On March 23, 2024, Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev visited Singapore, marking the first official state visit in over 20 years. Tokayev, who previously served as a diplomat in Singapore during the 1970s, also delivered the 46th Singapore Lecture on May 24th at the Yusof Ishak Institute. The lecture was of symbolic importance as this event was not only Kazakhstan’s debut as an emerging middle power on the global stage but also the country’s initial engagement with other members of the middle power club. Just a month later, Astana hosted the highly anticipated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. This summit became a significant ground for major negotiations, with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, among others, in attendance.
Tokayev’s inclination to create a sense of equality and commonality with great and middle powers alike signifies a shift in Kazakhstan’s identity on the global arena. While one can argue that recognition of Kazakhstan as a middle power was long overdue—thanks to effective domestic reforms and its trademark ‘multivector’ foreign policy that transformed the landlocked country into the ‘linchpin of Eurasia’, the biggest beneficiary of trade flows between Asia and Europe—this view is only partially true. The long shadow cast by its mighty neighbours has indeed limited its recognition, but there’s more to the story.
Kazakhstan has always been pragmatic in its policies, striving to be a partner to everyone and an opponent to none. This approach allowed it to act as a facilitator of regional cooperation, whether through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), or the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Additionally, Kazakhstan has played a key role as a mediator in regional conflicts, such as the Astana Process on the Syrian War and its participation in the Iranian Nuclear Deal.
In essence, Kazakhstan has long acted as a typical normative middle power, even though it was not widely recognized as one. However, recent years have seen a significant shift in Kazakhstan’s stance towards a more assertive and reformist position. This new approach aligns Kazakhstan more closely with the middle powers of the Global South, thus assuming a middle power role rather than merely ‘acting in the middle’.
Two key components of this gradual shift are Kazakhstan’s frustration with the ineffectiveness of the system of global governance, particularly the Bretton Woods institutions, and the apparent inability of great powers to find common ground on shared global concerns such as climate change, trade regulations, and security issues. The continuous escalation of great power competition exacerbates these frustrations, as each side becomes increasingly self-serving, coercing and promoting their own interests while they ‘rarely show up for everyone else’s problems’.
This shift highlights the ongoing trend of decreasing normative behaviour and the rise of ‘mini-lateralism’ – pragmatic, regional, and realism-based initiatives focused on addressing problems rather than merely discussing them. In light of its pragmatic policy, Kazakhstan turns challenges into vehicles for cooperation, making it a valuable addition to the sphere of middle power cooperation. The country is a major exporter of oil and gas, but its potential value as a partner is much higher. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer of uranium and has significant deposits of rare earth elements needed for solar, wind, and electric batteries, positioning it as a crucial player in the global energy transition to combat climate change. Kazakhstan is already becoming a valuable partner for countries seeking to reduce their dependence on Russia or China for these critical materials.
Kazakhstan is continuously looking to hedge its interests to mitigate the potential impacts of great power tensions. This includes a persistent search for investments in the infrastructure of Caspian ports, which are major bottlenecks for the efficiency of the Middle Corridor. Additionally, Kazakhstan has expressed a desire to host peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, potentially opening the Zangazur corridor to address another bottleneck in the Caucasus.
The situation in Afghanistan presents another challenge, impacting the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a potential route to Asia that bypasses China. This has prompted Kazakhstan to promote the creation of a United Nations (UN) Regional Center for Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan, with its head office in Astana.
While these goals may not hold significant importance for the great powers, Kazakhstan increasingly seeks successful cooperation with other middle powers, such as Turkey, India, Singapore and Japan. As Central Asia rises to power and recognition on the global stage, Kazakhstan is emerging as a pivotal state with ambitions to lead regional cooperation and enhance connectivity to both world markets and global governance systems. This vision underscores Kazakhstan’s increasing focus on middle power diplomacy, which is likely to intensify. History shows that Kazakhstan has a track record of leveraging competing interests and high-profile events to enhance its influence and promote its strategic interests.
Kazakhstan’s newfound assertive stance as a middle power is likely to resonate across Central Asia and the Middle East, regions increasingly troubled by escalating great power rivalry. By positioning itself as a mediator and facilitator, Kazakhstan aims to foster stability and cooperation, further solidifying its role as a key player in regional and global affairs.
