites have talked of the world politics without common sense if they are not idiots. Recently George Allison, who is a journalist rather than a real scholar, wrote a piece with the title of “There might never be a better time for China to attack Russia”.
It is reportedly said that Lai Ching-te had asked the same question recently since he is the political figure of the Taiwanese separatism. For sure, Allison’s idea is not rare and appreciated by a few Chinese “xue-ren”. Last April, The Economist published a commentary by Feng Yu-jun, who is a Chinese historian and argues that Russia is sure to lose in Ukraine for four main factors such as the strong resistance and national unity shown by Ukrainians; a broad international support for Ukraine; the nature of modern warfare as Russia has struggled in it, and the role of information which has made Vladimir Putin trapped in an information cocoon, thanks to his having been in power so long while his national-security team lack access to accurate intelligence.
It doesn’t matter whether Feng said is true or not. Yet, the bottom-line is that never arguing with non-professionals on the issue of international affairs. Here, it repeats once again that history itself is not international relations although it can serve to understand the past issues. In theory, people are supposed to learn from the past; yet in practice, they always learn from it how to make new mistakes. Feng and other home-trained historians have reiterated that Russia will be sure to lose in Ukraine again in line with three cases in history: “the Crimea war in 1856, the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992”. However, this group of “xueren” lost their common sense that “history is just a refuse without reading the context properly”.
Allison’s argument on China’s attack on Russia is ridiculous for three reasons. First, like a Chinese saying goes, before you want to kill a targeted person, it is necessary to kiss his/her ass first. Accordingly, Allison presented a rosy picture that China is stronger and better-prepared than Russia in the world stage economically and military technologically. Therefore, it is a ripe time for China to reclaim its lost territory back from Russia given that Putin has deployed his air/ground forces almost totally committed in Ukraine. Second, like other elites in the West who try to drive a wedge between China and Russia, Allison spoke of the “senior-junior partnership” between China and Russia.
Intellectually, Allison looks much inferior to Russian scholar Andrey Kortunov as he said that “Being a junior partner is not about the absolute size of your trade, but about the trade’s structure. The West maintains that Russia’s exports to China are not diverse enough. This is not entirely true when we dig deeper into to the military domain of Russia-China relations. In fact, Moscow has assisted Beijing with some military technologies from delivery of Su-35 fighter jets to S-400 air defense missiles, which have enhanced China’s military capabilities.
In international affairs where sovereign states react with each other, they do not necessarily see eye-to-eye on all issues. No two partners in the world have completely identical interests—no matter how close their relationship may be. In the 21st century, the idea of junior and senior partners have come to be outdated and even archaic. True international partnerships are based on mutual respect, empathy and a carefully calibrated balance of interests. If Allison and his shared-views friends in other countries read carefully the classics on international relations, they should be smart enough in talking about international affairs.
Geographically, China and Russia are not only the neighbors to each other, but also cover vast Eurasia jurisdictionally referring to the territory from the Volga to the Yangtze and from the Himalayas to the Arctic. Yet, geopolitically, the U.S. strategists have perceived Eurasia as the “Heartland” of the world since the 19th century and then seen it as the key to the global dominance. During the 1990s when the USSR disintegrated, the U.S. still held that no matter which power, either of Europe or Asia, dominated Eurasia, that danger must be seen as a structural threat to its primacy in the world. Given this, it is sensible for China and Russia to form strong partnership to counterbalance the U.S. and its allies.
It is self-evident that during the 1990s, either Russia or China had no interests to challenge the U.S. primacy. As a solo superpower of the day, however, the U.S. declined taking Russia and China as equal partner in the world. Rather, the U.S. has taken all necessary steps to prevent the emergence of peer competitors now and in the future. Such a policy only led Washington to pursue the goals that were sure to antagonize and alienate the two leading powers in Eurasia and their partners around the world. Equally, the U.S. was supposed to outmatch Russia as it did to the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. They exaggerated that serious obstacles would undercut mutual trust between China and Russia since they held divergent views on the bilateral relations in history and the growing anxiety among the Russians to the rapid rise of China’s economics.
Yet, Russia, though losing the superpower status during the Cold War, is still a mature power and military power of the world. China has been in the seminal transition from a developing country to a major player since the 1980s. Both powers aspired for regaining national greatness respectively in a multipolar world order rather than under America’s primacy. To that end, Russia and China have bolstered the strategic dialogues during the 2000s and finalized the comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination in 2019. It is the historical logic and geostrategic choice that have necessitated the strategic ties in terms of political consultation, economic cooperation and military coordination.
It concludes that when the U.S. and its allies have seen Russia as the immediate threat in Europe and China as the pacing systemic rival in the world, is it wise for China to seize the moment to attack Russia which is seen as the strongest strategic partner of China and the most reliable buttress to the U.S. hegemony?