In this article, it will be argued that US foreign policy strategy on China risks war and is unviable to promote a rules based international order, thus shifting the strategy to focus more on communication and trust, coupled with deterrence, is necessary. The shift in US strategy refers to how current foreign policy is heavily focused on undermining China’s rise, instead of accepting China as a great power on the international stage. The deterrence is necessary because of persistent Chinese hybrid warfare yielding some success, incentivizing PRC decisionmakers to continue the greyzone operations instead of entering negotiations. By deterring CCP policy makers from utilizing an aggressive method to achieve their goals, they can then choose to begin negotiations with the US.
Foreign policy circles in Washington have been characterized by anti-China sentiments, perceiving Chinese initiatives as malevolent and countering them with aggression. The belief began back in 2008 when civil unrest in Tibet was met with a violent crackdown. Since then, Beijing has become increasingly authoritarian within its borders and assertive in the international community. This behavior change caused reflexive fear among US policymakers, leading them to adopt a reactive posture against China. The reactive posture refers to US efforts to undermine China’s rise in the global stage, which signifies US rejection of China as a great power besides the US. (Weiss, 2022)
This perception can easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy, risking a catastrophic war. The accompanying stance is characterized by aggression and threats. Concessions can easily be misconstrued as weakness and exploited, hindering dialogue and cooperation. Mistakes can be misinterpreted as intentional aggression, triggering escalation and increasing mistrust. If the US leadership continues this path, bilateral relations will only worsen over time. (Weiss, 2022)
The belief of a future inevitable armed conflict led US leadership to prepare for war. By 2021, Admiral Philip Davidson testified to the US Senate Armed Services Committee that China will invade Taiwan sometime in the next six years. His belief, dubbed the Davidson Window, soon spread to other high-ranking officials and became the driving force of US defense strategy and foreign policy in the Asia Pacific. In anticipation of a future armed conflict with a near peer adversary, the US military began preparing for war. (Kardon & Kavanagh, 2024)
But this reaction of preparing for a conventional armed war can be seen as a mismatch of force against Beijing’s strategy of a slow encroachment on Taiwanese shores (Kardon & Kavanagh, 2024). Whilst the PLA is among the strongest militaries in the world, their deployment and action abroad is disproportionately low when compared with other militaries. For example, the French and New Zealand militaries are much smaller than the Chinese PLA, yet the French armed forces are involved in parts of Africa and New Zealand was involved in Afghanistan, both were there due to the political will of their civilian governments. In contrast, most of the PLA’s involvement abroad is concerned with peacekeeping missions, with little to no deployment on behalf of the PRC. Instead of conventional military prowess, Chinese leadership has opted to utilize other means of projecting power and influence. When it comes to territorial disputes such as those in the South China Sea, grey warfare is waged. For this short essay, grey warfare, also known as greyzone tactics or hybrid warfare, is defined as coercive actions outside of regular everyday politics but below the threshold of armed conflict. These actions include, but are not limited to, economic, psychological, or cyber warfare; intruding foreign airspace or waters; or establishing presence and de facto dominance in disputed territories. (Lin et al., 2022)
For greyzone operations out at Sea, Beijing has deployed the maritime militia. The maritime militia is mostly comprised of vessels owned and operated by civilians. In conjunction with the coast guard, it often assert operational presence and dominance in disputed waters resulting in tense confrontations. As the maritime militia and the China Coast Guard are not formally part of the military, it is not seen as a significant escalation, yet still serves to assert de facto sovereignty. (Poling et al., 2021)
Another significant form of greyzone tactics employed by Beijing is in the economic domain. The PRC has imposed sanctions to coerce other governments and corporations to refrain from certain acts. In 2020, the government instituted exorbitant tariffs on Australian wine after the prime minister, Scott Morrison, calls for an inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus. After the PRC passed the national security law in Hong Kong to suppress democracy and freedom of speech, South Korea remained silent due to sanctions on the Lotte company in 2016. In 2019, China sanctioned game broadcasts and online merchandises of the NBA Houston rockets after a team staff member expressed support for democracy in Hong Kong. These past actions make it clear that economic warfare is part of the grey warfare that the CCP regularly employs to coerce others. (Cha, 2023)
This mismatch of force results in the US failing to maintain the Asia Pacific’s rules based order. While China is slowly but surely asserting its sovereignty over the disputed waters and islands, the US is instead fixated on preparing its military for a conventional armed conflict.
To Washington
To prevent an armed conflict against China, policymakers in Washington need to change their perception and subsequent stance on China, specifically one emphasizing on dialogue and cooperation as opposed to constant aggression and threats. Bilateral diplomatic efforts are not the only solution to this issue. Diplomatic efforts can also be directed to the international community as a whole, specifically to change the international system towards one that accepts China as a great power. (Weiss, 2022)
While the US attempts to restore mutual cooperation, the PRC may continue to utilize grey warfare as it yields some success that faces little to no meaningful resistance (Cordesman, 2020). In such a scenario, CCP leadership may not feel incentivized to negotiate and build mutual trust, rendering the need to deter and counter Chinese hybrid warfare.
For this essay, deterrence refers to the practice of threatening the adversary to convince them to refrain from taking a certain action (Huth, 1999). The threats themselves must be credible, either through past or present actions, with said actions preferably in the form of US greyzone tactics. However, deterrence cannot only comprise of threats, but also alternatives and assurances (Weiss, 2022). Alternatives as in alternative actions that the PRC can take instead of the ones that the US government is deterring against. Meanwhile, American diplomats must also assure officials in Beijing that concessions are not conceived as weak and will not be exploited.
To undermine the PRC’s assertion of de facto control of disputed waters, the US Coast Guard can be deployed. As the US coast guard has a very large size, rivalling navies of other countries, it can be called upon to disrupt the Chinese maritime militia and coast guard efforts to establish dominance (Kardon & Kavanagh, 2024). The US coast guard is also part of the US military which allows them to have access to an extensive logistics support system, making a presence of their vessels in the western pacific as viable. Washington can also sponsor other countries’ navies and coast guards to enhance their capabilities to preserve their own sovereignty.
In the economic realm, the US and its allies who share the same values can form an economic alliance focused on deterring coercive economic policies from Beijing. While countries rely on China for trade, China itself is also reliant on other countries for trade. An example of this is the silver powder that China imports from Japan, which makes up 90% of silver powder imports. While the PRC can switch to domestic production to make up losses from these efforts, doing so would come at a significant cost. By forming an alliance that present a credible threat to China’s reliance on certain goods, the US can then deter future economic warfare efforts. (Cha, 2023)
Considering the experience and might of the US military and vast intelligence agencies, there are virtually no technical obstacles to wage its own hybrid warfare. However, there may be obstacles from the standpoint of US values. As Washington officials often call for a rules based international order, Hybrid warfare can be argued to violate international norms, thus contradicting the values US officials are championing. To call for members of the international community to adhere to international norms, while also violating said norms would be another case in a long list of American hypocrisy, lowering the credibility of the US and discouraging others from adhering to international norms.
So What’s All This About?
Current relations between the PRC and the US is highly dangerous as it risks war and current US efforts to maintain the international rules based order does not suffice. While a change of foreign policy is needed, particularly one that emphasizes dialogue and cooperation, deterrence is still necessary to incentivize CCP leadership to negotiate. So while it may seem to be counterproductive to advise American leadership to initiate its own grey warfare program while also attempting to build trust with the PRC, this essay ultimately attempts to reconcile both conflicting ideas and goes beyond to argue that both need to work in tandem to prevent war and advance US objectives. However, the debate of whether Greyzone operations align or contradict with the values touted by American officials is still unresolved.
