The official visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam To Lam from October 9–11, 2025, has attracted special attention from international analysts. This is the first visit by a senior Vietnamese leader to Pyongyang in more than 17 years and takes place in a volatile international context. From a strategic perspective, this visit is not only of a normal diplomatic nature but also sends subtle messages from Hanoi to major countries, reflecting Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy” mettle.
International context and bilateral history
Northeast Asia is one of the most complex geopolitical hotspots in the world, where the interests of major powers such as the US, China, Russia, and Japan intersect, while also containing inherent security conflicts revolving around the hostile relationship between the North and the South and the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. While most countries maintain their distance from Pyongyang due to international sanctions, along with North Korea choosing a closed model to ensure regime security, the fact that a Southeast Asian country like Vietnam proactively visits a high-level North Korean cannot be considered a normal diplomatic action. It can only be explained as a strategic move, demonstrating the calculation of the timing and the message that Hanoi wants to send to major countries in the context of power competition that is reshaping the Asia-Pacific region.
Historically, Vietnam-North Korea relations originated from President Ho Chi Minh’s personal relationship with North Korean leader Kim Il-sung and reached their peak when the Vietnam War began (1955-1975), so Pyongyang showed strong support for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) through material aid and military training support. According to research by James F. Durand published in the International Council on Korean Studies, North Korea once sent a squadron to support combat in Vietnam during the period 1967-1968, demonstrating deep ideological ties within the socialist bloc during the Cold War. However, after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, this relationship gradually declined as Vietnam shifted towards international integration, while North Korea chose to maintain a model of self-isolation. Since the early 2000s, relations between the two countries have been restored to normal diplomatic levels, maintaining bilateral delegation exchanges and cooperation within the framework of international forums, but trade turnover remains very limited at only under 10 million USD/year by 2023.
In recent years, North Korea has expressed its desire to expand its diplomatic reach into Southeast Asia as an effort to break its isolation, with Vietnam considered a special partner. Pyongyang sees Vietnam as a “possible model” if it gradually considers economic reform while maintaining political control of the Party. Vietnam, with its successful “Doi Moi” process since 1986, is an attractive model for North Korean leaders. Many observers believe that Hanoi can exchange more experience in its development path with Pyongyang in return for a greater voice in issues related to the Korean Peninsula to expand its international position through the image of a “mediator,” similar to the way Vietnam was chosen by the US as the venue for the 2019 US-North Korea Summit.
Message to America: Independence and autonomy
From the US perspective, Vietnam’s sending of a high-ranking leader to visit North Korea amid the ongoing US-North Korea tensions can be seen as a testament to Hanoi’s trustworthy neutrality. Vietnam does not participate in the West’s “isolate Pyongyang” campaigns but also does not violate any UN nuclear resolutions. This approach helps Vietnam maintain its independence while strengthening the image of a country that can dialogue with all sides without breaking international rules. For Washington, this shows that Hanoi is a trustworthy partner, independent in policy but not disrupting the regional order, and contributing to maintaining strategic balance in Southeast Asia.
Through the visit, Vietnam sent a subtle but strong message that its relationship with the US is a strategic pillar, but Hanoi does not let Washington shape its entire diplomatic space. In the context of a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment towards polarization, maintaining a sufficient distance between major powers is a core factor for Vietnam to preserve its autonomy and flexibility in foreign policy. This is a typical manifestation of the art of soft balancing that Vietnam has consistently pursued over three decades of international integration.
Message to China: Regardless of ideology
China is currently the largest neighboring partner and also the leading economic partner for both Vietnam and North Korea. As a socialist country with a separate development model, Vietnam prioritizes strengthening relations with countries with the same regime but does not allow itself to be bound by the Chinese influence network. Vietnam is actively using the Party channel to maintain and develop friendly relations with North Korea and China, thereby affirming its independent role in the political space of socialist countries.
The visit can also be understood as a strategic balancing signal sent to Beijing. In the context of China’s increasing pressure in the East Sea, Vietnam is showing that its diplomatic space is not limited to Southeast Asia but completely expands its interactions to the Northeast Asia region, showing that Vietnam is capable and willing to build a voice even in places where China is trying to show off its power.
The message sent to Beijing thus has two layers of meaning: on the surface level, it is an expression of friendship and dialogue in the spirit of sharing socialist ideology; but on a deeper level, it is a definitive affirmation that Vietnam is an independent partner, not a “political satellite” in China’s orbit. It is this flexible yet steadfast stance that helps Hanoi maintain a fragile but effective balance between cooperation and competition, between ideological consensus and the protection of national interests.
Message to Russia: Friendship, not confrontation
In fact, General Secretary To Lam’s visit to Pyongyang, which took place shortly after President Vladimir Putin’s visit in June, has attracted special attention from international analysts, especially in the context of Moscow expanding its strategic relations with North Korea. However, according to scholar Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University, Vietnam is maintaining the necessary strategic distance so as not to be classified into any political-military alliance. Vietnam-North Korea cooperation is mainly based on the foundation of traditional friendship and party exchanges, not linked to Moscow’s strategic orbit.
The core message that Hanoi wants to convey to Moscow is stable cooperation based on mutual respect, no alliance, and no confrontation. Vietnam is ready to maintain a practical, friendly, and cooperative relationship with Russia but does not accept any form of binding “security alliance.” The fact that Vietnam has not voiced support for or opposition to the Russia-North Korea treaty is a clear demonstration of the policy of independence, autonomy, and not choosing sides that Hanoi has consistently maintained since the Cold War.
In addition, Vietnam has also proactively sent another positive message that it is ready to play the role of a bridge between Russia and the Southeast Asian region. Through joint energy projects in the East Sea implemented within the framework of international trade and forums such as EAS or ARF, Hanoi wants to affirm that economic cooperation should not be politicized. For Russia, this is an invitation to cooperate based on the principles of mutual respect and avoiding confrontation, thereby maintaining Vietnam’s position as a reliable, stable, and mediating partner in the Southeast Asian regional security structure.
Message to South Korea and Japan: Vietnam is a stable partner.
South Korea and Japan are currently the two pillars in Vietnam’s economic partnership network. Seoul is the largest foreign direct investor with more than 9,500 valid projects and total registered capital exceeding 85 billion USD, while Tokyo is the leading source of bilateral ODA, making important contributions to Vietnam’s infrastructure and energy transition projects. In contrast, both countries maintain a tough stance on Pyongyang and are key links in the US-Japan-Korea trilateral security alliance in Northeast Asia.
In that context, Vietnam’s visit to North Korea has more of a reassuring meaning for these two major partners, because Hanoi wants to demonstrate that strengthening friendly relations with Pyongyang does not harm the interests or cooperative orientation with Seoul and Tokyo, but on the contrary, can open an indirect communication channel to help reduce tensions in the region.
For South Korea, Vietnam is sending a clear message that Hanoi understands and shares the goal of long-term peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and is ready to play the role of an indirect channel when conditions for dialogue between the two Koreas are restored. Vietnam’s proactive engagement with Pyongyang is not a challenge to Seoul but a test of Hanoi’s ability to balance in the complex diplomatic environment of Northeast Asia. With the experience of hosting the 2019 US-North Korea Summit, Vietnam possesses a special advantage in terms of reliability and the ability to maintain political balance, which both Seoul and Washington appreciate.
As for Japan, Vietnam’s visit to Pyongyang reinforces Hanoi’s image as an independent, stable, and non-ideological diplomatic partner—a factor that Tokyo can confidently promote strategic cooperation with. In the eyes of Japanese elites, Vietnam is not only a bridge between ASEAN and Northeast Asia but also a springboard for Tokyo to expand its development and infrastructure influence through initiatives connecting the Mekong sub-region and Northeast Asia. With the ability to dialogue with Pyongyang, Vietnam can play a supporting role in Japan’s humanitarian diplomatic efforts, especially related to the issue of abducted citizens and post-conflict development cooperation if the Korean Peninsula moves towards reconciliation in the future.
At the global level, this visit shows that Vietnam is consolidating a diplomatic model that is different from the majority of ASEAN countries, a model that some scholars call “pragmatic hedging,” demonstrated by the ability to maintain good relations with all parties (even in cases of mutual hostility such as Russia and Ukraine) while not being dependent on any country.
Vietnam’s message to the international community is clear: in a polarized world, Hanoi chooses the role of a bridge, not an arena. The proactive visit to Pyongyang proves that Vietnam can use party diplomacy as a tool to build trust while simultaneously promoting state diplomacy with capitalist powers. This reflects the distinctive foreign policy philosophy of “independence, self-reliance, peace, cooperation, and development,” which has been consistently affirmed through the documents of the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam and will certainly be affirmed even more strongly in the upcoming 14th National Congress taking place in early 2026. In conclusion, General Secretary To Lam’s visit to North Korea carries many layers of strategic messages. In an increasingly divided world, the ability to maintain balanced multilateral relations between major powers is the “most valuable asset” in Vietnam’s foreign policy, helping Vietnam not only protect its national interests but also shape its image as a stabilizing agent in a changing world order.
