Even though the times have changed, and there are obvious differences, an examination of the connections between both invasions; their causes, as well as their justifications by the perpetrators; is needed to stop future power-hungry dictators from trying the same.
This week marks the 85th anniversary of the invasion of Poland, which kickstarted the Second World War. This week also marks day two and a half years since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Both conflicts have points in common which serve the purpose of answering the questions. What could have been done to stop it? Why did it happen? What are the signs that point to future conflict with dictators?
One of the most apparent similarities lies in the aggressive expansionism preceding the conflicts and the justifications used by both Nazi Germany in 1939 and Russia in 2022. Saarbrucken, Austria, the Sudetenland, Memel, and Danzig all hosted important German communities which included proponents of German reunification and were, under the pretext of protection from attacks, swallowed by the Germans. Adolf Hitler justified the invasion of Poland by claiming to protect ethnic Germans and responding to alleged Polish provocations, even faking a Polish attack on a radio station to use as a pretext. These fabricated grievances were designed to mask a broader aim of territorial expansion and domination, to achieve Lebensraum (by reuniting the German people, conquering the territories to the East, and repopulating it with Aryans). Putin’s Russia first invaded Chechnya, then Crimea, and lastly supported pro-Russian separatism in Ukraine, all under the claim that Russians were being mistreated and massacred by the foreign governments. For the formal invasion of Ukraine, Russia justified its invasion by asserting the need to “save” the Russian speaking, pro-Russia and deeply russified regions of Lugansk and Donetsk through annexation and accusing Ukraine of aggression.
These pretexts concealed both countries ambitions to reassert control over their perceived spheres of influences and challenge the post WW1, and post-Cold War orders, respectively. Under the terms of Versailles Germany lost around 13% of its home territory and all its overseas possessions, while German annexation of other states was prohibited, reparations were imposed, and limits were placed on the size and capability of the country’s armed forces (no tanks or air force). The USSR lost 26% of its territories, and whilst the national composition (empire vs union), the circumstances, and many other factors where different, there was undoubtedly a strong ideological revanchism in both governments. Both Hitler and Putin compared the Treaty of Versailles and the dissolution of the USSR, as the worst moments in the history of their respective countries.
Regarding the actual fighting, tactically there is some resemblances due to the preference of armour thrust by both armies. The invasion of Poland introduced “Blitzkrieg” tactics to a global scale—rapid, overwhelming military force by combined arms, intended to quickly destabilize and conquer the target. In the case of Russia, a modern version of Blitzkrieg was attempted with a swift attack aimed at quickly capturing Kyiv and toppling the Ukrainian government, made by thousands of tanks and armoured vehicles. While Russia’s efforts were less successful than Germany’s Blitzkrieg in 1939, the goal was similarly to achieve a rapid victory through overwhelming force. The lack of total air dominance by Russia was one of the main factors, and the use of drones has made armour more and more redundant.
The international response to both conflicts is very interesting. September 1st followed years of appeasement by European powers, who had failed to check Hitler’s earlier expansions. This lack of decisive action emboldened Hitler, making war almost inevitable. Similarly, in the years leading up to the Ukraine invasion, the West often responded weakly to Russian aggression, such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 or showed diplomatic weakness, as with the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan by a politically divided US. Even more worrying, Germany, France and most of Europe were trying to appease Putin due to unpreparedness and economic dependency on Russian raw materials. This lack of a strong, unified action to both events arguably encouraged Russia to pursue its territorial ambitions further.
The role of alliances in both conflicts, in my opinion is the most intriguing topic. In 1939, Poland was largely isolated despite having alliances with Britain and France. When Germany invaded, they declared war on Germany but failed to provide immediate military support; leaving Poland to face the invasion alone; due to geography, political indecisiveness, and fear of German strength (French troops were greatly outnumbering German ones in the Western front in 1939). Britain hosted the Polish government in exile but couldn’t manage to return them to power after the war. Whilst Ukraine has received significant military and economic support from Western nations, the prospect of another abandonment by the West, in this case with regards to a future peace deal, are not too far-fetched. If Donald Trump regains the White House and forces Ukraine to make peace at any cost, it could leave Ukraine so weakened (Like Czechoslovakia was without the Sudetenland forts), that it might end up falling back to the Russian sphere after all.
Obviously both conflicts are inherently very different, but a dive into the similarities is needed to understand what went wrong when dealing with warmongering dictators, to try and avoid it in the future. The obvious danger of appeasement, the justification of expansionism and the importance of multilateralism and alliances are equally as important now as they were 85 years ago. We should remember that when we remember WW2, we should remember that when we talk about Ukraine, if we don’t, all the suffering will just keep repeating itself.
