For the past decade, the Philippines has been drifting aimlessly amid increasingly aggressive Chinese maneuvers, ranging from water cannons to ship rammings. The Philippines no longer relies on stagnant ASEAN diplomacy or fruitless bilateral efforts. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. made a decisive political decision, directing an external balancing strategy involving the United States, Japan, Australia, and India to strengthen Philippine power in the South China Sea. This move was considered a sound calculation for the Philippines, with its limited military capabilities facing the growing power of China.
The apparent shift in policy direction can be seen in the most obvious comparison: the gap between Duterte’s and Marcos Jr.’s approaches. Duterte prioritized an accommodating approach and placed his hopes on economic gains from China. But this failed to produce any change in China’s behavior. Maritime violations persisted, patrol vessels and maritime militia continued to intrude, and China continued to manipulate the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, which China considered uninhabited and open to its whims. Marcos Jr. Preferring a reverse approach, if China doesn’t respond favorably, the Philippines must strengthen its bargaining position through the network of major powers behind it.
This is called external balancing, a classic concept in the Balance of Power theory. Small countries lacking strong military capabilities will seek external support to offset pressure from stronger nations. In this context, the Philippines is unlikely to be strong enough to compete with China on its own. As a developing country, its budget is still limited, its military modernization is still in its infancy, and its maritime capabilities are not yet comparable to the capacity and strength of China’s navy. Therefore, partnering with major powers is one way to exert a deterrent effect.
The Philippines also knows that ASEAN cannot act as a counterbalance. Internal fragmentation has prevented ASEAN from establishing a unified position against Chinese aggression. Vietnam has opted for unilateral modernization, Indonesia has maintained a diplomatic approach, and Cambodia and Laos have consistently aligned with China’s economic interests. There is no Collective Security mechanism. To this point, dependence on ASEAN has actually weakened the Philippines’ position. Marcos’s strategy recognized this and led to the formation of a minilateral security coalition.
Evidence suggests the Philippines is using external balancing, expanding US military access through the EDCA, then deploying troops and building strategic infrastructure in locations near Taiwan and the South China Sea. Simultaneously, the Philippines is also engaging in trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan, conducting joint patrols with Australia, and signing a defense agreement with Tokyo. India has even entered the market through the sale of the Brahmos missile system, a device that can alter the operational cost calculations for Chinese ships. These steps demonstrate a consistent, measured pattern of external balancing, no longer clouded by domestic doubts.
However, this approach has received criticism. Some argue that bringing in a large force actually increases the risk of escalation and triggers a security dilemma. It is true that any form of balancing can be interpreted by China as an attempt at encirclement. However, this argument ignores the fact that China has demonstrated coercive behavior even when the Philippines is trying to be friendly. In a situation where one party continues to expand its power or territorial claims, adding ships, and using grey-zone techniques, the absence of balancing can actually encourage more aggression. A power imbalance is an invitation to revisionist behavior. In other words, whether or not balancing the two could be dangerous for the Philippines.
Another criticism highlights the uncertainty of the United States’ commitment. Indeed, no alliance is completely free from strategic ambiguity. But the current geopolitical realities of the Indo-Pacific demonstrate the growing US interest in maintaining stable trade routes and preventing Chinese dominance in key waters. As long as Washington needs regional partners to uphold maritime order, the Philippines remains a key partner that cannot be ignored. This means that the moral hazard risk often attached to small states in asymmetrical relationships is not entirely relevant in this context.
The implications of this strategy are quite significant. First, China is no longer facing a lone Philippines, but a network of powers with a collective interest in maintaining freedom of navigation. Second, this move sends a signal to ASEAN that the stagnant path of regional diplomacy is no longer viable.
