With the expiry of the New START treaty on February 5, 2026, the last legally binding constraint on nuclear arsenals between the United States and Russia has lapsed, potentially destabilizing the strategic balance between the two powers. New START that was signed in April 8, 2010 aimed to halt the development andfielding of new delivery system and the deployment of additional nuclear warheads to existing delivery systems. Under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), the treaty capped deployed strategic warheads at 1550 down from 2200 limit, working as a silent stabilizer of strategic competition between the US and Russia. After the expiration of New START treaty, structured and negotiated limits on worlds two largest nuclear arsenals have ended, prompting a new arms race in a multi-polar nuclear order.
This Bilateral arms control agreement between the US and Russia has served as the cornerstone of global nuclear restraint for nearly two decades. Both the Washington and Moscow controls 80 percent of worlds nuclear warheads. This arms control framework provided numerical ceiling, transparency, predictability and ensured verification mechanism between Washington and Moscow. Even during intense political hostilities, treaty remained successful in reducing incentives for an arms race by institutionalizing the habit of communication. In absence of such transparency and numerical ceiling, the global nuclear order enters a period of uncertainty. Without data exchanges, compliance mechanisms, and inspections, mistrust will deepen, undermining crisis stability in a global nuclear order.
The loss of mutual visibility has become a great concern after the expiry of New START between US and Russia. Though satellites can monitor launchers, still they are not successful in verifying warhead loadings and doctrinal intentions. In absence of such intrusive verification, strategic planners are compelled to operate under worst-case assumptions, breeding arms race.
Both Washington and Moscow are already engaged in nuclear force modernization, making the time of expiry of New START a major concern for future of arms control. Emerging technologies that involve hypersonic delivery systems, space-based assets and non-strategic nuclear weapons are already complicating deterrence equation. Drive by automation, Strategic stability in contemporary era depends more upon avoiding mistakes, miscalculations and accidental escalations. These domains remain outside the bounds of arms control framework, and in such a transforming strategic landscape, international community is deeply perturbed regarding the future of arms control.
The expiry of New START treaty has ramifications well beyond the US-Russia bilateral relations. The broader architecture of non-proliferation is weakened with the end of formal arms control arrangement, understating global confidence in nuclear restraint. Major powers have not fulfilled their disarmament obligations, and this lack of adherence with disarmament obligations has been repeatedly questioned by the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Meanwhile, vertical and horizontal proliferation has been intensified given regional rivalries. Absence of such guardrails destabilizes today’s multi-polar nuclear order, affecting threat perceptions and force postures in nuclear dyads beyond Europe and transatlantic space.
Moscow has extended a modest proposal in October 2025 to Washington to extend compliance with central quantitative limits set under the New START for a year. However, the issue of resumption of data exchanges and inspections of the strategic systems between the two sides disrupted further negotiations on extension of New START. The expiry of New START clearly shows that Moscow and Washington have no appetite for a renewed bilateral framework. In such challenging times, world can consider more inclusive arrangements that could also consider emerging technologies and additional nuclear stakeholders.
Since the approval of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, all the three major nuclear powers – the United States, Russia and China- has abstained from conducting nuclear test. CTBT categorically banned nuclear tests worldwide. However, the Trump administration announced resumption of nuclear testing for the first time in over 30 years. The announcement of nuclear testing by the US would compel both Russia and China to conduct tests for developing sophisticated weapons. President Putin already announced in November that Kremlin would take reciprocal measures if the US resumes nuclear tests. In such a blind nuclear era, verification will be replaced by misjudgements and fear will triumph over certainty. States cannot become safe or more powerful in such a blind nuclear environment; it makes States more vulnerable to catastrophic error. Arms control is more related to institutionalized scepticism rather than trust, transforming abrupt competition into manageable and controlled competition. Therefore, future of arms control must evolve beyond cold war concepts. The focal points of future arms control framework must stand on the responsible application of AI to nuclear command systems, greater transparency in hypersonic testing and the assurance of robust space-based early warning capabilities rather than mere counting of warheads.
With the demise of the final and sole pillar of bilateral nuclear restraint between the United States and Russia, there are risks that number could exceed 1550 warhead limit set under the treaty, destabilizing mutual balance of terror between Russian and US strategic forces. For the first time in 35 years, the US and Russia are not constrained in deployment of strategic arsenals by uploading additional warheads on existing bombers and missiles, reversing decades of work to reduce the risk of nuclear war.
