The harsh anarchy endemic to the Middle Eastern system has, with predictable certainty, intruded upon the core interests of the Turkish Republic. In response, Ankara has labored, over the last two decades, to delineate its preferred sphere of influence through the strategic rubric of the neo-Ottoman doctrine. Historically, until the partial collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime’s authority and the subsequent rise of non-state actors, Turkey’s calculus of conflicting interests largely focused upon the traditional Middle Eastern state players. However, the dramatic and kinetic shift in the balance of power in the Levant has forced a fundamental, painful redefinition of Ankara’s geopolitical objectives. In the chaotic wake of the Syrian conflict’s escalation, Turkey attempted a delicate policy of controlling the conflict’s temperature, yet its intricate, high-stakes political maneuvering with Israel has proven decidedly counterproductive. While President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has skillfully articulated Turkish interests across the hard geopolitical faults of the East and the West, the complex narrative of the Levant is proving altogether different and less tractable.
This intractable regional complexity, however, finds its clearest expression in the geopolitical and geo-economic confrontation now reaching a fever pitch. Israel, systematically seeking profound territorial and political changes within Syria, has repeatedly targeted assets recently attributed to Turkish influence. The foundational premise here is Tel Aviv’s deep-seated conviction: it perceives the neo-Ottoman doctrine not merely as a regional challenge but as an existential, long-term security conundrum—a vital threat to its regional preeminence. It almost goes without saying that the parties are simultaneously locked in a ferocious competition in the field of “energy geopolitics.” This energy rivalry is overwhelmingly centered on the colossal natural gas resources newly unearthed in the Eastern Mediterranean and the controversial Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline project, commonly styled as EastMed. Israel, in conjunction with Greece and Cyprus, is actively striving to pipeline its gas to Europe through this route, an initiative designed expressly to bypass and ultimately eliminate Turkey from the vital European energy equation. Ankara, standing on its interpretation of international law, counters that the proposed pipeline’s trajectory illegally traverses its disputed maritime territory (continental shelf). A meticulous account of the situation reveals that this competition for energy routes and resources is far from an “independent variable”; rather, it stands as a fundamental, irreducible element driving the continuation and structural intensification of the geopolitical clash between Turkey and Israel. Structurally, an inevitable outcome, though, for now, the parties are prudently pursuing a soft confrontation.
In managing this soft confrontation, Turkey is anchoring its position upon its NATO membership, which it attempts to wield as a structural deterrent against Israel. The North Atlantic Treaty stands as a critically important restraining structural variable in Turkey’s strategic confrontation with Israel. NATO membership apparently ensures that these simmering conflicts remain largely confined to the level of a gray zone—a theater of proxy operations or limited, surgical attacks (such as those observed in Syria)—thereby preventing the spiral into a full-scale interstate war. This context of constrained military action, however, necessitates addressing a fundamental question: Why, given this structural restraint, is Turkey actively moving toward developing tangible security cooperation with Iran?
The answer lies, in part, in the fact that the deep historical mind of Turkey remains heavily burdened by the story of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the traumatic division of the historic Ottoman lands. With this historical mindset as the frame of analysis, it must be noted that while NATO carries no formal defense commitment to Israel, the powerful American interest in the uncompromising maintenance of Israel’s security effectively translates into a diplomatic red line for the alliance. Utilizing the analytical framework of realism, any systemic disruption of the delicate balance of terror between Iran and Israel would precipitate unpleasant and strategically costly consequences for Turkey. Concurrently with the 12-day war—Israel’s limited missile exchanges with Iran—the Turkish media’s dominant view posited that the Israeli state considered Ankara’s assets the country’s next target. Furthermore, the surgical Israeli missile attack targeting a Hamas leadership meeting in the heart of Doha was widely interpreted as a clear, chilling hidden signal directed toward Turkey. One must not forget the strategic alliance shared by Turkey and Qatar. This action brutally demonstrates Israel’s willingness to strike at the regional arms of its rivals, even within the sovereign territories of America’s friends and allies (Qatar), substantially increasing the cost of Turkey’s support for Hamas and placing Ankara at an acute strategic crossroads.
The resulting necessity for strategic adaptation is clearly visible in the observable model of Turkey’s diplomatic support for Iran during the 12-day war, coupled with an unprecedented level of overt and covert cooperation within the emergent framework of a change in security architecture for the Middle East, which paints a decidedly different picture. Traditionally, rival actors are now defining necessary security relations, whether they fully desire them or not; this transactional reality is clearly visible in the security transactions unfolding between Tehran, Islamabad, and Riyadh. The exponential increase in tension and the unofficial entry of Turkey and Israel into a persistent gray zone dispute is not a conflict rooted in ideological incompatibility, but rather the unavoidable result of an inevitable competition for power and security across the Middle East—a competition that has intensified dramatically following the geopolitical power vacuum in Syria.
Underpinning this entire shift, the single most consequential driving force behind the changing Middle East security architecture remains the actor known as Israel, which, while defining an altogether new level of national interests, actively seeks geopolitical changes in West Asia. The restricted volume of interests available and the entrenched structural anarchy of the region present a formidable strategic equation, which is only compounded by the coefficient of the “club of the powerful” and the broader flux in the balance of international relations. Consequently, Turkey and other traditional Middle Eastern players are gravitating toward tactical or strategic cooperation with Iran as a functional strategy for creating a balance against Israel. In an anarchic environment, governments are compelled to seek the creation of a balance of power against aggressive or regionally dominant powers. The sustained growth of Israel’s power and influence in the region (which is firmly accompanied by the unwavering support of the United States) is now considered a common threat to the critical geopolitical interests of both Turkey and Iran.
The resulting cooperation, crucially, is not an “ideological alliance” but a purely “pragmatic partnership.” Turkey’s robust diplomatic support for Iran during the 12-day war and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s subsequent visit to Tehran stand as unmistakable signs of a nascent convergence in the security sphere. Turkey’s redefinition of cooperation with Iran follows the same essential algorithm observed in the strategic shifts undertaken by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Riyadh itself constitutes a paradoxical situation within the broader transactions between Tehran and Ankara; Saudi Arabia plays a pivotal, complex role that can both generate opportunities for Iranian-Turkish convergence and, simultaneously, act as a limiting factor against the formation of this defensive alliance. While accelerating joint security cooperation with both Iran and Turkey, Saudi Arabia possesses no strategic interest in the formal consolidation of a decisive “security bloc” between Tehran and Ankara. Although the parties share undeniable and powerful geopolitical interests vis-à-vis Israel, “ideological conflicts” and traditional regional rivalries remain potent deterrents. In particular, Turkey continues to increase tactical cooperation with Iran and Russia across the security-intelligence and political-diplomatic spheres, though notably without forming a formal military alliance. This carefully calibrated scenario assists Turkey in maintaining its valuable NATO membership while simultaneously fielding a credible counter to the pervasive Israeli threat. Ultimately, in the event of increased Israeli attacks on vital Turkish interests or intensified US diplomatic pressure, Türkiye would be compelled by strategic necessity to further deepen its defense and economic relations with Iran, especially within the critical domains of energy and border security.
