In mid-February, media outlets reported that Russia was developing the so-called ‘Son of Oreshnik’ – an allegedly “unstoppable” ballistic missile. It is intended to replace the ‘Oreshnik’, which has already been used twice against Ukraine. Earlier, it became known that China is assisting Russia in the production of this missile. It is possible that Moscow, which is becoming more dependent on Beijing in many areas, will again ask for help in manufacturing this new type of weapon.
The Oreshnik is an intermediate-range ballistic missile with a maximum range of around 5,500 km, posing a direct threat mainly to Europe, while much of the United States lies beyond its reach. The strike on Lviv (a Ukrainian city on the border with Poland, a member of the European Union and NATO) using the missile on the night of 8–9 January was widely seen as a warning to Europe. Ukrainian member of parliament Oleksiy Honcharenko, commenting on discussions about a possible European peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine, captured the Kremlin’s message: “If you want to introduce forces into western Ukraine, this is what will happen. Moreover, if the Oreshnik reaches Lviv in 10–15 minutes, how long would it take to reach Warsaw or Berlin? A difference of a few minutes is hardly significant.”
Concurrently, the Center for Strategic and International Studies report “Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine” detailed China’s role in sustaining and expanding Russia’s ballistic missile production. Beijing provides critical dual-use items – machine tools, microchips, sensors and chemicals like ammonium perchlorate (essential for solid rocket propellant). Chinese supplies reportedly account for up to 70% of Russia’s recent ammonium perchlorate imports. Overall, China constitutes about 34% of Russia’s foreign trade turnover – roughly a quarter of a trillion US dollars annually.
However China consistently denies bolstering Russia’s military capabilities. On 29 January, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated that Beijing does not exploit the conflict for gain and views such accusations as attempts to shift blame onto China.
Yet over four years of war, China has repeatedly misled the international community about its role. Officials long denied any military assistance, but in 2024 a Russian state-owned defense firm tested an unmanned aerial vehicle on Chinese soil with Chinese specialists involved. Beijing also claimed no Chinese citizens serve in Russian forces, yet in April 2025 President Zelenskyy announced the capture of two Chinese nationals fighting for Russia in Donetsk, stressing these were not isolated cases and the real number on the front line is significantly higher.
Against this backdrop, Chinese peacekeeping proposals or peace statements face deep scepticism. In September 2025, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas stated: “While Western leaders gather in diplomacy, an autocratic alliance [China, Russia, Iran and North Korea] is seeking a fast track to a new world order. These are not just anti-Western optics; this is a direct challenge to the international system built on rules. And it is not just symbolic: Russia’s war in Ukraine is being sustained by Chinese support. These are realities that Europe needs to confront.”
Amid growing European concern over strategic risks from closer China ties, French President Emmanuel Macron’s 20 January Davos remarks surprised many. He welcomed more direct Chinese investment in Europe to overcome the current crisis: “China is welcome, but what we need is more Chinese foreign direct investments in Europe.”
This may reflect Paris’s effort to counterbalance the confrontational US stance under Donald Trump – including disputes over Greenland. Yet if translated into policy, it risks enabling deeper Chinese economic penetration – a tactic Beijing often uses in hybrid influence strategies through acquiring strategic assets and infrastructure.
Europe should not see China as a reliable partner or counterweight to US pressures. Russia’s experience shows the high cost of dependence on Beijing: Chinese support prevented immediate collapse early in the war, but Russia has become increasingly subordinated in economic, technological and defense spheres. On 20 January, Kyrylo Budanov, Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine (and former chief of military intelligence), stated that “China is actively absorbing Russia”, exploiting Moscow’s vulnerability under sanctions.
Europe now faces a historic chance to strengthen strategic autonomy and become a truly independent global actor. The US distancing from European affairs – worsened by Greenland and other disagreements – will hurt, but can catalyze greater self-reliance.
Turning to China may seem the easiest short-term fix for transatlantic strains, yet it carries severe long-term risks. Dependence on an economy four times larger than Russia’s would be far harder to unwind than the shift from Russian energy. Closer ties with Beijing would also increase indirect dependence on Moscow, given China’s role as Russia’s top resource buyer and the tight interconnections between the two regimes.
There are no valid grounds to doubt Europe’s capacity to pursue an independent foreign policy without constantly deferring to other powers. The United States (population ~349 million, nominal Gross domestic product ~$32 trillion) remains the world’s leading power. Why then does a united Europe – with ~450 million people and combined nominal GDP of ~$22.5 trillion (still ahead of China’s ~$20.7 trillion) – view its potential as a major global center with such pessimism?
Right now, amid US political turbulence, Europe has a unique opportunity: to emerge as the recognized leader of the global democratic community and defend humanity’s hard-won values of freedom against aggressive authoritarian regimes.
