Amid speculations about the fate of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the inevitable arms race linked to its failure, Russian President Vladimir Putin has proposed a one-year extension of the treaty. President Putin stated that the complete dismissal of New START’s legacy would be a short-sighted step that could negatively affect the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Simultaneously, President Trump has also signaled a positive outlook on Putin’s proposal, albeit without issuing any official statement. This characterizes a significant milestone in the bilateral arms control efforts between the United States (US) and Russia. But, as optimism about extending the treaty grows, the accompanying challenges magnify, suggesting that the time is not suitable for the New START’s extension.
The New START is the last remaining bilateral arms control arrangement between the US and Russia. This treaty accounts for 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons and is set to expire in February 2026. After its expiry, there would be no other treaty left to cap the numbers and types of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the US and Russia. Moreover, both countries have suspended their participation in New START since the onset of the Ukraine conflict in 2022, while they still unilaterally observe the treaty limits. Nonetheless, each side has attempted to assign the blame for noncompliance to the other. Washington blamed Russian noncompliance for jeopardizing “the viability of US-Russia nuclear arms control moving forward,” whereas senior Russian officials put the onus on the US for “politicizing nuclear arms control.” In any case, the foundation of mutual accountability was eroded by the deferral of the on-site inspections following the tensions over the Ukraine conflict. This has led to the amplification of the trust deficit between the US and Russia.
Prolonging New START’s term for another year amid such circumstances would only face challenges. The major challenge is the absence of an effective reciprocal verification regime between the two former Cold War rivals that has aggravated their mutual distrust. According to the 2023 report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), since February 2022, both the US and Russia have started reducing their transparency regarding nuclear weapons. Another SIPRI report from 2025 recorded that both the US and Russia are already modernizing their nuclear warheads, along with their delivery systems and their nuclear weapon production facilities. With New START unable to constrain, it is obvious that both countries would seek incentives to deploy more warheads, thereby impacting strategic stability. Owing to these shortcomings, the extension of New START will only be symbolic. It is the on-site inspection and data-sharing arrangement under the treaty that ensures both parties are adhering to the set limits. With no mechanism to ensure compliance, the likelihood of noncompliance accusations increases, undermining the treaty’s credibility. In essence, the primary purpose of an arms control arrangement cannot be served without a credible verification regime that includes on-site inspection and a data-sharing mechanism.
The second obstacle to the way of a viable materialization of President Putin’s proposal is the unresolved status of the Ukraine conflict, because rebuilding US-Russia ties is inconceivable without peace in Kyiv. The mutual distrust between the US and Russia has deepened since the onset of the conflict, compelling both sides to redefine their strategic postures. Consequently, the US has increased its presence in Europe, evident through the American decision to control the Aegis missile defense system in Poland and the recent US-German agreement that will allow the positioning of the US ground-launched missiles in Germany from 2026. In parallel, Russia has also made some strategic adjustments, including the revision of Russian nuclear doctrine to expand the range of contingencies under which Russia could use nuclear weapons and the announcement to position its tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Belarus. Such advancements imply the revival of a new arms race, accompanied by mutual strategic insecurities and heightened suspicion between the US and Russia. The situation becomes even more volatile as Russian concerns over alleged American involvement in Ukraine grow and as the efforts to negotiate conditions for a ceasefire in Ukraine fail. Hence, in such a strained strategic environment, a short-term extension of New START cannot guarantee compliance, especially in the absence of a verification mechanism.
Lastly, the evolving European security posture also poses a challenge amid heightened Russian strategic anxieties. The SIPRI report 2025 revealed that the military spending of all European states apart from Malta increased by 17% in 2024. Earlier in 2022, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries had begun to increase their military forces in the eastern part of the alliance. Several other developments complicate the security environment in Europe, such as Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the French proposal to extend its nuclear umbrella to Europe, and Poland’s interest in hosting American nuclear weapons. These advancements have increased the Russian suspicions towards NATO’s actions and the possibility of a confrontation. Thus, it paints a bleak future for New START despite its extension.
In the end, it can be concluded that the increasing priority of the Americans and Russians towards the extension of New START for one year may be good news for nuclear restraint; however, in the longer run, this development stands on fragile ground. With the Ukraine conflict not yet resolved and with the growing strategic buildup in Europe, the extension of New START appears as a symbolic effort incapable of achieving any substantial success in maintaining the US-Russia strategic stability. Simultaneously, the absence of a robust verification regime further reduces the possibility of mutual compliance under the treaty. Therefore, to save the world from another Cold War-type arms race, the US and Russia must restore trust and resume dialogue before negotiating any lasting framework.
