Iraqi Kurdistan spent decades fighting to escape the political control of others. Its emergence as a federal region with its own government, parliament, and security forces was one of the most significant achievements in modern Kurdish history. Yet today, the region is at risk of losing much of the political leverage it fought so hard to secure, not because of an external military defeat, but because of decisions being made by its own leadership.
Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s handling of the confrontation with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has exposed a fundamental failure of political leadership. Rather than pursuing a sustainable agreement with a party that retains substantial territorial, political, and security influence, Barzani has chosen to press ahead with forming a government without it. The PUK’s subsequent withdrawal from the regional government and threat to establish parallel institutions have brought the Kurdistan Region dangerously close to another institutional division.
This is the predictable consequence of a governing approach that increasingly prioritizes the concentration of authority over political accommodation. Barzani may regard the KDP’s electoral victory in October 2024 as justification for exercising greater control over the regional administration. But securing 39 of 100 parliamentary seats does not confer a mandate to disregard the political realities of a region that has never functioned as a genuinely integrated state. Winning an election is one thing; demonstrating the ability to govern an entire region is another.
The November parliamentary session, secured through the support of individual MPs from rival parties, did little to resolve this problem. Instead, it reinforced the perception that parliamentary arithmetic has become more important than political legitimacy. The result is a government formation process that has deepened divisions rather than restored confidence in Kurdish institutions.
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The consequences will be felt most immediately in Baghdad. For years, Kurdish leaders relied on their collective political influence to defend constitutional autonomy, negotiate budgetary arrangements, and protect control over natural resources. That leverage has already been eroded by disputes over oil exports, federal revenue transfers, and customs collection. Baghdad has progressively expanded its authority over areas previously managed by Erbil. A divided Kurdish leadership makes reversing that trend considerably harder.
Barzani’s approach contains a fundamental strategic contradiction: in attempting to consolidate his authority within the Kurdistan Region, he risks weakening the region’s position against the federal government. Baghdad does not need to overcome a unified Kurdish leadership when its political divisions are doing much of the work for it. The same applies to the unresolved status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories, where advancing Kurdish constitutional claims requires coordination and a credible negotiating position.
The consequences extend beyond Iraq. Turkey and Iran have spent decades developing political, economic, and security relationships across Iraqi Kurdistan. Their interests differ, but both benefit from a Kurdish leadership that struggles to act collectively. Ankara has significant interests in its relationship with the KDP and PUK, the future of the PKK, and developments in neighboring Syria. Tehran, meanwhile, seeks to maintain influence across northern Iraq, restrict the activities of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, and prevent the emergence of security threats along its border. A fragmented Kurdistan gives both countries greater opportunities to pursue these objectives through separate political relationships rather than engaging with a cohesive regional government.
For Iran in particular, the weakening of Kurdish institutions creates additional opportunities to exert pressure and expand its influence through established networks. The danger is not simply political interference. It is the erosion of the regional security coordination needed to protect Kurdish territory and prevent neighboring powers from dictating its security arrangements.
Western governments also have reasons to be concerned. The United States and European countries invested heavily in the Kurdistan Region, particularly during the campaign against Islamic State. The Peshmerga became important security partners, while Erbil developed into a significant diplomatic and commercial center. But international partnerships depend on predictable institutions and political stability. A region whose leadership cannot agree on basic questions of governance becomes a considerably less reliable partner.
The changing American military presence makes this particularly important. With US forces having completed their withdrawal from Erbil in September 2026, the ability of Kurdish institutions to coordinate security and maintain international relationships is increasingly consequential. Instead of strengthening those institutions, the current political confrontation threatens to undermine them.
There is also a broader economic cost. Kurdistan’s position as an energy-producing region and an important corridor connecting Iraq with Turkey gives it considerable strategic potential. But investment depends on security, predictable administration, and reliable relations with Baghdad and Ankara. Continued political instability puts those advantages at risk, potentially discouraging the international investment needed to strengthen the region’s economic independence.
The 2017 independence referendum should have provided a lasting lesson. The overwhelming Kurdish vote demonstrated the strength of the national aspiration, but the subsequent loss of control over Kirkuk exposed the consequences of internal divisions and insufficient international support. This cannot be achieved through declarations alone. It requires political cohesion, functioning institutions, economic strength, and a diplomatic strategy capable of securing international backing.
Almost a decade later, Kurdistan risks repeating the same mistakes. The proposed creation of a separate Sulaimani-centered federal region would formalize divisions that the 2006 reunification was supposed to overcome. But neither this prospect nor unchecked centralization offers a sustainable solution. What is required is a political settlement that recognizes the region’s realities and establishes institutions capable of functioning independently of partisan interests.
Barzani’s responsibility is therefore considerable. His position as prime minister demands more than the ability to secure parliamentary support or advance the interests of his own political administration. It requires the judgement to recognise that Kurdish autonomy is larger than any electoral victory and that governing a divided region requires compromise. His refusal to make that compromise risks turning a political disagreement into a strategic setback from which Kurdistan may struggle to recover.
The Kurdish national movement survived decades of repression, displacement, and conflict to establish the foundations of self-government. Those achievements should not be squandered through a leadership strategy that mistakes centralization for strength. A Kurdistan increasingly dependent on Baghdad, vulnerable to pressure from Ankara and Tehran, and losing the confidence of its Western partners will have progressively less control over its own future.
The greatest danger is that the Kurdish people could find themselves with less autonomy today than they had hoped to secure for tomorrow. The dream of autonomy cannot advance while the institutions required to protect it are being weakened from within.
