The past decade has seen American-led unipolarity gradually shifting into a new international system with elements of both US-China bipolarity and multipolarity. This has been accelerated by the United States withdrawing from its traditional leadership role under the presidency of Donald J. Trump and the weakening of international norms from the United States’ capture of Nicolas Maduro and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The instability of the current global order has allowed for several middle powers–among them Indonesia, Brazil, Turkey, and Vietnam–to become more influential than ever, as they take advantage of this instability to further their own interests, increasing their strategic autonomy and working to set the rules for their own neighborhoods.
Contrasts with a Cold War Past
The new US-China rivalry differs significantly from the old Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union. First, it does not have the same ideological passions that caused many aspiring revolutionary governments, or those opposed, to directly side with one superpower over another. Second, China participates in and has benefited significantly from the liberal international system created by the United States after WW2, which the United States under Donald Trump is now actively undermining. Third, while the Soviet Union primarily threatened the United States militarily, China threatens the United States economically as well. Finally, these elements have helped result in a significant economic interdependence between China, the US, and American allies.
In addition to these differences between these rivalries, the nature of middle powers have significantly changed as well. Middle powers today have working relationships with both the United States and China. They have also developed relatively strong industrial bases and carry more relative economic and military weight than in the past. Furthermore, the demographic and economic trends of the 21st century have allowed many of these powers to increase their relative strength and agency relative to traditional powers.
The Art of Strategic Fence-Sitting
All of these factors have allowed middle powers to take a more transactional and pragmatic view when it comes to handling relations with both. They have worked to develop working and positive relationships with both the United States and China without limiting their strategic autonomy by tying themselves too closely to either superpower. So long as the benefits of fence-sitting outweigh its costs, middle powers will continue to use their agency in a way that benefits their own interests, and the further away from either the United States or China, the better.
Even traditional US allies have gone against American interests for what they believe is best for their own interests. American allies trade extensively with China for their own economic benefit and South Korea is seen as an unreliable partner in the case of any potential military conflict over Taiwan. This trend is perhaps best exemplified by Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, which has seen worsening relations with its Western allies and actively worked against their interests for its own benefit by importing Russian oil and stalling Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO.
Like the United States, India also has a rivalry with China, and as such has cooperated with the US on security issues when it comes to China, such as through participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. However, this same cooperation does not exist when it comes to Russia, with India importing large amounts of both energy and weapons from the country.
With the United States seen as an increasingly unreliable partner, middle powers have also taken a leading role in promoting their agendas. At times, this has taken the shape in the form of promoting multilateralism and new rules for their regions, such as with Japan taking a leading role in promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership after the United States withdrew in 2017. It has also taken the form of Poland taking a leadership role in providing military support to Ukraine.
Turkey: A Case Study in Strategic Autonomy
The Republic of Türkiye is a prime example of a modern middle power. During the Cold War, directly threatened by the Soviet Union, the country was a firm American ally, hosting American nuclear missiles, joining NATO, and sending troops to fight on the side of the United States in the Korean War.
Today, Turkey is still part of NATO and relies heavily on Western capital when it comes to finance and investment. However, its geopolitical situation has completely transformed since the end of the Cold War. No longer threatened by a bordering, hostile superpower, the country is no longer as dependent on the West for its security. And it has grown larger in terms of population, economy, and industry.
This has allowed the country to pursue a much more independent foreign policy, to the point where it has strained relations with its formal allies. Turkey opposed American support of Kurds in Iraq and Syria, purchased the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system in 2017, and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine proved difficult when it came to Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO, using the issue to extract concessions from the West when it came to defense and the Kurds. Its newfound strategic autonomy has allowed the country to work as a mediator in modern conflicts, as seen through its role in the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Trump’s peace plan for Gaza.
Turkey has also been using its newfound economic and industrial prowess to extend its influence across what it believes to be its own neighborhood in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. It has involved itself militarily in Syria, Iraq, and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. In particular, the country invested heavily in the Syrian conflict, taking in millions of refugees and funding the opposition forces that eventually toppled the Assad regime.
The Inevitable Path to a Multipolar Future
Even if the trend of US isolationism is reversed, the global trend of increasing multipolarity at the expense of American unipolarity, and the structural forces driving this trend, will not. The activity we see today from middle powers provides a glimpse into what the world will look more like in the future. As the world grows increasingly unpredictable and fragmented, middle powers will continue to find it within their own interest to provide predictability and unity for themselves where it benefits them. The world will no longer be defined by American hegemony nor opposing blocs such as during the Cold War. Regional dynamics will be increasingly shaped by the middle powers that step up to replace the void created by a relatively weaker and withdrawn America and the interests of these middle powers.
